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 I 
Abstract 
This thesis studies the effects of thin-capitalization rules on the level and the tax rate 
sensitivity of internal and total debt in foreign affiliates of Norwegian multinationals. In 
response to multinationals’ enhanced opportunities to explore the tax advantages of debt, 
several countries have implemented such rules to protect their corporate tax base. For the 
empirical analysis, we construct a main sample of micro-level panel data on foreign affiliates 
of Norwegian multinationals in European and OECD countries, years 1996 – 2004, as well 
as an extended sample where 25 countries are added and the period extended to 1994 – 2006. 
The data set provides information on total and parent debt, where the latter serves to identify 
the effects on internal debt. 
  
The full samples provide weak evidence of thin-capitalization rules reducing the tax rate 
sensitivity of parent and total debt, and no evidence supporting a direct level effect. Two 
subsamples provide stronger evidence. In a subsample including only the countries that 
implemented a rule during the sample period, a thin-capitalization rule with a safe haven 
ratio of 4:1 is estimated to reduce the parent debt-to-assets ratio by 2.8 – 4.7 percentage 
points, and reduce the tax rate sensitivity of a 10 percentage points increase in the tax rate by 
25% – 40%. A subsample including only firms with the highest parent debt ratios provides 
robust evidence of the same qualitative effects. Neither of the subsamples provides strong 
evidence for the expected effects on total debt.   
 
Identification of the effects of thin-capitalization rules has proven harder on the Norwegian 
data, compared to existing studies on German and US multinationals. To the extent this 
thesis provides evidence, it supports that thin-capitalization rules reduce the use of internal 
debt in affiliates of multinationals, but it only shows limited evidence of reduced total debt 
ratios. 
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 1 
1. Introduction 
It is well documented that the capital structure decision of firms, in general, is distorted 
towards debt financing, as most tax codes allow for interest on debt to be deducted from 
taxable profits. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of equity is usually not tax 
deductible. Multinational companies (MNCs) have enhanced opportunities to explore the tax 
advantages of debt, compared to domestic firms, through the use of internal leverage
1
 and 
international debt shifting (see e.g. Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr, 2004; Huizinga, Laeven, & 
Nicodeme, 2008). Facing different tax rates in the countries they operate, MNCs can shift 
both internal and external debt such that the overall tax savings are maximized (Møen, 
Schindler, Schjelderup, & Tropina, 2011, p. 2). This gives MNCs a competitive advantage 
over domestic firms, as it allows them to lower the effective cost of capital (Schindler & 
Schjelderup, 2012, p. 642). It may also create a bias towards becoming an MNC rather than a 
domestic firm (Bucovetsky & Haufler, 2008).  
 
In addition to hurting domestic competition, the emergence of MNCs may be worrisome for 
the host country, inasmuch as international tax planning can reduce the corporate tax base. 
Credit markets today extend across borders and MNCs may be more likely to issue external 
debt internationally compared to domestic firms. In addition, interest on MNCs’ internal debt 
is paid solely to foreign entities. If tax treaties between countries reduce or abolish 
withholding taxes on international interest payments, the return on capital in affiliates of 
MNCs can be completely tax exempt in the host country
2
 (Buettner et al., 2012, p. 931). 
 
The last few decades’ ongoing globalization of formerly national financial markets, and new 
technology such as the Internet, has substantially lowered the barriers for corporations to 
operate across borders. In combination with the abovementioned benefits of operating 
internationally, this has led to a significant growth in foreign direct investments and the 
emergence of an increasing number of MNCs. In line with this development, the 
consequences of international debt shifting have gained greater attention among policy 
makers, and rules curbing thin-capitalization in affiliates of MNCs have seen the light of day. 
                                                 
1 Internal debt, also known as intracompany debt, is debt provided by another affiliate within the same MNC, e.g. the parent 
of the MNC, or other related parties to the firm such as shareholders. 
2 In fact, it has come to light that multibillion, global corporations such as Apple, Google and Starbucks have been able to 
obtain effective tax rates close to zero on corporate income, while generating huge revenues and benefiting from public 
infrastructure (see e.g. Barford & Holt, 2013). 
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Among such rules are so-called thin-capitalization rules, which are the focus of this thesis. 
Canada was a pioneering country, introducing thin-capitalization rules as early as 1971, 
followed by Australia, Indonesia, the UK and the U.S. in the eighties (Blouin, Huizinga, 
Laeven, & Nicodème, 2014, p. 7). However, widespread adoption took place between the 
mid-nineties and 2005. In that period, the number of OECD countries practicing thin-
capitalization rules increased from about one-third to three-fifths (Ruf & Schindler, 2012, p. 
4). There is no universal way of defining thin-capitalization rules, and thus there is a variety 
of rules around the world. By and large, thin-capitalization rules are aimed at preventing 
MNCs from evading their tax liabilities, by restricting tax deduction of interest on 
international debt. 
 
A crucial point about thin-capitalization rules is how effective they are in accomplishing 
their intent of reducing debt financing and increasing the tax base and tax revenue of the host 
country. If thin-capitalization rules are effective in increasing equity finance, the corporate 
tax base should increase, all else equal. However, if external debt is not restricted, firms may 
respond by substituting external for internal debt (see e.g. Wamser, 2014). The consequence 
for the tax base and tax revenue then depends on whether the debt is issued to domestic or 
foreign investors, and whether the investor is a corporation or a personal taxpayer
3
.  
 
It is clear that there are many factors that determine the ultimate effect of thin-capitalization 
rules on a country’s tax base and tax revenue. Empirical studies have provided evidence that 
thin-capitalization rules are effective in reducing the overall debt levels in affiliates of 
MNCs, suggesting that the direct effect of these rules are increased corporate tax base per se. 
However, it has been pointed out that thin-capitalization rules can also have adverse, indirect 
effects on the corporate tax base, leaving the total effect ambiguous
4
.  
                                                 
3 If internal debt is replaced by external debt issued to a domestic, corporate investor, the corporate tax base and tax revenue 
should increase, even if internal debt is replaced by external debt. If the investor is a personal investor, the corporate tax 
base will not increase, but the total tax base of the host country will increase since the interest income is taxed domestically. 
However, if personal taxes are lower than corporate taxes, the total tax revenue will not increase as much as it would if the 
debt holder is a corporation. If internal debt is replaced by foreign external debt, the consequence may be that neither 
corporate tax base nor total tax base increases, if tax treaties exempt the debt holder from local taxation. 
4 For instance, since restrictions on debt financing increase the effective cost of capital for MNCs, it may reduce 
investments, and thus the total capital base, in countries that impose thin-capitalization rules (Buettner, Overesch, & 
Wamser, 2014, p. 4; Merlo, Riedel, & Wamser, 2014, p. 23). If that is the case, the corporate tax base may not increase by 
imposing thin-capitalization rules, even if a larger share of the capital is taxable. Further, thin-capitalization rules may foster 
tax-competition in order to attract MNCs (Haufler & Runkel, 2012), and it may also increase the incentive to use transfer 
pricing to shift profits out of high-tax countries. 
 3 
The focus of this thesis is the potential direct upside of thin-capitalization rules through 
reduced debt levels in affiliates of MNCs. The aim is not to determine whether or not the tax 
base or tax revenue increases, but to search for evidence of thin-capitalization rules’ 
effectiveness in reducing the use of internal and total debt. In the end, it might be the impact 
on the tax base and tax revenues that are the most important, but an essential first step is to 
reduce debt financing. This thesis is inspired by similar, existing studies on thin-
capitalization rules. Despite the relatively rich literature on the use of debt in MNCs, 
surprisingly few papers have studied the effects of thin-capitalization rules. Earlier studies 
have mainly focused on German or US MNCs, and to the best of our knowledge, this thesis 
is the first to study foreign affiliates of Norwegian MNCs in relation to thin-capitalization 
rules. The research question of this thesis is  
 
Do thin-capitalization rules reduce leverage in foreign affiliates of Norwegian MNCs?  
 
This thesis is mainly inspired by a similar study on German MNCs, by Buettner et al. (2012). 
Our study closely follows that paper, and we partially adopt the same investigation approach. 
Buettner et al. (2012) focus on how thin-capitalization rules impact the use of debt through 
the tax rate sensitivity of debt. This thesis will also study the direct level effect of thin-
capitalization rules, partly inspired by Blouin et al. (2014). Note, however, that the level 
effect is also studied in working paper versions of Buettner et al. (2012)
5
. 
 
The thin-capitalization rules analyzed in this thesis are so-called safe haven rules. These 
rules define a “safe haven” debt-to-equity ratio and deny tax deductions of interest on debt 
that exceeds the defined ratio. Safe haven ratios are usually defined in terms of total debt-to-
equity or internal debt-to-equity, but in both cases it is usually only tax deduction of interest 
on internal debt that is restricted (Buettner et al. 2012, pp. 931-932).  
 
For our empirical analysis, we use information on tax rates and thin-capitalization rules for a 
broad range of countries, including information on safe haven ratios. We address the 
research question by utilizing the variation in the presence and the tightness
6
 of thin-
capitalization rules over time within each country. We have two full samples, where the 
                                                 
5 See Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber, & Wamser (2006, 2008). 
6 The tightness refers to the defined safe haven debt-to-equity ratio: for instance, a ratio of 2:1 is tighter than a ratio of 3:1. 
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main sample includes observations for the same years, 1996 – 2004, and 36 OECD and 
European countries as Buettner et al. (2012). The extended sample is expanded to include all 
years available in the data set, 1994 – 2006, and observations from 25 more countries. In 
addition, we study several subsamples. For instance, a subsample of only the countries that 
implemented a rule and a subsample of the affiliates with the highest debt levels allow us to 
study the effects in the countries and affiliates of most interest. Optimally, we would split 
debt into external, parent and non-parent internal debt. However, our data set only provides 
us with data on parent and total debt, and parent debt thus serves to identify the effects of 
thin-capitalization rules on internal debt.   
 
The empirical analysis of the main sample provides evidence that the tax rate sensitivity of 
both internal and total debt is reduced by thin-capitalization rules, but the results are not 
robust to the extended sample, and we find no evidence of a direct reduction in the level of 
debt. In the subsample of countries that implemented a rule, the parent debt-to-assets ratio is 
estimated to be reduced by 2.8 – 4.7 percentage points, while the tax rate sensitivity, to a 10 
percentage points increase in the tax rate, is estimated to be reduced by 25% – 40%. 
Studying only affiliates with debt levels in the highest quintile, we find further evidence for a 
reduced tax rate sensitivity of parent debt, and the level effect is estimated to be a reduction 
of 3.2 – 4.4 percentage points. In general, we only obtain weak evidence supporting that 
thin-capitalization rules affect the total debt ratio. 
 
This thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 presents related literature on the capital 
structure of MNCs and how it is affected by thin-capitalization rules. Section 3 gives an 
introduction to the main characteristics of thin-capitalization and provides descriptive 
information on how they affect affiliates of MNCs. In Section 4 we present the theoretical 
model which is based on existing theoretical concepts, allowing us to make predictions of 
the effects of thin-capitalization rules on internal debt - including parent debt - and total debt. 
Section 5 provides an outline of our investigation approach and the general regression 
equation of the analysis. Section 6 explains sample restrictions, data calibration, relevant 
variables and descriptive statistics. In Section 7 the results from the main and extended 
sample are first presented, together with a discussion of the results. Next, various subsamples 
are tested to search for further evidence of the effects of thin-capitalization rules. Section 8 
provides our conclusions. 
 5 
2. Literature Review 
This section presents existing literature related to the capital structure decisions of MNCs 
and thin-capitalization rules. The objective is to provide an overview of findings and 
predictions from existing research. First, literature on the general use of debt financing is 
reviewed. Then, we present literature on the tax rate sensitivity of MNCs’ capital structure 
and international debt shifting mechanisms. These topics are important for the understanding 
of the capital structure choice of MNCs in the absence of thin-capitalization rules. Lastly, 
literature directly related to the effects of thin-capitalization rules is presented. As noted by 
Blouin et al. (2014), most studies on the capital structure of MNCs consider the tax 
advantage of debt only regarding variation in tax rates
7
. Consequently, there are relatively 
few papers studying the effects of thin-capitalization rules.  
2.1 Capital Structure and Costs/Benefits of Debt 
Modigliani and Miller are by many seen as the founders of modern thinking on capital 
structure. With their simplest version of the irrelevance theorem, they showed that in a world 
without friction, e.g. taxation and bankruptcy costs, the value of a firm is determined solely 
by its underlying assets, and not by how the assets are financed (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).  
However, they also considered that interest payments on debt were tax deductible at the 
corporate level - known as the debt tax shield - but this issue was addressed more 
specifically in a later paper (Modigliani & Miller, 1963).  
 
In addition to the debt tax shield, firms have to consider other costs and benefits of debt. 
Kraus and Liztenberger (1973) introduced a theory showing that the optimal debt level is 
determined by a trade-off between costs and benefits of debt. The costs and benefits of 
internal and external debt are commonly assumed to differ, but the trade-off theory applies to 
both. 
 
Jensen (1986) argues that external debt can be beneficial, as it helps reducing asymmetric 
information problems and discipline managers. Shareholders and managers may not have 
                                                 
7 See Blouin et al. (2014, p. 3). 
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coinciding interests, and managers can have incentives leading to decisions and spending of 
the firm’s free cash flows in a way not beneficial to shareholders. External debt is thought to 
reduce these problems because debtors will monitor the firms, and interest payments and 
debt repayments will restrict free cash flows. 
 
Myers (1977) argues that typical costs of external debt include debt overhang problems
8
, and 
Robichek & Myers (1966) point to financial distress and reorganization costs as other costs 
of external debt. Several studies have found empirical evidence of bankruptcy and financial 
distress causing direct and indirect costs
9
 (see e.g. Altman (1984) and Betker (1997)). Direct 
costs have been reported to average about 1.5% – 4% of the pre-bankruptcy market value of 
a firm’s assets (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014, p. 544; LoPucki & Doherty, 2004). A study of 
highly leveraged firms by Andrade and Kaplan (1998) estimated a potential impact of 
indirect costs of 10% – 20% of a company’s value.   
 
Unlike external debt, internal debt does not affect the risk of bankruptcy, nor does it 
necessarily restrict the free cash flows of the firm (Schindler & Schjelderup, 2012, p. 638). 
However, the literature points to other costs and benefits. According to Desai et al. (2004, 
pp. 2468-2483) internal debt can be used to mitigate and overcome imperfections in the local 
capital markets. Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) argue that the ownership aspect of 
internal debt makes it easier to redeploy assets of underperforming projects. On the 
downside, facilitating internal debt is assumed to carry a cost, such as setting up an internal 
bank, and it may, in addition, carry concealment costs if rules restricting internal debt usage 
must be circumvented. 
2.2 The Capital Structure of MNCs and International Debt 
Shifting 
Although there is a common belief that taxation has implications for the capital structure, 
early studies of firms’ capital structure found it difficult to prove this. As pointed out by 
Graham (2003) and Auerbach (2002), this may partly be due to measurement problems or 
                                                 
8 A firm is said to have a debt overhang problem when equity-holders are not willing to invest in projects with positive net 
present value, because the face value of the existing debt is higher than the expected payoff from the project.   
9 Direct costs are associated with e.g. hiring outside help such as accounting and legal advisors and consultants. Indirect 
costs are related to loss of customers, suppliers, reputation, etc. 
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lack of variation in tax rates. However, the recent globalization of capital markets have led to 
countries reforming their tax systems - reduced tax rates being the most prominent change - 
and the emergence of many MNCs. As pointed out by Desai et al. (2004, p. 2484), analyzing 
affiliates of MNCs across national boarders has its advantages compared to analysis of 
domestic firms; it attenuate the difficulties in comparing heterogeneous firms measured by 
different accounting standards, and it exploits affiliate-specific variation in local tax 
incentives and capital market conditions. 
 
Compared to domestic firms, affiliates of MNCs have two additional sources of debt; parent 
debt, and internal debt from non-parent entities. Several papers have shown that this enables 
affiliates of MNCs to resort to debt financing to a higher degree than comparable domestic 
firms. One such paper is the beforementioned paper by Desai et al. (2004), studying the 
relationship between the local tax rate and the sources of debt available to affiliates of 
MNCs. Analyzing data from about 3,700 US MNCs for the years 1982, 1989, and 1994, they 
find that the use of both parent and external debt increase with tax rates. In particular, they 
estimate that a 10% increase in the tax rate is associated with a 2.8% increase in an affiliate’s 
total debt-to-assets ratio
10
. Similar results are obtained in a recent working paper by Blouin 
et al. (2014) running an analogous regression on the same data set extended by adding the 
years 1999 and 2004. Being one of the early papers on MNCs capital structure, a weakness 
of Desai et al. (2004) is that it does not include the debt shifting mechanisms that have later 
been pointed out by other papers. Coincidently though, it turns out that a shortcoming of the 
data they use actually might reduce the bias of omitting external debt shifting
11
.  
 
In the rest of this section, we will review literature on two international aspects of the capital 
structure of MNCs; external and internal debt shifting. The standard debt tax shield has 
already been discussed in Section 2.1; it benefits both MNCs and domestic firms, and it is 
driven solely by the local tax rate. 
 
Mintz and Smart (2004) show that internal debt shifting is driven by the maximum tax 
difference between the lowest taxed affiliate and all other affiliates. They study how firms 
                                                 
10 Desai et al. (2004, p. 2452). Examining their results reveals that they probably mean percentage points, even though they 
write %.  
11 The US data set used by Desai et al. (2004) has its drawbacks: back-to-back loans between parent and affiliates, and 
intercompany loans between affiliates other than the parent, is recorded as external debt (Desai et al. 2004, p. 2458). It is 
thus likely that the reported tax rate sensitivity of parent debt is underestimated, all else equal. On the other hand, it will 
reduce the bias of omitting external debt shifting (Møen et al., 2011, p. 4). 
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present in several jurisdictions can use tax-planning strategies to shift income. Since interest 
income from internal debt is taxable at the lending affiliate, their model predicts that the 
internal bank should be located in the lowest taxed jurisdiction. They test their model on 
Canadian firms present in several Canadian Provinces and are able to confirm their 
predictions. They also find that the use of internal debt in an affiliate increases with the 
spread between that affiliate’s tax rate and the lowest taxed affiliate, i.e. the internal bank. 
Buettner and Wamser (2013) confirm a significant effect of the tax rate differentials, but 
they find that the effect is rather small
12
. Based on their findings, they argue that the use of 
internal debt is not necessarily motivated by profit shifting, but rather reflect the 
conventional debt tax shield.  
 
Huizinga et al. (2008) develop a model of external debt shifting, based on a hypothesis that 
the capital structure of an affiliate of an MNC is not only dependent on the local tax rate, but 
also on the tax rate faced by all other affiliates of the MNC, including the parent. For a given 
level of external debt, and thus cost of bankruptcy, it is optimal for the MNC to allocate 
external debt in those affiliates that produce the highest tax savings. An increase in the tax 
rate for one affiliate will incentivize the MNC to take on more external debt in that affiliate. 
At the same time, to keep the overall bankruptcy costs in check, the debt levels in all other 
affiliates should be reduced. External debt shifting thus lets MNCs exploit the external debt 
tax shield more aggressively than domestic firms, without affecting the overall risk of 
bankruptcy. Using firm data from MNCs present in 32 European countries, Huizinga et al. 
(2008) are able to confirm their predictions; if an MNC with two equally sized affiliates, 
located in different countries, experience a 10 percentage points increase in the tax rate in 
one of the countries, the debt-to-assets ratio in that country increases by 2.4 percentage 
points and the ratio is reduced by 0.6 percentage points in the other country
13
. A drawback of 
the empirical work by Huizinga et al. (2008) is that the data they use (Amadeus) does not 
distinguish between internal and external debt. As commented by Møen et al. (2011, p. 5), 
the empirical results may, therefore, be influenced by the use of internal debt, which is not 
controlled for.  
 
                                                 
12 Buettner and Wamser (2013) find that the low tax sensitivity may partly be explained by the German CFC-rules, which 
appear to curb profit shifting from high-tax to low-tax countries.  
13 See Huizinga et al. (2008, p. 81). The results can also be seen in Huizinga et al. (2008, p. 101), Table 8, regression (3).  
 9 
Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg and Winner (2010) find, in accordance to Desai et al. (2004), that 
MNCs resort more to debt financing in general than comparable domestic firms. Based on a 
model that accounts for internal and external debt, including debt shifting, they find the 
average difference in debt-to-assets ratios to be about 1.7 percentage points between 
domestically and foreign owned firms
14
. The difference is found to increase with the 
statutory tax rate, implying that the debt-to-assets ratios of MNCs’ affiliates are more 
sensitive to tax rate changes than comparable domestic firms. In comparison to the other 
abovementioned papers, Egger et al. (2010) apply a different identification strategy by 
explicitly using domestic firms as a reference group. They argue that other papers may suffer 
from their data being a non-random sample of only MNCs
15
.  
 
As is clear from the existing literature, the capital structure of MNCs is sensitive to tax rates, 
and MNCs employ both internal and external debt shifting. However, the papers examined 
so far has omitted either internal or external debt in their models, or been limited by the data 
set at hand. Thus, they have been unable to identify empirically the isolated effect of the 
mechanisms in play and their relative importance.  
 
Møen et al. (2011) develop a model taking all the three mechanisms driving debt into 
account, including the costs and benefits of debt discussed earlier. The model gives several 
important predictions. It shows that firm value is maximized when MNCs shift both external 
and internal debt. The finding is important, as it shows that studies omitting one of them will 
not truly reflect profit-maximization behavior. In addition, they point out that both internal 
and external debt shifting is driven by differences in local tax rates and are thus correlated. 
Empirical testing of models omitting one or the other may, therefore, suffer from an omitted 
variable bias. In accordance to Mintz and Smart (2004), the model by Møen et al. (2011) 
predicts that the internal bank should be located in the lowest taxed jurisdiction to maximize 
firm value
16
. 
 
Møen et al. (2011) test their predictions on a micro-level data set explicitly dividing debt into 
external debt, parent debt, and internal debt from non-parent affiliates. They are able to 
prove their theoretical predictions, and to identify the relative importance of the standard 
                                                 
14 Egger et al. (2010, p. 106), Table 8.  
15 Egger et al. (2010, p. 97). 
16 Møen et al. (2011, p. 9). 
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debt tax shield and international debt shifting. In a hypothetical case of an MNC with equally 
sized affiliates in two countries, they find that a 10 percentage points increase in the tax rate 
for the highest taxed affiliate will give a 4.6 percentage points increase in the debt-to-assets 
ratio of that affiliate, and a decrease of 1.4 percentage points in the other affiliate’s debt-to-
assets ratio
17
. This is a larger effect than reported by Huizinga et al. (2008). Møen et al. 
(2011, p. 23) show that about 40% of the increased debt ratio is due to the standard debt tax 
shield, and about 60% is due to international debt shifting, where internal and external debt 
shifting are of equal importance. Further, they find that the omitted variable bias of omitting 
international debt shifting mechanisms leads to an overestimation of the effect of the 
standard debt tax shield of 140% compared to their preferred estimate
18
.  
2.3 Effects of Thin-Capitalization Rules  
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) study the impact of a tightening of the German 
thin-capitalization rules on internal leverage, in affiliates of MNCs present in Germany. 
They find that the introduction of thin-capitalization rules in 1994 and the tightening in 2001 
seemingly reduced the use of internal debt for the affiliates affected. However, the effects 
found are modest, and it is pointed out that the internal debt-to-assets ratio had a declining 
trend for non-affected affiliates in the same period as well. Further, they find that the limited 
impact of the thin-capitalization rules can partly be explained by a loophole in the German 
legislation, allowing holding companies to have a higher internal debt-to-equity ratio. Lastly, 
the paper finds no evidence for thin-capitalization rules causing reduced investments, 
suggesting that the reduced internal leverage is replaced by either equity or external debt.  
 
Buettner et al. (2012) was the first paper to analyze how thin-capitalization rules affect the 
capital structure in affiliates of MNCs across countries and over time
19
. They use the MiDi 
database, studying foreign affiliates of German MNCs in all OECD countries and some 
additional European countries. The data set allows them to study the effect on non-parent 
internal debt, parent debt and external debt. Buettner et al. (2012, p. 936) find that imposing 
a relatively tight thin-capitalization rule about halves the tax rate sensitivity of internal debt, 
                                                 
17 See Møen et al. (2011, p. 21), Table 3, Column (2) and Møen et al. (2011, p. 23).  
18 Leaving out external debt shifting overestimates the standard debt tax shield effect by 100% and the contribution by 
internal debt shifting by 40%, whilst leaving out internal debt shifting gives a more modest bias of about 9% for the 
standard debt tax shield and 4% for external debt shifting. Møen et al. (2011, pp. 22-23). 
19 Note that the first working paper version of the paper is dated 2006 (Buettner et al., 2006). 
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but increases the tax rate sensitivity of external debt. They thereby qualitatively confirm the 
results of Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008).  Further, they find evidence suggesting 
that the reduced tax rate sensitivity of internal leverage is mainly driven by a reduced tax rate 
sensitivity of parent debt. The reduction in the tax rate sensitivity is found to be larger for 
rules where the safe haven ratio is defined in terms of total debt instead of related party debt. 
In terms of levels, they estimate that implementing a thin-capitalization rule denying interest 
deductions for debt exceeding a debt-to-equity ratio of 2:1, in a host country with a sample 
average tax rate of 34%, decrease the parent debt ratio by 5.5 percentage points if the rules 
are defined in terms of total debt
20
. If the rules are defined by a related party debt-to-equity 
ratio, the decrease can equivalently be estimated to 1.8 percentage points. An important 
implication is thus that rules defining a safe haven debt-to-equity ratio in terms of total debt 
are more effective in reducing the tax incentive for using internal debt. Further, their results 
suggest that the substitution of external debt for internal debt is not complete
21
, resulting in a 
decrease in total leverage, but this is not tested explicitly. Our thesis picks up on this, by 
including total debt as a dependent variable. The effect on total leverage is important, as it 
will determine how effective thin-capitalization rules are in actually increasing a country’s 
tax base.  
  
Blouin et al. (2014, pp. 6-7) criticize Buettner et al. (2012) for not controlling for the direct 
effect of thin-capitalization rules, and thereby potentially confounding the direct level effect 
and the indirect effect through a changed tax rate sensitivity. However, the working paper 
Buettner et al. (2006)
22
 includes the direct effect, and it is found to be insignificant. If the 
direct effect is insignificant, the exclusion of the direct effect in the published paper 
(Buettner et al., 2012) does not necessarily confound their results, and their estimated level 
effect for a given tax rate should be valid. 
 
One of the co-authors of the paper by Buettner et al. (2012) study the substitution effect 
suggested in both Buettner et al. (2012) and Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008). 
Based on the reform of the German thin-capitalization rules, Wamser (2014) analyzes the 
extent to which external debt is substituted for internal debt when firms face binding thin-
                                                 
20Buettner et al.  (2012, p. 936) 
21 According to their results, imposing a safe haven debt-to-equity ratio of 2:1, in a country with the sample average tax 
rate, increases the external debt ratio by 1.4 or 2.8 percentage points, depending on if the safe haven ratio is defined in terms 
of related party debt or total debt, respectively (Buettner et al. (2012, p. 936), Table 5, column 8). 
22 Buettner et al. (2006, p. 21), Table 3, Column (4).  
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capitalization rules. Wamser (2014) confirms that thin-capitalization rules reduce internal 
leverage and that companies seemingly are substituting external for internal debt. More 
importantly, he finds that firms for which the thin-capitalization rules became binding as a 
result of the reform, increase their external debt-to-capital ratio by 5.1 percentage points 
compared to firms for which the rules were not binding
23
. He also confirms that the 
substitution is not complete as the total debt level decreases. These findings are important, as 
they suggest that the substitution effect may limit the effectiveness of thin-capitalization 
rules in increasing the corporate tax base. 
 
A recent working paper by Blouin et al. (2014) studies the effect of thin-capitalization rules 
on affiliates of US MNCs. Blouin et al. (2014) collect a broader and more detailed data set 
on thin-capitalization rules, compared to for instance Buettner et al. (2012), totaling 54 
countries worldwide. Another difference is that they directly study the level effect on debt by 
thin-capitalization rules, as well as the effect on the tax rate sensitivity. They find that thin-
capitalization rules, with a safe haven ratio defined in terms of total debt, on average reduces 
the total debt-to-assets ratio by 1.9 percentage points
24
. A thin-capitalization rule restricting 
loans from the parent reduces the total debt-to-assets ratio by 0.8 percentage points
25
, while 
the parent debt-to-assets ratio is reduced by 6.3 percentage points
26
. Further, they find 
automatically enforced rules to exert stronger impact than discretionary enforced rules
27
.  
                                                 
23 Wamser (2014, p. 775), Table 4, Column 2 (Radius (r= 0.1)).  
24 Blouin et al. (2014, p. 29), Table 4, Column (4). Note that in the paper they write 1.9% (not percentage points), but 
looking at their tables it is apparent that the correct interpretation is percentage points.  
25 Blouin et al. (2014, p. 32), Table 7, Column (1). 
26 Blouin et al. (2014, p. 30), Table 5, Column (4). 
27 Application with discretion may, for instance, be by an arm’s length principle. 
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3. Introduction to Thin-Capitalization Rules 
The aim of this section is to give a brief overview of the characteristics of thin-capitalization 
rules, and how they are designed to curb international tax planning. There are almost as 
many ways of specifying thin-capitalization rules as there are countries applying them. Our 
aim is thus not to describe every possible specification, but rather give a brief overview of 
the most common features and areas of variation. We will also define the type of thin-
capitalization rules analyzed in this thesis, and what assumptions we make about their 
properties.  
3.1 Characteristics of Thin-Capitalization Rules 
A common feature of all thin-capitalization rules is their purpose; to limit excessive use of 
leverage and tax revenue loss from international debt shifting. Dourado and de la Feria 
(2008, p. 2) categorize rules limiting interest deductibility into specific and non-specific 
rules. The main difference is that specific rules directly restrict deduction of interest from 
internal debt, based on a safe haven debt-to-equity ratio, while non-specific rules usually 
restrict tax deduction of interest from all kinds of debt. It is easy to see that specific thin-
capitalization rules are only relevant to MNCs, as internal debt in terms of tax planning is 
beneficial for MNCs only. Non-specific rules, on the other hand, might affect domestic firms 
as well, as the rules consider total debt levels, but countries often offers domestic firms 
leeway such that the rules in practice mainly are relevant for MNCs (Ruf & Schindler, 2012, 
p. 6). The most apparent example of non-specific rules are so called “earnings-stripping 
rules”, denying tax deductibility of interest payments in excess of a defined percentage of 
(usually) EBITDA. 
 
Because of the many different specifications of thin-capitalization rules, and the fact that 
they are not defined by a specific theoretical concept, there is no universal definition of what 
falls under the term “thin-capitalization rules”. For example, Dourado and de la Feria (2008, 
p. 2) claim that earnings-stripping rules are not really thin-capitalization rules, but rather just 
rules having similar effects as “real” thin-capitalization rules. On the other hand, Ruf and 
Schindler (2012, p. 5) find this differentiation “too semantic”. For this thesis, the distinction 
between earnings-stripping rules and thin-capitalization rules is not of concern, as earnings-
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stripping rules were not adopted by any of the countries included in our analysis until 
2008
28,29
. What is described as thin-capitalization rules in this thesis is most similar to what 
has been described as specific thin-capitalization rules.  
 
Common for specific thin-capitalization rules are that they define a maximum amount of 
debt allowable relative to a measure of capital, often called a “safe haven” or “safe harbor” 
ratio. What is not common is precisely how this safe haven ratio is defined. The numerator is 
usually defined as either total debt or total internal debt, but the two measures can also be 
specified in more narrow terms
30
. The denominator in the safe haven ratio is usually a 
measure of the equity of the company
31
, but there is also more than one way to specify 
equity.  
 
Further on, thin-capitalization rules differ among countries in which firms they apply to, how 
the rules are applied, and how excess interest payments are treated
32
. Some countries only 
apply thin-capitalization rules to affiliates where a foreign parent has a substantial direct or 
indirect ownership share, while other countries apply the rules to all affiliates of foreign 
MNCs
33
. Some countries apply the rules automatically, meaning that once the safe haven 
ratio is exceeded the affiliate will be subject to restrictions, while others use discretion in the 
application of the rules, usually by an arm’s length principle. Finally, once an affiliate is 
subject to restrictions, there are mainly two ways to treat excess interest. The first is to 
simply deny tax deduction of interest to all or exceeding debt, and the second is to reclassify 
interest payments as dividends.  
 
                                                 
28 In 2008, Germany replaced it’s specific thin-capitalization rules with earnings-stripping rules, denying deductibility of 
interest expenses exceeding 30% of EBITDA regardless of to what kind of debt (internal or external) the interest is paid 
(Ruf & Schindler, 2012, p. 5). 
29 The U.S thin-capitalization rules, adopted in 1989, leans somewhat towards being earnings-stripping rules. The U.S. rules 
deny tax deduction of interest payments exceeding 50% of EBITDA. However, this only applies if the debt-to-assets ratio 
exceeds a safe haven ratio of 1.5 and if the interest is paid to related parties exempted from U.S. taxation. Thus, these rules 
are not pure earnings-stripping rules, and the preconditions are analogous to specific thin-capitalization rules. We therefore 
treat the U.S. rules as specific TC-rules in our analysis.  Buettner et al. (2012, p. 932) refer to the U.S. rules as “interest-
stripping rules”.   
30 See Blouin et al. (2014, pp. 23-24) Table 1: Characteristics of thin capitalization rules at year-end 2004 for full details 
on the different specifications of safe haven ratios for both internal debt and total debt. 
31 New Zealand defines the safe haven ratio in terms of debt to assets (Smith & Dunmore, 2005, p. 8). 
32 Even more sources of variation exist. Readers are referred to the papers by Bloiun et al. (2014) and Dourado and de la 
Feria (2008) for more detailed reviews of thin-capitalization rules on a per country basis.  
33 For instance, the US and Denmark applies thin-capitalization rules only to affiliates where the parent has an ownership 
share of at least 50%, while the rules in Belgium and Switzerland applies to all affiliates.  
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Due to the great variety of specifications of thin-capitalization rules, we have to make 
simplifying assumptions to be able to produce a well-defined theoretical framework and 
predictions for the empirical analysis. We do that by summarizing the most important, 
common characteristics of the rules; they define a maximum allowable debt-to-equity ratio, 
and put restrictions on the tax deductibility of interest on internal debt if that ratio is 
exceeded
34
. This will be applied as the definition of thin-capitalization rules for the 
remainder of this thesis.  
3.2 Effects on the Capital Structure 
We now turn to the impacts of thin-capitalization rules on MNCs’ capital structure. This 
section aims at providing a basic intuition, while the effects are formalized in a theoretical 
model in the following theory section. By restricting the tax deductibility of interest on 
internal debt, thin-capitalization rules should affect the optimal level and the tax rate 
sensitivity of internal debt in restricted firms, i.e. affiliates with debt ratios above the safe 
haven ratio. However, an important determinant of the effectiveness of the rules is whether 
or not there exist loopholes to partly circumvent the rules (Ruf & Schindler, 2012, p. 3).  
 
For the case where there are no loopholes, often called strictly binding thin-capitalization 
rules, interest expenses become nondeductible as soon as the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio 
is exceeded. In other words, the debt tax shield from internal debt drops to zero and the 
marginal concealment costs increase to infinity for every unit of debt above the allowable 
amount. Efforts to employ more internal debt are then not profitable. Firms facing binding 
thin-capitalization rules are thus incentivized to reduce their debt-to-equity ratio until it 
equals the safe haven ratio. A tightening of the rules by reducing the safe haven debt-to-
assets ratio should further reduce the internal debt level in affiliates affected by the rules. 
Since the debt tax shield is capped at the safe haven ratio, firms will not find it profitable to 
increase the amount of internal debt in response to an increase in the tax rate. The tax rate 
sensitivity of internal debt should thus be zero for firms restricted by strictly binding rules. 
Firms that have debt-to-equity ratios below the defined safe haven ratio should not be 
affected by the rules. 
                                                 
34 Our definition is in line with how thin-capitalization rules are usually defined and treated in existing papers on thin-
capitalization rules (see e.g. Buettner et al., 2012; Overesch & Wamser, 2010; Ruf & Schindler, 2012; Wamser, 2014; 
Weichenrieder & Windischbauer, 2008).  
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When there are loopholes available to partly circumvent the thin-capitalization rules, the 
effects of the rules may be weaker. Loopholes allow for interest expenses on internal debt to 
remain tax deductible, even when the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio is exceeded. However, 
exploration of loopholes is assumed to be costly, as it requires extra concealment efforts, and 
consequently the cost of internal debt increases. Compared to the case with strictly binding 
thin-capitalization rules, firms facing restrictions may in the case with loopholes not find it 
optimal to reduce their internal debt levels all the way down to the safe haven debt-to-equity 
ratio. However, because of the increased costs of debt, restricted firms should find it optimal 
to reduce their use of internal debt to some extent. The optimal debt level will be somewhere 
between the case with strictly binding rules and no rules. Since the debt tax shield remains 
positive in the case with loopholes, the tax rate sensitivity of internal debt will also stay 
positive. However, because of the increased concealment costs, firms should not find it 
profitable to increase the amount of internal debt as much as they would in the absence of a 
thin-capitalization rule. The tax rate sensitivity is thus reduced even when there are 
loopholes, but it should not drop to zero, as was the case with strictly binding rules. 
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4. Theoretical Framework 
This section aims at presenting the underlying theoretical model of our empirical analysis. 
This thesis is concentrated on a small part of the capital structure literature, and will in 
accordance be focused on the theoretical impacts of thin-capitalization rules on optimal 
leverage. We build our model by combining theory and models presented in existing work. 
The result is a theoretical model that, by and large, is similar to the theoretical model 
underlying the empirical analysis by Buettner et al. (2012)
35
. However, we choose a slightly 
different approach and make some other assumptions, but the fundamental concepts and 
theoretical predictions are coinciding.  
 
The thin-capitalization rules in focus of this thesis are assumed only to have an impact on the 
optimal level of internal debt
36
. However, as has been stressed earlier, thin-capitalization 
rules may have an indirect effect on the use of external debt as firms may substitute internal 
for external debt when internal debt is restricted. This is discussed at the end of this section.  
4.1 Theoretical Model 
The model of international debt shifting by Møen et al. (2011, Section 2) serves as our base 
model to determine the optimal capital structure of MNCs
37
. We adapt their main 
assumptions, but in contrast to Møen et al. (2011), we exclude external debt shifting from 
our model. This is done to achieve a simpler and tidier model. The exclusion of external debt 
shifting has no implication for the theoretical predictions, as we assume thin-capitalization 
rules only to affect internal leverage. Compared to the full model by Møen et al. (2011), 
excluding external debt shifting is the equivalent to assuming that the parent does not 
guarantee for external debt, i.e. the overall bankruptcy cost, 𝐶𝑓 , is zero.  
 
The model is formed by defining an MNC as a company resident in country p with fully 
owned affiliates in 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑛 countries. It is assumed that the parent company is a holding 
                                                 
35 The theoretical framework is elaborated in more detail in a working paper version (Buettner et al., 2008) of the published 
paper. 
36 Note that there exist rules that also restrict the use of external debt. The effect on external debt by such rules should be 
analogous to the effect on internal debt by rules only restricting internal debt (Ruf & Schindler, 2012, p. 7).  
37 Note that the model by Møen et al. (2011) is in turn inspired by other work.  
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company and has direct ownership in its affiliates. We relax the assumption of direct 
ownership to also include indirectly owned affiliates. Our claim is that the ultimate decision 
lies at the parent of the MNC, regardless of whether the affiliate is directly owned or 
controlled via an ownership chain
38
.  
 
Each affiliate produces a homogenous good by the production function 𝑦𝑖 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖) where 𝐾𝑖 
denotes total capital and the sales price is normalized to unity, i.e. 𝑝 = 1. Capital can be 
provided from three sources; equity, external debt, and internal debt. External debt is 
assumed to be debt provided by non-related parties. Internal debt is debt coming from the 
parent company or other affiliates within the same MNC. The parent provides affiliate 𝑖 with 
the needed equity to obtain the optimal, tax-efficient capital structure.  The capital structure 
of affiliate 𝑖 can be written as 
 
𝐾𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐼 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐸   where  𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
      𝐷𝑖
𝐼 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
      𝐷𝑖
𝐸 = 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
 
The rental cost of capital is taken as exogenous and equal to 𝑟 > 0 (i.e. small country 
assumption) and we assume an arm’s length principle to apply such that the interest rate on 
internal and external debt is equal
39
. In line with most real world tax regimes, the rental cost 
of debt is assumed to be tax deductible, while the opportunity cost of equity is not
40
. Debt is 
thus tax-favored compared to equity. MNCs benefit from the debt tax shield of both external 
and internal debt. The debt tax shield is determined by the rental cost of debt, 𝑟, and the tax 
rate, 𝑡 𝑖, and is from an affiliate’s point of view defined as  
 
𝑡 𝑖 𝑟  𝐷𝑖       where     𝐷𝑖 =  𝐷𝑖
𝐼 , 𝐷𝑖
𝐸  
 
                                                 
38 In the empirical analysis, we test if this assumption impacts the results. 
39 By the small country assumption, we assume 𝑖𝐸 = 𝑟𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦. Further, firms may have incentives to set the interest rate on 
internal debt above the interest reate on external debt (market value) to shift profits out of high taxed countries. The arm’s 
length principal is a restriction to prevent firms from setting the interest rate on internal debt above the market value. We 
thus assume the maximum value of interest on internal debt to be equal to the interest on external debt, 𝑖𝐼 = 𝑖𝐸. We 
therefore assume 𝑖𝐼 = 𝑖𝐸 = 𝑟𝐸𝑞 = 𝑟. 
40 Note that in countries with corporate tax systems such as “allowance for corporate equity” (ACE) or Comprehensive 
business income tax (CBIT), the differential treatment of debt and equity will to a large extent be eliminated (De Mooij & 
Devereux, 2011). 
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The optimal levels of debt are determined by a trade-off between the tax shield benefit of 
debt, and other costs and benefits of debt
41
. Thus, the cost functions of internal42 and 
external debt, 𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) and 𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) respectively, are included in the model. The functions are 
defined as
43
  
 
𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) =
𝜂
2
∙ (𝑏𝑖
𝐼)2 ∙ 𝐾𝑖  ,  if   𝑏𝑖
𝐼 > 0 ,          and   𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) = 0,   if   𝑏𝑖
𝐼 ≤ 0    (1) 
𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) =
𝜇
2
∙ (𝑏𝑖
𝐸 − 𝑏∗)2 ∙ 𝐾𝑖 −
𝜇
2
∙ (𝑏∗)2 ∙ 𝐾𝑖    (> 0)      (2) 
𝐶(𝑏𝑖
𝐼 , 𝑏𝑖
𝐸) = 𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) + 𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)           (3) 
 
where 𝑏𝑖
𝐼 =
𝐷𝑖
𝐼
𝐾𝑖
  and 𝑏𝑖
𝐸 =
𝐷𝑖
𝐸
𝐾𝑖
  are the internal and external debt-to-assets ratios respectively, 
𝑏∗ is the optimal external debt-to-assets ratio in absence of taxation, and 𝜂 and 𝜇 are positive 
constants. Except for the debt tax shield and the costs of debt, the model assumes perfect 
capital markets.  
 
Equation (3) illustrates that the cost functions of external and internal debt are assumed to be 
additively separable. This assumption is commonly adopted in models on capital structure, 
based on some fundamental differences between the cost of internal and external debt (see 
e.g. Schindler & Schjelderup, 2012, p. 638), but hinges to some degree on assuming perfect 
capital markets
44
. Further, the assumption is in line with the workings of thin-capitalization 
rules restricting only internal leverage, and it allows for clear theoretical predictions based 
on thin-capitalization rules’ effect on the cost of internal debt.  
 
  
                                                 
41 Costs and benefits of debt were reviewed in Section 2.1. 
42 We assume costs of internal debt to be positive, though low, even in the absence of thin-capitalization rules. The 
alternative case, 𝐶𝐼 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑖
𝐼 > 0, would imply 100% internal debt financing as internal debt always would be cheaper 
than external debt and equity, and have no offsetting cost.  
43 Note that these cost functions are net cost functions. 
44 Desai et al. (2004) argue that separability only holds in perfect capital markets; if internal debt is a substitute for external 
debt in imperfect capital markets, the two kinds of debt will depend on each other.    
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The cost functions of both internal and external debt are assumed to be convex in the debt-
to-assets ratios. The properties of the cost functions can be summed as follows 
 
𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) > 0,  with  𝐶𝐼′(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) > 0,   𝐶𝐼′′(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)  > 0,   if  𝑏𝑖
𝐼 > 0   (4) 
𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) = 0,  with  𝐶𝐼′(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)  = 0,      if  𝑏𝑖
𝐼 ≤ 0   (5) 
𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) > 0,  with  𝐶𝐸 ′(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) > 0,   𝐶𝐸′′(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)  > 0,   if  𝑏𝑖
𝐸 ≥ 𝑏∗   (6) 
    𝐶𝐸 ′(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) < 0,   𝐶𝐸′′(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)  > 0,   if  𝑏𝑖
𝐸 < 𝑏∗   (7) 
 
On the affiliate level, the true economic profit, 𝜋𝑖
𝑒 , taxable profit, 𝜋𝑖
𝑡, and after-tax profit, 
𝜋𝑖 , of affiliate 𝑖 is defined as 
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑒 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖) − [𝑟 + 𝐶
𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) + 𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)] ∙ 𝐾𝑖          (8) 
𝜋𝑖
𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖) − 𝑟 ∙ [𝐷𝑖
𝐼 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐸] − [𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) + 𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)] ∙ 𝐾𝑖        (9) 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 = 𝜋𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑡𝑖𝜋𝑖
𝑡                       
      = (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ 𝐹(𝐾𝑖) − 𝑟 ∙ 𝐾𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 ∙ [𝐷𝑖
𝐼 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐸] − (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ [𝐶
𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) + 𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)] ∙ 𝐾𝑖  (10) 
 
Note that we assume the costs of internal and external debt to be tax deductible, implying 
that the costs are tangible costs showing up on the income statement for corporate taxation
45
. 
The assumption does not change the qualitative results, compared to e.g. Møen et al. (2011), 
but it will theoretically lead to higher levels of debt as it implies a tax subsidy on the costs of 
debt. 
 
Given the cost functions of debt, and the profit functions on the affiliate level, the MNC 
employ equity and debt such that the overall value of the MNC is maximized. In a static, 
one-period model, total profits and the value of the MNC are identical, and can be written as
46
 
 
Π𝑀𝑁𝐶 = 𝑉
𝐿 = ∑ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿
𝑖 = ∑ (𝜋𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝜋𝑖
𝑡)𝑖         (11) 
                                                 
45 Assumption in accordance with Schindler and Schjelderup (2012, p. 639). The assumption deviates from Møen et al. 
(2011) and Huizinga et al. (2008), who assume the costs not to be tax deductible. Huizinga et al. (2008, p. 94) argue that 
bankruptcy costs are induced by loss making firms, and cannot be credited against profits earned elsewhere in the MNC. 
Møen et al. (2011, p. 7) argue that the assumption is necessary for deriving well-defined structural equations for their 
empirical model of international debt shifting, though admitting the assumption may be strong. We would argue that some 
costs do show up in the income statement, such as concealment costs, and the stronger assumption of non-deductibility is 
not needed for our model to yield well-defined equations and predictions. From the first order conditions it can be seen that 
the choice of either assumption does not affect the results qualitatively. 
46 As has been mentioned earlier, we have omitted external debt shifting from our model. Equation (11) and (12) thus 
deviates from the corresponding equation by Møen et al. (2011, p. 8) by omitting the overall bankruptcy cost on the parent 
level, 𝐶𝑓.  
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Maximizing the value of the MNC yields the following optimization problem 
 
max
𝐷𝑖
𝐼,𝐷𝑖
𝐸
Π𝑀𝑁𝐶  
 
= ∑ {(1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ 𝐹(𝐾𝑖)𝑖 − 𝑟 ∙ 𝐾𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 ∙ [𝐷𝑖
𝐼 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐸] − (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ [𝐶
𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) + 𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)] ∙ 𝐾𝑖}   (12) 
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝑟 ∙ 𝐷𝑖
𝐼 = 0
𝑖
 
 
Note the constraint that the sum of all interest on internal debt must equal zero. This is 
intuitive, as interest paid to internal debt in affiliate 𝑖 is earned as interest income in another 
affiliate 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. The total must thus sum up to zero. Solving the maximization problem yields 
the following first-order conditions (FOC) for the optimal levels of internal and external 
debt
47
: 
  
FOC Internal debt:       (𝑡𝑖 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼 ≥ 0   ∀ 𝑖             (13) 
FOC External debt:        𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙
𝜕𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸 > 0                  ∀ 𝑖              (14) 
 
As shown by equation (13) and (14), the optimal debt structure of the MNC is found by 
balancing the debt tax shields (Left Hand Side, LHS) against the marginal costs of debt 
(Right Hand Side, RHS). The resulting first-order conditions have several important 
implications. One is that it is optimal for affiliates of MNCs to employ both internal and 
external debt, given that 𝑟 > 0 and 𝑡𝑖 > 0. Since we have excluded external debt shifting, 
the first-order condition for external debt is exactly the same for an affiliate of an MNC as 
for a comparable domestic firm, but the affiliate of the MNC will still have more total debt 
due to internal borrowing.  
 
Before moving on, an examination of the first-order condition of internal debt is needed. 
First, notice the Lagrange parameter 𝜆. It represents the shadow price of shifted interest 
expenses, caused by the fact that the lending affiliate pays tax on the interest income from 
internal debt. It can be shown that 𝜆 should be chosen such that 𝜆 = min𝑖 𝑡𝑖 to maximize the 
overall value of the MNC
48
. In other words, the tax efficient set-up is to choose the lowest 
taxed affiliate as the internal bank, and that affiliate should be the only one lending money.  
                                                 
47 See appendix A for complete derivation of the first-order conditions. 
48 See Schindler and Schjelderup (2012, p. 645), Appendix A for proof.  
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Since our internal debt related dependent variable is parent debt – a special case of internal 
debt – we need to address an issue regarding parent debt. Following the abovementioned 
logic behind 𝜆 = min𝑖 𝑡𝑖, there should be no internal lending between the parent and other 
affiliates, if the parent is not the lowest taxed entity in the MNC. The Norwegian parents in 
our data set are not likely to be the lowest taxed affiliate in the MNCs, since many countries 
have lower tax rates than Norway. Despite this, the data set shows extensive use of parent 
debt. Several other studies also show that parent debt is indeed employed, even if the parent 
is located in a high-tax country
49
. Imperfect external capital markets and institutional 
environments have been pointed out as possible reasons for why parent debt is employed 
(Aggarwal & Kyaw, 2008, p. 409)
50
. Another reason might be presence of CFC-rules in the 
home country of the MNC
51
.  The focus of this thesis is internal debt in general, and it is not 
within the scope of this thesis to solve what some authors call the ”parent debt puzzle” (see 
e.g. Møen, Schindler, Schjelderup, & Bakke, 2012; Niesten-Dietrich, 2014). However, we 
find it important to have a brief discussion of parent debt before moving on with the 
theoretical predictions. 
 
Existing literature have pointed out that parent debt, when financed by external debt, may be 
a substitute for external debt at the affiliate level, simply rerouting external debt from 
external creditors to affiliates via the parent company (see e.g. Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, 
2010). The argument is that this is a more credible way for the parent to commit to the debt, 
which in turn lowers the credit spread on external debt
52
. Further, Buettner et al. (2008, p. 6) 
argue that parent debt is more likely to be financed by external debt if the parent is not 
located in a low-tax country, because the potential tax burden on the interest income could 
otherwise be substantial. Since Norway is not a low-taxed country, it may be more realistic 
to assume parent debt to be financed by external debt. 
 
 
                                                 
49 See e.g. the descriptive statistics in Buettner et al. (2012, p. 935) and Blouin et al. (2014, p. 25). 
50 For a comprehensive review of literature on parent debt, see Niesten-Dietrich (2014), section 3. 
51 The Norwegian CFC rules limit the use of internal banks by taxing profits from affiliates at the tax rate faced by the 
parent, if the affiliate faces an effective tax rate lower than 2/3 of the Norwegian tax rate (Schjelderup et al., 2006, p. 106). 
Norway has had CFC-rules since 1992  (Schjelderup et al., 2006, p. 103). 
52 An alternative approach presented in existing literature is that the affiliate directly takes on external debt and parent 
guarantees for the debt (see e.g. Huizinga et al. 2008, p. 94). However, some argue that taking on the external debt at the 
parent level serves as a more credible commitment, reducing the credit spread.  
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By looking at equation (13), it can be seen that lending from the parent to a lower taxed 
affiliate actually carries a negative debt tax shield, because 𝜆 > 𝑡𝑖. However, if parent debt is 
financed by external debt, the interest income at the parent will be offset by the 
corresponding interest cost. This means that the shadow price of shifted interest on debt, 𝜆, 
will be reduced to zero, as the tax burden at the parent is not increased. Further, if parent 
debt is financed by external debt, Møen et al. (2012, p. 4) argue that the agency costs and 
benefits of parent debt should qualitatively be the same as for external debt, if the parent 
monitors the affiliate closely. By the arguments stated above, a more realistic first-order 
condition for parent debt may then be
53
 
 
𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙
𝜕𝐶𝑃(𝑏𝑖
𝑃)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝑃 > 0   ∀ 𝑖                    (15)  
 
where 𝑏𝑖
𝑃is the share of parent debt over total assets. The first-order condition for parent debt 
(equation 15) differs from the previously stated first-order condition for internal debt 
(equation 13). However, qualitatively, the debt tax shields in the two equations are the same; 
they both increase in the host country’s tax rate. In addition, even though the agency costs 
may differ, the concealment costs of internal debt, which will increase with thin-
capitalization rules
54
, should be the same for parent debt and non-parent internal debt. This 
means that the tax rate sensitivity and the effects of thin-capitalization rules should 
qualitatively be analogous for non-parent internal debt and parent debt, even if we were to 
assume parent debt to be financed by external debt. For the continuation of the theoretical 
predictions, we therefore employ the first-order condition for internal debt stated by equation 
(13) as the first-order condition for internal debt in general. The important take-away is that 
the predictions we yield in the following subsections are not dependent on this choice, and 
that our analysis should be valid in identifying the effects of thin-capitalization rules on 
internal debt in general, even though our dependent variable is parent debt
55
.  
 
Having defined the first-order conditions for the optimal levels of internal and external debt, 
it can be determined how the debt ratios are affected by changes in the tax rate, i.e. the tax 
                                                 
53 The presented first-order condition for parent debt is simplified for the sake of the argument. For a more advanced model, 
see Møen et al. (2012, section 2). 
54 The effects of thin-capitalization rules on internal debt are examined in section 4.3. 
55 It is also important to be able to predict the effect on total internal debt, i.e. internal debt in general, to be able to predict 
the effect on total leverage. 
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rate sensitivity of internal and external debt. Implicitly differentiating the first-order 
conditions yields the following tax rate sensitivities
56
 
 
𝑑𝑏𝑖
𝐼
𝑑𝑡𝑖
=
𝑟 + 𝜕𝐶𝐼 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼⁄
(1−𝑡𝑖) ∙ (𝜕
2𝐶𝐼 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼2⁄ )
 > 0                       (16) 
 
𝑑𝑏𝑖
𝐸
𝑑𝑡𝑖
=
𝑟 + 𝜕𝐶𝐸 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸⁄
(1−𝑡𝑖) ∙ (𝜕
2𝐶𝐸 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸2⁄ )
 > 0                     (17) 
 
Based on the maximization problem hitherto presented, and its resulting first-order 
conditions, we can draw some conclusions of how the tax rate is related to internal and 
external debt in affiliates of MNCs in the absence of thin-capitalization rules. It is clear that 
the tax rate sensitivity of both is positive. Higher taxed affiliates will have higher levels of 
both internal and external debt than comparable, lower taxed affiliates, due to the higher 
value of the debt tax shield. An increase in the tax rate will increase the value of the debt tax 
shield of both internal and external debt. Looking at equations (13) and (14), this implies an 
increase of the LHS. This in turn means that the levels of debt should increase to restore the 
balance between the marginal costs of debt and the debt tax shield. This is confirmed by 
equations (16) and (17), showing a positive tax rate sensitivity of both internal and external 
debt. In addition, since we assume costs of debt to be tax deductible, an increase in the tax 
rate also affects the RHS of the first-order conditions (equation 13 and 14) as it increases the 
tax subsidy on the costs of debt, reinforcing the positive tax rate sensitivity of debt.  
4.2 The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules 
This section now turns to how thin-capitalization rules impact the capital structure decision. 
Again, we stress that we assume thin-capitalization rules to only have an effect on internal 
debt. Thus, the results for the optimal level of external debt and its tax rate sensitivity stated 
above holds under thin-capitalization rules. 
 
Recall from Section 3.2 that thin-capitalization rules are either strictly binding or possible to 
circumvent to some degree due to loopholes. In Buettner et al. (2012, Section 4) thin-
capitalization rules are modeled as strictly binding. In contrast, we chose to model thin-
                                                 
56 See Appendix A for complete derivation of the tax rate sensitivity. 
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capitalization rules as non-strictly binding, i.e. we allow for loopholes. We find it more 
likely that rules offer some leeway rather than being 100% strictly binding. As explained in 
Section 3.2., and shown below, this assumption does not change the qualitative predictions; 
the level of internal debt and the tax rate sensitivity should still be reduced. However, 
quantitatively the effects will be smaller, as the tax rate sensitivity will remain positive, and 
affiliates will not have the same incentive to reduce the debt level all the way down to the 
threshold.  
 
As stated in Section 3.2, exploring loopholes allows for the debt tax shield to stay positive 
even when the debt ratio exceeds the safe haven ratio, but it is assumed to be costly. To 
incorporate the additional costs, we add an argument, 𝛼𝑖, to the cost function of internal debt. 
The 𝛼𝑖 represents how strictly the thin-capitalization rules are applied, i.e. how difficult it is 
to circumvent the rules, and it can be seen as a positive shock on the marginal cost of 
internal debt. 𝛼𝑖 takes the value of zero if there is nothing enforcing the thin-capitalization 
rules, i.e. in practice no rule apply, and increase towards infinity with how strict the rules are 
enforced. We redefine the cost of internal debt and its first-order condition as 
 
Cost function of internal debt: 
𝐶𝐼 = 𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼 , 𝛼𝑖)                       (18) 
with   
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝛼𝑖
> 0,  
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
(𝜕𝛼𝑖)
2  > 0,  
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼𝜕𝛼𝑖
 > 0  if  𝑏𝑖
𝐼 > 𝑏𝑖?̅?    (19) 
with   
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝛼𝑖
= 0,  
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
(𝜕𝛼𝑖)
2 = 0,  
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼𝜕𝛼𝑖
> 0    if  𝑏𝑖
𝐼 = 𝑏𝑖?̅?   (20)
 with   
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝛼𝑖
= 0,  
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
(𝜕𝛼𝑖)
2 = 0,  
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼𝜕𝛼𝑖
= 0    if  𝑏𝑖
𝐼 < 𝑏𝑖?̅?   (21) 
 
First-order condition for optimal internal debt: 
(𝑡𝑖 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼   ∀ 𝑖                     (22) 
       with  
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼 >
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼   if  𝛼𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖
𝐼 ≥ 𝑏𝑖?̅?               (23) 
 
where 𝑏𝑖?̅? is the safe haven debt-to-assets ratio. Examining the equation above, it can be seen 
that the case of 𝛼𝑖 = 0 is the equivalent of not having thin-capitalization rules, as equation 
(18) then is the same as equation (1). Further, equation (21) shows that the strictness of the 
rules does not increase the cost of internal debt as long as the debt ratio of an affiliate is 
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below the safe haven ratio. The theoretical outcome is that the level of internal debt is 
unaffected by thin-capitalization rules, and it responds to changes in the tax rate as if no rule 
is in place.  
 
The more interesting case to examine is affiliates with debt ratios above the defined safe 
haven ratio. These are the affiliates that we, and governments imposing thin-capitalization 
rules, are the most interested in. From equation (23) it is clear that the thin-capitalization 
rules cause the marginal costs of internal debt to increase for these affiliates, and the second 
derivative in equation (19) shows that the costs increase progressively with the strictness of 
the rules. This means that the marginal costs of internal debt will equal the internal debt tax 
shield at a lower level of debt when the firm is restricted. Said slightly different, the level of 
internal debt is expected to decrease by the imposition of a thin-capitalization rule. Using 
comparative statistics, this can formally be shown by 
 
𝑑𝑏𝑖
𝐼
𝑑𝛼𝑖
= −
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖) (𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼𝜕𝛼𝑖)⁄
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖) (𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
2
⁄
< 0 57  if   𝑏𝑖
𝐼 > 𝑏𝑖?̅?                   (24) 
 
Equation (24) confirms that thin-capitalization rules should reduce the level of internal debt 
in affiliates where the debt ratio exceeds the safe haven ratio. The equation also states that 
the stricter the rules are enforced, the more it will reduce the internal debt ratio.  
 
The thin-capitalization rules will also impact the tax rate sensitivity of internal debt. Because 
of the loopholes, the value of the internal debt tax shield increases with the tax rate as if no 
rules were in place, but, as shown in equation (23), the corresponding marginal costs 
increase more when there is a rule. Thus, the resulting increase in internal debt from a rise in 
the tax rate will be lower with a thin-capitalization rule in place, i.e. the tax rate sensitivity is 
reduced. Note, however, that even though the tax rate sensitivity is lowered, it is still 
positive. Formally, this can be seen below by comparing the tax rate sensitivity of internal 
debt when there is a thin-capitalization rule in place, to the case without a rule  
 
𝑑𝑏𝑖
𝐼
𝑑𝑡𝑖
=
𝑟+𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼⁄
(1−𝑡𝑖) ∙ [𝜕
2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) (𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼⁄ )2]
>
𝑟+𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼⁄
(1−𝑡𝑖) ∙ [𝜕
2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖) (𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼⁄ )2]
> 0      (25) 
                                                 
57 The expression is negative since both the numerator (equation 19) and denominator (compare equation 26 and 4) is 
positive.  
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since  
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼 >
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼  ,      
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼,𝛼𝑖)
(𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
2 ≫
𝜕2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
(𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
2       (26) 
 
The tax rate sensitivity is further reduced the stricter the rules are applied. In other words, the 
tax rate sensitivity is declining in 𝛼𝑖. As a final remark, note that strictly binding thin-
capitalization rules are the equivalent of assuming that the application of thin-capitalization 
rules is infinitely strict, in other words that 𝛼𝑖 → ∞.  
4.3 Thin-Capitalization Rules in Relation to Total Debt  
Our model assumes that thin-capitalization rules have no direct effect on external debt. 
Given that thin-capitalization rules reduce internal leverage, it is thus implied that total debt 
also will be reduced. However, as was mentioned in the literature review, thin-capitalization 
rules may have an indirect effect on external debt if firms substitute external for internal debt 
when internal debt is restricted. In Section 3, it was assumed that interest on external debt 
remains fully tax deductible under thin-capitalization rules, while the incentive to use 
internal debt is reduced. Facing the changed tax incentives of debt, MNCs must consider the 
overall costs and benefits of debt. If external and internal debt has some identical costs and 
benefits, MNCs may find it profitable to replace internal with external debt when facing 
thin-capitalization rules (Wamser, 2014, pp. 768-769). The degree of substitution thus 
depends on to what extent internal and external debt serve the same purpose and carry the 
same costs
58
. For instance, Wamser (2014, p. 769) argues that the benefit of debt restricting 
free cash flows is common for internal and external debt.  
 
The costs and benefits of internal and external debt do have some fundamental differences, 
meaning that complete substitution is unlikely. This has also been confirmed in empirical 
studies (Buettner et al., 2012; Wamser, 2014). The takeaway for our empirical analysis is 
thus that we should expect total debt ratios to decrease when thin-capitalization rules are 
introduced, but the decrease in total debt may be less pronounced than the decrease in parent 
debt because of the possible substitution effect.  
                                                 
58 We assume costs of internal and external debt to be additively separable, and that there are some fundamental differences 
in the cost and benefits of internal and external debt. However, that does not mean that the costs and benefits are entirely 
different.  
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4.4 Theoretical Predictions 
The theoretical discussion of how thin-capitalization rules impact the capital structure of 
MNCs gives us the following predictions to bring into our empirical analysis: 
 
Affiliates with internal debt ratios below the safe haven ratio should not be affected by thin-
capitalization rules. Their debt levels should react to changes in the tax rate as if no rule 
were in place, i.e. the debt levels are expected to increase with the tax rate. 
 
Affiliates with internal debt ratios above the safe haven ratio should reduce their levels of 
internal debt if a thin-capitalization rule is introduced. The internal debt level is expected to 
react weaker to changes in the tax rate, i.e. their tax rate sensitivity should be reduced. The 
decrease in internal debt, and the tax rate sensitivity, should be larger the stricter the rules 
are enforced.  
 
External debt should not be directly impacted by thin-capitalization rules, but may be 
indirectly affected by a substitution effect. If that is the case, external debt may increase. The 
substitution is not likely to be complete, and thus total leverage of restricted affiliates is 
expected to decrease, but the decrease might be modest.   
 
 29 
5. Investigation Approach 
Equipped with the theoretical predictions from Section 4, we now turn to testing these 
predictions empirically. At hand, we have a panel data set containing affiliate-level 
financials for a selection of Norwegian MNCs
59
. In addition, we have collected information 
about each country’s corporate tax rates, and safe haven ratios for countries with thin-
capitalization rules. Together, the collected data gives us three main sources of variation. 
First, there is variation in corporate taxation. The tax rates differ both within and across 
countries over time. The other two sources of variation are the presence and the safe haven 
ratios of thin-capitalization rules. During the period of our study, some countries 
implemented a rule, one abolished its rule
60
, while others had a rule the whole period. In 
addition, some countries changed the safe haven ratio. We thus have variation in thin-
capitalization rules within countries. These sources of variation should enable us to test the 
theoretically predicted implications of thin-capitalization rules on the levels and the tax rate 
sensitivity of debt in affiliates of MNCs. 
 
We miss information on two important factors to be able to set up a complete and true 
regression model, based on our theoretical predictions. The first is accurate information on 
whether or not an affiliate is subject to being restricted, i.e. if its debt ratio exceeds the safe 
haven debt ratio. In principle, this should be as easy as just comparing the observed debt 
ratio to the defined safe haven ratio. With our data set, this can be done for total debt when 
the safe haven ratio is defined in terms of total debt-to-equity. However, for internal debt we 
have information on parent debt, but not total internal debt. The latter is often the numerator 
in safe haven ratios, and thus it is not possible to determine if affiliates in countries with 
such a safe haven ratio are in fact restricted
61
. The second piece of missing information is 
how strict the rules are enforced. Exhaustive information on loopholes in each country’s 
thin-capitalization rules is next to impossible to collect. It would require legal expertise and 
full insight in each country’s legislation. Further, companies exploiting loopholes are not 
very likely to say so publically, making it even harder to identify the loopholes they exploit.  
                                                 
59 See Section 6: Data and descriptive statistics. 
60 Slovakia abolished their rules in 2004. 
61 In addition, even with the total debt ratio available, and if we had information on total internal debt, it would still be hard 
to be absolutely sure about the status of the affiliate. The reason is that the application of thin-capitalization rules differ 
across countries (see Section 3.1), and specific firm characteristics are often needed to determine the correct tax status of an 
affiliate (Buettner et al., 2012, p. 934). We are therefore not able to accurately determine the status of each affiliate. 
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In order to identify the effects of thin-capitalization rules, Buettner et al. (2012) use an 
approach that exploits the relationship between the likelihood of rules being binding – i.e. 
the likelihood that firms are restricted by the rules – and a measure of the tightness of safe 
haven ratios. The probability of a rule being binding is increasing with the tightness of the 
rule, and the use of a quantitative tight variable allows the effects of thin-capitalization rules 
to depend on the tightness. We choose to adopt the same approach in our analysis. Note that 
Buettner et al. (2012) assume rules to be strictly binding if a firm is restricted, while we 
allow for loopholes. However, that does not change the probability of a rule being 
restricting
62
; it merely affects the theoretically expected quantitative outcome, but not the 
qualitative result.  
5.1 Econometric Techniques  
The cross-sectional units in our panel data are individual affiliates. It is reasonable to assume 
that every affiliate is associated with unobservable, affiliate-specific effects, which may 
affect the dependent variable and be correlated with one or more of the independent 
variables. In that case, we risk suffering from an omitted variable bias, and we use fixed 
effects estimation to minimize that risk
63
. In addition, fixed effects estimation will control 
for average differences across affiliates. We are then left with the variation within each 
affiliate. A potential problem with the analysis is two-way causality, as rules are not 
randomly assigned to countries. It is only natural that countries experiencing substantial debt 
shifting are more likely to implement a thin-capitalization rule. In that case, we have that 
thin-capitalization rules affect the debt levels, but at the same time the debt levels affect thin-
capitalization rules. Using fixed effects may in this case reduce the problem of two-way 
causality, since fixed effects consider variation around the mean values; it should be the 
absolute level of debt shifting in a country that drives the potential two-way causality and 
not the variation from the mean. 
 
                                                 
62 The safe haven ratio determines if a rule is binding, i.e. if a firm is restricted, or not. The ratio is the same regardless of 
loopholes. Thus, the probability of a rule being binding does not change with loopholes. This is explained further in 
Appendix B.  
63 Omitting a variable that affects the dependent variable, and is correlated with at least one explanatory variable, causes the 
error to be correlated with the explanatory variable(s) (Wooldridge, 2014, pp. 76-80). Assuming the unobservable affiliate-
specific effects are time-invariant, fixed effects estimation will remove the part of the error term which is potentially 
correlated with the independent variable(s), and the omitted variable bias will be eliminated.  
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Industry and country should be fixed for every affiliate, and the affiliate-specific effects, 
therefore, nest industry-specific and country-specific fixed effects. The latter will, for 
instance, capture time-invariant characteristics of each host country. The parent of an 
affiliate is not necessarily fixed, as the majority owner of an affiliate may change due to 
mergers and acquisitions. Parents may have different debt policies, and we control for this by 
including parent dummies in the regressions. In addition, we include time dummies to 
capture time-specific effects. These are effects associated with a particular year, which affect 
all affiliates independent of location and parent. Since all MNCs in our analysis share the 
same home country, the time-specific effects will capture characteristics of the home country 
such as lending conditions and tax rates.  
 
A potential problem with our analysis is serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error 
terms within clusters
64
. Failing to adjust for this will not bias the estimated coefficients of 
the explanatory variables, but can lead to (usually) underestimated standard errors, which 
will produce too high t-statistics. The cluster-specific fixed effects will control for part of the 
within-cluster serial correlation, but not for heteroskedasticity (Cameron & Miller, 2013, p. 
16). To control for both, we compute cluster-robust standard errors on the country-year cells, 
adopted from Buettner et al. (2008, 2012). 
5.2 Regressions 
We have two dependent variables of interest. The first is the parent debt-to-assets ratio of 
affiliate i, located in country j, observed in period t, 𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡. The second is the total debt-to-
assets ratio of the same affiliate, 𝑇𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡. All regressions will be run two times – one for 
each dependent variable. In addition to the main explanatory variables, we include the firm- 
and country-specific control variables (𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), as well as affiliate-, parent-, and time-fixed 
effects (𝛼𝑖,𝑗, 𝜇𝑀𝑁𝐶 and 𝛾𝑡, respectively). 
 
                                                 
64 Serial correlation in the error term is present if the error terms of two observations, either from different points in time or 
cross-sectional observations, are correlated. Formally, it violates the assumption that 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖,𝑡, 𝑢𝑗,𝜏|Χ) = 0 for all (𝑖, 𝑡) ≠
(𝑗, 𝜏) (Wooldridge (2014), Chapter 12). Heteroskedasticity is present if the variance of the error term is dependent on one or 
more of the explanatory variables. Formally, it violates the assumption that 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖,𝑡|Χ) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜎
2 (Wooldridge, 
2014, pp. 212-213). 
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Our theoretical framework focuses on two effects of thin-capitalization rules on the capital 
structure of MNCs; the direct impact the rules have on the level of debt (level effect), and the 
indirect effect through a changed tax rate sensitivity of debt. We begin our empirical analysis 
with two simple tests to obtain some descriptive evidence of the normal tax rate sensitivity 
of debt and the level effect of thin-capitalization rules. We do that by running two 
regressions; one with the tax rate, 𝒯𝑗,𝑡, as the explanatory variable, and one with a dummy-
variable, 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡, indicating whether or not a thin-capitalization rule is in place. However, a 
weakness with these tests is that both the tax rate and the presence of thin-capitalization rules 
are determinants for the capital structure, and running two separate regressions fails to take 
this into account. We therefore run a third regression where both variables are included.  
 
Next, we want to test the impact of thin-capitalization rules on the tax rate sensitivity of debt. 
We do that by running a regression where we include the tax rate and an interaction term 
between the tax rate and the dummy variable for rule. However, the regression may suffer 
from not including the level effect as well. If the main effect is not included, the regression 
may confound the main effect and the interaction effect (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). To control 
for this, we run a fifth regression including both main effects and the interaction term, which 
gives the general regression equation
65
  
 
𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝒯𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝒯𝑗,𝑡 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑀𝑁𝐶 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑗,𝑡      (27) 
 
The first term captures the relationship between debt ratios and the tax rate in the absence of 
thin-capitalization rules, which is expected to be positive for both parent and total debt. 
Finding a significantly positive 𝛽1 will provide evidence supporting this prediction.  
 
The second term represents the level effect of thin-capitalization rules on the debt ratios. In 
equation (27), 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if a rule is in place in 
country j in period t. The theoretically predicted effect on parent debt is that the parent debt 
ratio is reduced, which will be supported by finding a significantly negative 𝛽266. For total 
                                                 
65 The dependent variable in the regression equation is displayed as debt ratio, 𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, which can be either total debt or 
parent debt.  
66 Note that 𝛽2 is actually interpreted as the effect of a thin-capitalization rule if the tax rate is zero. This is not very 
interesting as a zero tax rate would imply no internal debt (no debt tax shield), and thus the theoretical expected level effect 
would be zero. In addition, none of the included countries have a zero tax rate. We therefore re-run the regression where we 
replace the tax variable with a variable measuring the difference in the tax rate from the sample average, i.e. (𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑡̅). The 
coefficient is then interpreted as the level effect on an affiliate facing the sample average tax rate.  
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debt the effect may not be as pronounced if external debt is substituted for internal debt 
when a rule is imposed, but existing literature have found evidence of the substitution not 
being complete. Finding a significant negative 𝛽2 when testing total debt will provide further 
evidence for an incomplete substitution, and suggest that thin-capitalization rules are 
effective in reducing total debt levels.  
 
The third term captures the effect thin-capitalization rules may have on the tax rate 
sensitivity of debt. While the tax rate sensitivity in the absence of thin-capitalization rules is 
measured by 𝛽1, the tax rate sensitivity is (𝛽1 + 𝛽3)67 when a rule is in place. The theoretical 
model predicts that the tax rate sensitivity of internal debt is reduced by thin-capitalization 
rules, and thus 𝛽3 is expected to be negative when testing parent debt ratios. The effect on 
the tax rate sensitivity of total debt is again dependent on the substitution effect, but given 
that the substitution is not complete we expect 𝛽3 to be negative. 
 
Next, we also run regressions based on the relationship between the probability of rules 
being binding and the tightness of the safe have ratios, adopted from Buettner et al. (2012). 
We do that by replacing the rule dummy in the regressions above with a variable that reflects 
the tightness of the safe haven ratios
68
. The variable utilizes the quantitative information in 
the rules’ safe haven ratio, and allows for the effects of thin-capitalization rules to vary with 
the tightness. Buettner et al. (2012) define the variable as 
 
𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗,𝑡 =
1
1+𝜎𝑖,𝑡 
      
        
where 𝜎𝑗,𝑡 is the safe haven ratio. 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗,𝑡 captures the whole spectrum of safe haven ratios, 
in the range 0 to 1. The variable is decreasing in the safe haven ratio, meaning that it takes 
the value of 1 if no debt is allowed (i.e. safe haven ratio =0), and the value of 0 if an 
unlimited amount of debt is allowed. The expected signs of the coefficients in the 
regressions are the same when using the tight variable as they are when using the dummy.  
 
                                                 
67 
𝜕𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝜕𝒯𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡, where 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡=1 if a country has a rule. 
68 Appendix B formally shows how Buettner et al. (2012) incorporate the tightness of thin-capitalization rules in their 
regressions. 
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Theoretically, the regressions using TIGHT separate the effects of thin-capitalization rules 
on restricted firms from unrestricted firms (see Appendix B). In practice though, TIGHT will 
measure the average effects of thin-capitalization rules within a country
69
, and we are 
dependent on a sufficient number of firms being restricted to identify the effects
70
. In further 
efforts to study the effects on the firms that are actually restricted, we will therefore test 
subsamples where affiliates are assigned to a quintile based on their debt levels. Affiliates in 
the fifth quintile are the most likely to be restricted by the rules, and may thus allow us to 
separately test the effects on the affiliates that the thin-capitalization rules are aimed at.   
 
Before moving on, it should be noted that the regression in column (8) of our regression 
tables (see Section 7) is exactly the same as one of the regressions run by Buettner et al. 
(2012). As an extension to this regression, Buettner et al. (2012) split the tight variable to see 
if safe haven ratios defined in terms of total debt versus related party debt have different 
effects
71
. In addition to our ten base regressions, we have also run this extended regression. 
Generally, the interaction term between the tax rate and the tight variable do not prove 
significant, neither in column (8) nor in the extended regression. We therefore do not report 
the extended regressions where the tight variable is split, except for one instance where they 
turn out to be significant (see Section 7.2.3). 
                                                 
69 The reason is that the probability of being restricted will be equal for all firms within the same country, as tightness is 
measured on the country-level, and the approach do not account for the actual debt levels. 
70 This is also the case for the dummy variable approach.   
71 Recall from Section 2 that Buettner et al. (2012) find that thin-capitalization rules with safe haven ratios defined in terms 
of total debt are more effective in reducing the tax rate sensitivity of parent debt.  
 35 
6. Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
6.1 Data Origin and Sample Restrictions 
The data set used in this thesis is derived from the survey “Utenlandsoppgave”, by Statistics 
Norway
72
. The data set is an annual panel for the period 1990 – 2006 and holds information 
on Norwegian MNCs and their foreign affiliates. During this period, Norwegian MNCs had 
the choice to submit the survey electronically or by paper. Our data set only contains 
electronic submissions of the “Utenlandsoppgave”. It includes information about ownership 
shares and financial transactions between the Norwegian parent and their affiliates, basic 
information about the balance sheet and the income statement of the affiliates, and which 
country the affiliates operate in.  We merge the “Utenlandsoppgave” with data from the 
SIFON-registry. The SIFON-registry provides information on all Norwegian limited 
companies with at least one foreign investor. The registry shows the total foreign ownership 
share in the affiliates, and the ownership share of the largest foreign investor. 
 
We combine the “Utenlandsoppgave” and the SIFON-information with country-level data on 
thin-capitalization rules. Georg Wamser has provided us with data on thin-capitalization 
rules for the OECD and European countries used in Buettner et al. (2012), for the period 
1996 – 200573. This allows us to create a main sample including the same years, 1996 – 
2004, and 36 countries as used in the study by Buettner et al. (2012). In addition, we have 
collected data on thin-capitalization rules for the years 1994 – 1995 and 2006, and data for 
25 additional countries
74
, to construct an extended sample
75
. The additional countries were 
selected based on the criteria that at least five observations from the country were available 
in our data set, and that values for the control variables were possible to find. 
 
While the data set provides data on parent debt from 1994 and onwards
76
, it only provides 
information on total debt for the years after 1998. We, therefore, have quite different 
numbers of observations for the two dependent variables, and hence we have two versions of 
                                                 
72 Form printed in Appendix C, p. 80. 
73 Note that their analysis includes the time period 1996-2004. 
74 See Table C2 for a list of the countries in the main and extended sample. 
75 Years 1994-2006 for parent debt, and years 1999-2006 for total debt. 
76 Out of the 9266 observations before 1994 only 4 contains data on parent debt, see Table C1. 
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both the main and the extended samples. The main samples for parent debt and total debt 
consist of 9,863 and 6,424 affiliate-year observations, respectively. The two extended 
samples consist of 15,440 and 9,610 affiliate-year observations for parent debt and total debt, 
respectively.  
6.2 Data Set Calibration 
This subsection presents the data set calibration in chronologic order, as presented in Table 
1. We limit our analysis to foreign affiliates where the Norwegian parent has an ownership 
share above 50%. This ensures that the Norwegian parent is in control of the financial 
decisions of the affiliate. In addition, several countries define a foreign ownership 
requirement for the thin-capitalization rules to apply. Another issue is that some affiliates 
enter the data set several times the same year, because some have several Norwegian owners 
who all report to Statistics Norway. Removing affiliate-observations where the Norwegian 
ownership share is not above 50% solves this problem as well. We are then left with the 
information provided by the parent with the largest ownership share in the subsidiary.  
 
We remove the few affiliates where the reported country of the affiliate changes from one 
year to another to avoid complications, as we are computing cluster-robust standard errors at 
the country-year level. Observations with nonsensical values in relevant variables, such as 
negative assets, revenue or debt, are also dropped
77
.  
 
Total debt ratios and parent debt ratios are calculated by dividing total debt and parent debt 
by total assets. We eliminate observations with missing values in one of these three 
variables. As have been mentioned before, we only have total debt figures from the years 
after 1998, and thus many observations disappear from that sample at this stage. We only 
have four observations of parent debt before 1994
78
, and these are dropped.  
 
It is technically possible to have negative equity and still be in business. However, if the 
equity is negative over several years, it may be that the affiliate is being kept alive for special 
reasons. In addition, special taxation conditions may apply if the equity is negative. To make 
                                                 
77 For example, the data set includes an account for loans from the parent to the subsidiary, and another account for loans 
from the subsidiary to the parent, and hence the parent debt variable should not have a negative value. 
78 See Table C1. 
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sure the included affiliates are productive and that no special taxing conditions apply, we 
remove all observations with negative equity.  
 
Financial service providers and holding companies are eliminated as special conditions often 
apply to such firms
79
. The Norwegian standard industrial classification (SIC) for these types 
of firms is a code between 65000 – 6720080. For the year 2006, the “Utenlandsoppgave” 
does not include a variable for the SIC code. We, therefore, use the median SIC-code for an 
affiliate when dropping financial service providers. By using the data from the SIFON-
registry, we can see if parents are more than 50 % foreign owned. Affiliates where the parent 
has a foreign majority owner are excluded, as we want to analyze affiliates with Norwegian 
parents.  
 
Revenue is supposed to be reported in 1000 NOK in Statistics Norway’s survey, but 
examining the data reveals that some MNCs most likely have failed to divide by 1000
81
. To 
handle this, we delete affiliate-year observations where current year’s revenue is 900 times 
larger or smaller than the revenue in the previous and following year. Due to the same 
reasons as why negative equity is dropped, we also delete observations with zero revenue. 
This also eliminates observations where the affiliate is being discontinued. 
 
As total debt includes all kinds of debt, parent debt can by definition not exceed total debt. 
Despite this, the data set has observations where parent debt exceeds total debt. We remove 
these observations as there is most likely a reporting error in either of the debt variables. We 
also remove observations where the parent debt ratio or the total debt ratio exceeds 1
82
. We 
use the variable total assets, instead of total capital, when calculating parent and total debt 
ratios. We have data on total assets for all years in the data set, while values for total capital 
are missing before 1999, due to the lack of values for total debt.  
                                                 
79 For instance, the German thin-capitalization rules before 2001 allowed holding companies to have substantially higher 
debt levels (Ruf & Schindler, 2012, p. 11). 
80 By looking at the codes in the data set it seems like the 2002 version of the SIC-codes have been used, and not the 2007 
SIC-codes that are currently effective ("Standard for næringsgruppering (SN2002)," 2009). 
81 For example, we have observations where revenue is approximately 1000 times the revenue the year before and after, 
which we find likely to be an error.  
82 This is per definition not possible when we do not allow for negative equity. However, firms may have reported rounded 
numbers, so we use a cut of value of 1.01. We take this into account by setting debt ratios in the range 1 < 𝑥 < 1.01 equal 
to 1. 
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Table 1: Data calibration 
  Number of obs. Number of obs. 
  Parent debt ratio Total debt ratio 
(1) All observations of foreign affiliates from 1990 to 2006 66,425 66,425 
(2) Remove pure duplicates 66,382 66,382 
(3) Remove minority owned affiliates and observations 52,618 52,618 
(4) Remove duplicates on affiliate level and affiliates changing country 52,412 52,412 
(5) Remove observations with nonsensical values in relevant variables 51,787 51,787 
(6) Remove observations with missing values in the dependent variable 32,798 22,326 
(7) Remove observations before 1994  32,794 22,326 
(8) Remove observations with equity less than zero 28,472 19,591 
(9) Remove financial service providers 27,793 19,066 
(10) Remove observations if parent has a foreign majority owner 24,129 16,291 
(11) Remove observations with extreme values of revenue  24,117 16,287 
(12) Remove observations with revenue equal to zero 16,298 10,012 
(13) Remove observations where parent debt exceeds total debt 16,042 10,012 
(14) Remove observations where the dependent variable exceeds 1  15,950 9,943 
(15) Remove observations with missing TCR-info or control variables 15,440 9,610 
 Extended sample 15,440 9,610 
(16) Remove countries not in Buettner et al. 2012 13,686 8,335 
(17) Remove years not in the period 1996-2004 9,863 6,424 
 Main sample 9,863 6,424 
6.3 Relevant Variables 
6.3.1 Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable to be tested is parent debt ratio, which is the fraction of parent 
debt to total assets. This ratio should be directly affected by thin-capitalization rules. 
Buettner et al. (2012) explicitly test the effects on parent debt, and thus our results will be 
directly comparable. As mentioned before, we would prefer to analyze the effect on total 
internal debt, but this information is not available in our data set. However, an advantage of 
using parent debt is that it is indisputably defined as internal debt
83
, and Buettner et al. 
(2012) find parent debt to be the main driver of thin-capitalization rules’ effects on total 
internal debt
84
.   
 
The second dependent variable to be tested is total debt ratio. Total debt consists of non-
parent internal debt, parent debt and external debt, and total debt ratio is the fraction of total 
debt to total assets. This dependent variable should be directly affected by thin-capitalization 
rules through internal debt, but may also be indirectly affected by the substitution effect 
between internal and external debt. Buettner et al. (2012) do not explicitly test the effects on 
total debt ratios, but imply that it is reduced.  
                                                 
83 Buettner et al. (2012, p. 936) argue that it can be hard to determine what categorizes as total related party debt for tax 
purposes. Parent debt on the other hand is definitely a type of related party debt. 
84 The results were reviewed in section 2.3. 
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6.3.2 Variables for Thin-Capitalization Rules  
We generate the same two variables as Buettner et al. (2012) to control for the presence and 
the tightness of the thin-capitalization rules
85
. 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is 
a thin-capitalization rule in place in country 𝑗 in period 𝑡, and 0 otherwise. TIGHT𝑗,𝑡 is a 
transformation of the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio. This variable was outlined in Section 
5.2. 
 
6.3.3 Tax Variable 
The variable Statutory tax rate is created from augmenting data on tax rates from Georg 
Wamser
86
, with tax rates from the OECD Tax Database, and tax surveys done by KPMG, 
EY, and PWC
87
. The tax rates are adjusted as best possible to reflect the tax incentive for 
using debt
88
. For example, while the corporation tax in Italy was 37 % in 1997, the tax 
burden on corporate income was 53.2%, due to the local corporate income tax rate of 16.2% 
(Bordignon, Giannini, & Panteghini, 2001, p. 193).   
 
6.3.4 Control Variables 
To control for other determinants of the capital structure, we include control variables in 
addition to the abovementioned explanatory variables. The control variables are inspired by 
other studies, and they are thus commonly used in the literature. To obtain directly 
comparable results to Buettner et al. (2012), we use the same affiliate-level and country-level 
control variables when running regressions on our main sample. Three affiliate-level 
variables are used: 
 
Loss carryforward may reduce the tax-induced incentives to use debt financing, as the 
effective tax reduction from using debt might be zero when there is loss carryforward 
                                                 
85 The sources for the collected information on thin-capitalization rules are listed in Appendix G. 
86 We have slightly changed a few of the tax rates, based on other tax rate sources. For instance, Estonia was registered with 
a zero tax rate. That is true on the affiliate level, but as soon as the profits are transferred to the parent the profits are taxed. 
The tax incentive from the parents point of view is thus not reflected by a zero tax rate (Lehis, Klauson, Pahapill, & 
Uustalu, 2008). We also did robust tests using the exact same tax rates provided by Wamser, but it did not affect the 
qualitative results. 
87 In addition, other tax rate sources have been used. These sources are listed in Appendix G. 
88 An alternative tax rate measure could be the median effective tax rate in each country, as used by e.g. Blouin et al. 
(2014). However, this hinges on a sufficient number of observations per year in order to reflect the true changes in the tax 
incentive of debt financing; in a large sample the median is likely to change in line with the statutory tax rate. For small 
samples on the other hand, changes in the observed median effective tax rate may be due to random changes. We thus favor 
using statutory tax rates.   
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(Mackie-Mason, 1990). In that case, the expected relationship between loss carryforward and 
the debt ratios is negative. Running a loss may also make it difficult to obtain external loans. 
This would lead to lower external debt ratios, and higher internal debt ratios if there is a 
substitution effect. In that case, the effect on the total debt ratio will depend on the rate of 
substitution, but in any case it is not expected to increase. Loss carryforward is not reported 
in our data set, so we create a binary variable indicating if the affiliate ran a loss in the 
previous years. The dummy is set equal to 1 if the accumulated profit in the previous years is 
negative, otherwise 0
89
. The loss carryforward variable is created before the cleaning of the 
data set, but even so around 10 % of our final samples have missing values for loss 
carryforward the first year. In order not to lose these observations, we give the first-year 
observation of an affiliate the value 0
90
.  
 
Revenue is an indicator of the cash flows and the size of the affiliate, which is thought to 
capture variation between companies in borrowing conditions and corporate debt policies. 
Larger firms may face better lending conditions, which can increase the use of external debt. 
In addition, MNCs with larger affiliates in the form of cash flows might use internal debt 
shifting in a greater degree than smaller MNCs. Revenue may thus be expected to be 
positively related with debt.  
 
Fixed assets ratio is the ratio of fixed to total assets, which may also capture differences in 
borrowing conditions. Fixed assets may serve as collateral to external creditors, making it 
easier to obtain external debt (Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p. 1451). The effect on internal and 
total debt would then again depend on the rate of substitution between external and internal 
debt. Since depreciable assets carry tax deductible allowances, it might reduce the incentive 
to utilize the debt tax shield (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980, p. 4). In that case, the expected 
effect would be a reduction in both debt ratios.  
 
In addition to the affiliate-level controls, we employ the external lending rate as a country-
level control variable, to control for external lending conditions. Optimally, we would use 
actual, subsidiary-specific interest expenses. However, our data only shows interest paid to 
                                                 
89 We allow the loss carryforward to accumulate profits for up to the five previous years, as the OECD countries could carry 
forward trading losses 5 years or more during the period (Messere, de Kam, & Heady, 2003, p. 115; OECD, 2002, p. 47), 
and most of the other countries could also carry forward losses for at least 5 years (Ernst & Young, 2004, 2015). 
90 However, if profits are negative the first, second and third year, we find it likely that the profit was negative in the 
previous (unobserved) year as well, and give the first observation a value of 1 instead of 0. 
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parent debt, but no information on interest paid to external debt. We thus choose to use the 
host country’s nominal lending rates for the private sector as our control variable. We 
augment the lending rates provided by Georg Wamser with lending rates from the World 
Development Indicators database of the World Bank. Higher external lending rates are 
expected to have a negative effect on external debt. Higher external lending rates also allow 
for higher interest rates on internal debt, which together with the substitution effect may lead 
to higher internal debt levels. On the other hand, if internal debt is restricted and parent debt 
is a substitute for external debt
91
, higher lending rates might have a negative effect on parent 
debt
92
. It may then be profitable to reduce parent debt by taking on external debt directly and 
increase the use of non-parent internal debt as this is usually the cheaper kind of internal 
debt. The substitution effect makes the effect on total debt undetermined.  
 
Other factors that typically affect financial decisions are corruption and the conditions of 
financial markets. We find these factors to be of less concern in the main sample, as it 
consists of European and OECD countries. However, in our extended sample, countries with 
less developed economies are included, and we add two additional country-level variables: 
 
Corruption is the annual level of corruption in each country measured by the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), taken from Transparency International. The CPI ranks countries 
based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be, and it is used as a proxy for a 
country’s legal system and political risk. The index is a combination of different corruption-
related data collected from a variety of reputable institutions and experts. It is expressed as a 
number between 0 and 10, where 10 indicate that a country is very clean. Møen et al. (2011, 
p. 15) point out that it may be harder and less safe to obtain credit in corrupt countries, 
suggesting that the corruption index may have a positive relationship to external debt. At the 
same time, this suggests that more internal debt is used in more corrupt countries, and, thus, 
that there is a negative relationship between internal debt and the corruption index. On the 
other hand, the risk of expropriation may induce firms to use external debt rather than 
internal debt in order not to lose their own money if things go south (Aggarwal & Kyaw, 
2008, p. 416). This would suggest opposite relationships to the ones described above. The 
expected effect of corruption on the debt levels is thus ambiguous.  
                                                 
91 See section 4.1. 
92 As stressed before, our internal debt related dependent variable is in fact parent debt. 
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Inflation is the annual percentage change in the consumer price index from the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) database of the International Monetary Fund
93
. Mintz & 
Weichenrieder (2010, p. 119) suggest that higher inflation will increase leverage, since 
higher inflation, at a given lending rate, reduce the real interest rate. Another view is that 
higher inflation might reduce internal debt, but increase external debt, since it could be an 
indication of future currency depreciations (Aggarwal & Kyaw, 2008, p. 418). High inflation 
also often means that higher inflation risk premiums must be paid on external credit. This 
should, however, be picked up by the variable (nominal) lending rate.  
 
Lastly, in a robustness test, we test if another commonly used control variable, creditor 
rights, should be included. Creditor Rights is the annual index of creditor rights in a country, 
from Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). Well-protected creditor rights generally 
facilitate borrowing, and may thus be associated with higher external debt. This could in turn 
reduce the need for internal debt. However, countries such as Cyprus, Iceland, Estonia, 
Luxembourg, and Malta are not included in the creditor rights index, and observations in 
these countries will thus be lost if creditor rights is used as a control variable. In addition, the 
index does not include the years after 2004, meaning that the 2004-values must be assumed 
not to change for the consecutive years in order to use the index. For these reasons, we have 
chosen not to employ creditor rights as a control variable as the default, but rather test its 
importance as a robustness test.  
6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table C3 and Table C4 (Appendix C) show the correlation matrixes of the tax rate-, thin-
capitalization rules-, and control variables for the main and extended samples. TCR is 
positively correlated with the tax rate in both samples, which indicates that high-tax 
countries are more likely to have a thin-capitalization rule. Parent debt ratio does not show a 
significant correlation with tax rate, nor thin-capitalization rules (variables TCR and TIGHT) 
in neither of the samples. Total debt, on the other hand, is positively correlated with the tax 
rate in the extended sample, and it is negatively correlated with TCR in both samples. In the 
main sample, total debt also shows a significantly negative correlation with TIGHT. In the 
                                                 
93 An alternative would be to use the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. However, WEO 
generally has less missing data for the countries we are using. In the few cases where data is missing from WEO, inflation 
data from the WDI is used. 
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extended sample (Table C4), the control variable creditor rights is not significantly 
correlated with the two dependent variables
94
. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables in the main and extended samples are presented in 
Table 2 and Table 3 and includes 10,171 and 16,217 affiliate-year observations, 
respectively
95
. In the extended sample there are 3,735 affiliates that belong to 875 parents, 
observed over 13 years. On average there are 4.3 observations per affiliate and 4.3 affiliates 
per parent. The largest parent has 188 affiliates, while 83% of the parents have less than 10 
affiliates. The data set consists of electronically submitted responses in the period 1990-
2006, and thus the number of observations per year may be expected to increase in line with 
the digitalization. Table C1 show that the number of observations increases from 1998 to 
2001, while being stable from 1994 – 1998 and 2001 – 200696. However, for the final 
samples, Table 9 and Table 10 in Section 7.2.2 show that the number of observations per 
year is quite evenly distributed.  
 
Table 2 and Table 3 show very similar statistics. The mean tax rate in the main sample is 
33%. The mean parent debt ratio of 11.6% is slightly lower than the average in Buettner et 
al. (2012)
97
. Fixed assets account for about 30% of total assets in the average firm. About 
60% of the observations in the main sample are from countries having a thin-capitalization 
rule, while this number is about 55 % in the extended sample. The mean value for corruption 
is about 8 in both samples, which mean that the sample average observation is in a country 
not perceived as being corrupt. The maximum inflation rate is found in Bulgaria in 1997
98
.  
 
Table 4 shows that there is a declining trend in both the mean tax rate and the mean debt 
ratios. The mean tax rate in the extended sample decreased from 34.7% in 1994 to 29.5% in 
2006. In the same period, the mean parent debt ratio declined by 3.3 percentage points (23 
%), while total debt ratio declined by 5 percentage points (8%) from 1999 to 2006. Note that 
in the year 2000, both debt ratios seem to experience a negative shock.  
                                                 
94 Recall from section 6.3.4 that our default is to not include creditor rights as a control variable. Since the variable creditor 
rights is not correlated with the dependent variables, omitting it should not cause an omitted variable bias in our regressions.  
95 Note that the number of observations for both parent debt and total debt is lower than the total number of observations. 
This is due to some observations missing values for either of the ratios. For instance, the total number of affiliate-year 
observations for parent debt ratio is lower than the sample total, because we have 777 observations for total debt ratio where 
the value for parent debt ratio is missing. 
96 In Table C1 52,412 observations are included, as minority owned affiliates and duplicates are removed (see step 4 in the 
data calibration). However, the trend in the amount of yearly observations is the same when these observations are included.  
97 Average parent debt ratio in Buettner et al. (2012) is 13.2%. 
98 The second highest was an inflation rate of 1.97 in Russia in 1995. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the main sample 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Affiliate-level variables      
Parent debt(rel. to total assets) 9,863 0.116 0.212 0 1 
Total debt (rel. to total assets) 6,424 0.583 0.286 0 1 
Loss carryforward (binary) 10,171 0.389 0.488 0 1 
Revenue (in mill. NOK) 10,171 282 1,552 1 51,409 
Asset tangibility 10,171 0.303 0.294 0 1 
      
Country-level variables      
STR (Statutory tax rate) 10,171 0.330 0.066 0.125 0.532 
RULE (Thin-capitalization rule exists)  10,171 0.595 0.491 0 1 
TIGHT
99
 10,171 0.203 0.188 0 0.5 
TIGHT (related party debt)  10,171 0.067 0.134 0 0.4 
TIGHT (total debt) 10,171  0.136 0.190 0 0.5 
Lending rate  10,171 0.069 0.041 0.018 1.23 
Corruption 10,171 8.017 1.634 2.66 10 
Inflation  10,171 0.023 0.152 -0.011 10.61 
Creditor rights  9,949 1.959 1.211 0 4 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the extended sample 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Affiliate-level variables      
Parent debt(rel. to total assets) 15,440 0.118 0.213 0 1 
Total debt (rel. to total assets) 9,610 0.569 0.284 0 1 
Loss carryforward (binary) 16,217 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Revenue (in mill. NOK) 16,217     260    1,387 1 51,409 
Asset tangibility 
 
Country-level variables 
16,217 0.306 0.298 0 1 
STR (Statutory tax rate) 16,217 0.324 0.070 0.10 0.532 
RULE (Thin-capitalization rule exists)  16,217 0.546 0.498 0 1 
TIGHT 16,217 0.186 0.188 0 0.5 
TIGHT (related party debt)  16,217 0.061 0.128 0 0.4 
TIGHT (total debt) 16,217 0.125 0.184 0 0.5 
Lending rate  16,217 0.083 0.096 0.017 3.20 
Corruption 16,217 7.730 1.922 1.5 10 
Inflation  16,217 0.028 0.131 -0.039 10.61 
Creditor rights  15,874 2.044 1.191 0 4 
 
Table 4: Mean parent debt ratio, total debt ratio and statutory tax rates (extended sample) 
Year 
 Mean Parent  
debt ratio  
Mean Total  
debt ratio Mean STR 
1994 .1430 - .3472 
1995 .1356 - .3489 
1996 .1345 - .3478 
1997 .1335 - .3422 
1998 .1224 - .3427 
1999 .1137 .6014 .3311 
2000 .0987 .5471 .3301 
2001 .1134 .5967 .3135 
2002 .1052 .5826 .3087 
2003 .1067 .5613 .3060 
2004 .1024 .5519 .2997 
2005 .1117 .5569  .2923 
2006 .1107 .5524 .2949 
                                                 
99 Tightness of the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio. 
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7. Empirical Results 
This section aims at testing the theoretical predictions outlined in Section 4. In Section 7.1.1, 
we run the base regressions on the main sample for both dependent variables of interest – 
parent debt ratio and total debt ratio. In 7.1.2, we run the regressions on the extended sample. 
A robustness test of the findings is thus conducted. Next, further robustness tests are done 
for both the main and the extended sample. In sum, the base regressions provide weak 
evidence for the theoretical predictions. In Section 7.2 we run the regressions on subsamples 
based on whether a country never had a rule, implemented a rule, or always had a rule during 
the period of the samples
100
. To further explore the data set, regressions are run on 
subsamples based on quintiles of debt ratios, and various other tests are presented, in Section 
7.3. The subsamples of countries implementing a rule and the fifth quintile of debt ratios 
provide evidence for the theoretical predictions. Lastly, the results are discussed in Section 
7.4.  
7.1 Base Regressions 
7.1.1 Main Sample 
Parent Debt 
Starting with column (1) and (2) of Table 5, the results provide no descriptive evidence of 
neither the tax rate nor the presence of a thin-capitalization rule affecting the parent debt 
ratio. Including the tax rate and the rule dummy in one regression (column 3) does not alter 
these results. The coefficients of both the tax rate variable and the rule dummy are positive. 
The latter suggests that imposing a thin-capitalization rule increases the level of parent debt, 
which clearly goes against the theoretical prediction. However, the coefficients are 
insignificant. The regression in column (4) tests the impact of a thin-capitalization rule on 
the tax rate sensitivity. A rule is expected to reduce the tax rate sensitivity, but we obtain no 
evidence supporting this.  
 
A thin-capitalization rule may have both a level effect and an impact on the tax rate 
sensitivity of debt, and the results hitherto may be confounded by the exclusion of either. In 
                                                 
100 Years 1996 – 2004 for the main sample, and years 1994 – 2006 for the extended sample. 
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column (5), both effects are included. The coefficient of the tax rate is positive and 
significant, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction that higher tax rates lead to 
higher debt levels. In particular, it is estimated that a 10 percentage points increase in the tax 
rate gives a 1.8 percentage points increase in the parent debt ratio (≈ 0.10 × 0.1807). This 
corresponds to a semi-elasticity of 15.5%, which is larger than the semi-elasticity found by 
Desai et al. (2004) and Buettner et al. (2012)
 101
. The significantly negative coefficient of the 
interaction term between the tax rate and the rule dummy provides qualitative proof of the 
prediction that rules reduce the tax rate sensitivity of parent debt. However, the magnitude is 
quite large relative to the main effect of the tax rate, implying that the tax rate sensitivity 
turns negative if a rule is imposed. The level effect of the rule by itself is significantly 
positive, but note that the dummy in column (5) measures the effect of imposing a thin-
capitalization rule when the tax rate is zero. This is not very interesting, and we, therefore, 
re-run the regression with a tax variable that measures the difference between the 
observation-specific tax rate and the sample average tax rate. The new coefficient of the rule 
dummy is reported in column (6). The coefficient is insignificant, providing no evidence that 
affiliates facing a tax rate at the sample average reduce the level of parent debt when a rule is 
imposed.  
 
Columns (7) through (10) are equivalent to the regressions in columns (3) through (6), where 
we replace the rule dummy with the tightness measure of thin-capitalization rules. Column 
(7) and (8) tests the level effect and the tax rate sensitivity separately. The coefficients are 
positive, suggesting that the level, and tax rate sensitivity, of parent debt increase with the 
tightness of a rule. However, none of these effects are significant. The regression in column 
(8) is directly comparable to the equivalent regression in Buettner et al. (2012), which finds 
significant coefficients in line with the theory
102
.  
 
Equivalent to regression (5) and (6), column (9) includes both the level effect and the tax 
rate sensitivity effect, and column (10) re-tests the level effect when the tax rate is measured 
as the difference from the sample average. The regressions provide no proof of a significant 
relationship between the tightness of thin-capitalization rules and the effect on parent debt; 
                                                 
101 The coefficient of tax rate in Desai et al. (2014, p. 2470), Table III, Column (10) is 0.0822, and the mean parent debt 
ratio is reported to be 0.08 (p. 2460, Table I), giving a semi-elasticity of about 10%. Buettner et al. (2012, p. 936) report a 
semi-elasticity of 9.5%.  
102 Buettner et al. (2012, p. 936), Table 5, column (3).  
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the coefficient of the level effect (column 10) and the coefficient of the interaction term is 
insignificant. Note though that the coefficient of the interaction term has the expected sign 
and is very close to being significant
103
.  
 
Loss carryforward displays a significantly positive effect on parent debt, suggesting that 
losses in previous years increase the use of parent debt in subsequent years. This positive 
relationship may be due to loss-making firms having more trouble getting loans from 
external sources. As discussed in Section 6.3.4, external lending rates might have a negative 
effect on parent debt if internal debt is restricted, but since not all countries have thin-
capitalization rules, the significant negative effect of interest rate on parent debt is 
unexpected. The significant positive effect of revenue indicates that higher revenue make it 
more important to engage in internal debt shifting as a profit shifting mechanism
104
. Fixed 
assets are found to have a negative impact on parent debt ratio. This might suggest that other 
types of tax deductible allowances reduce the incentive to utilize the debt tax shield. 
 
 
Table 5: Main sample with parent debt ratio as dependent variable 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0133  0.0214 0.0031 0.1807* 0.1807* 0.0595 0.0164 0.1735* 0.1735* 
 (0.046)  (0.047) (0.049) (0.104) (0.104) (0.059) (0.047) (0.103) (0.103) 
TCR  0.0126 0.0130  0.0858** 0.0127     
  (0.009) (0.010)  (0.039) (0.010)     
TIGHT       0.0754  0.2870** 0.0658 
       (0.046)  (0.145) (0.047) 
STR x TCR    0.0201 -0.2256** -0.2256**     
    (0.028) (0.113) (0.113)     
STR x TIGHT        0.1339 -0.6826 -0.6826 
        (0.136) (0.422) (0.422) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0191*** 0.0192*** 0.0191*** 0.0191*** 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0192*** 0.0191*** 0.0192*** 0.0192*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0293*** -0.0290*** -0.0288*** -0.0287*** -0.0325*** -0.0325*** -0.0293*** -0.0287*** -0.0326*** -0.0326*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0043** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0081 -0.0081 -0.0081 -0.0081 -0.0082 -0.0082 -0.0084 -0.0082 -0.0084 -0.0084 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
           
Observations 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 
R2 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.066 
Nr. of affiliates 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
 
                                                 
103 t-statistic: −0.6826 0.422⁄ = −1.6175. 
104 Other studies have found varying effects of revenue on parent debt: Buettner et al. (2012, p. 936) find a significant 
negative effect, while Blouin et al. (2014, p. 30) find a significant positive effect.  
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Total Debt 
Table 6 shows the same regressions as Table 5, but the dependent variable is replaced with 
total debt ratio. The results are generally the same as they were for parent debt; most 
coefficients are insignificant except for in column (5) and (9), where the level effect and the 
effect on tax rate sensitivity are included simultaneously. Starting with the dummy variable 
approach, columns (1) through (4) provides no evidence of the total debt ratio responding to 
changes in the tax rate. According to these regressions, the introduction of a thin-
capitalization rule has no significant effect on the total debt ratio. In column (4), the tax rate 
sensitivity obtains some magnitude, and the sign of the interaction term indicates a negative 
effect on the tax rate sensitivity by the introduction of a rule, but it is nevertheless 
insignificant. The story is similar when the tight variable is used instead of the rule dummy 
in columns (7) and (8).  
 
When both the level effect and the effect on the tax rate sensitivity are included in column 
(5) and (9), we obtain similar results for total debt as we did for parent debt. An increase in 
the tax rate in the absence of thin-capitalization rules exerts a significantly positive effect on 
the total debt ratio. In column (9), the effect of a 10 percentage points increase in the tax rate 
is estimated to increase the total debt ratio by 4.6 percentage points (≈ 0.10 × 0.4597). This 
is just short of 3 times the equivalently estimated increase in the parent debt ratio. The 
estimate may thus be reasonable, as total debt includes parent debt, non-parent internal debt 
and external debt, which should all react positively to an increase in the tax rate
105
. The 
interaction term in column (9) obtains a quite large, significantly negative coefficient, 
suggesting that the tax rate sensitivity of total debt is reduced when a thin-capitalization rule 
is introduced, and that the reduction is greater for tighter rules. The equivalent coefficient 
was not significant for parent debt. Quantitatively, the effect of introducing a rule with an 
approximately average safe haven debt-to-equity ratio of 4:1 – giving a tightness of 0.20 – is 
estimated to reduce the tax rate sensitivity of a 10 percentage points increase in the  tax rate 
to about zero ([0.10 × (0.4597 − 2.3426 × 0.20)] ≈ −0.0008).  
 
The sign of the control variables loss carryforward, revenue and asset tangibility are the 
same as in the regressions on parent debt. The latter can be interpreted similarly as for parent 
debt, and the effect of revenue is as expected. Loss carryforward was expected to have a 
                                                 
105 Buttner et al (2006, p. 21) Table 3, find a coefficient of about the same size.  
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negative or no effect on total debt ratios. Thus, the positive effect is unexpected. The 
insignificant effect of lending rate might be explained by the substitution between internal 
and external debt. 
 
Table 6: Main sample with total debt ratio as dependent variable 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0025  -0.0009 0.0814 0.5257** 0.5257** 0.0828 -0.0036 0.4597** 0.4597** 
 (0.095)  (0.091) (0.151) (0.250) (0.250) (0.134) (0.095) (0.217) (0.217) 
TCR  -0.0064 -0.0064  0.1757*** -0.0323     
  (0.039) (0.038)  (0.065) (0.048)     
TIGHT       0.1037  0.7273** -0.0318 
       (0.123)  (0.286) (0.161) 
STR x TCR    -0.1182 -0.6421** -0.6421**     
    (0.148) (0.269) (0.269)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.1357 -2.3426** -2.3426** 
        (0.489) (1.111) (1.111) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0511*** 0.0511*** 0.0511*** 0.0512*** 0.0521*** 0.0521*** 0.0513*** 0.0511*** 0.0519*** 0.0519*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0097 0.0095 0.0095 0.0087 0.0112 0.0112 0.0108 0.0093 0.0094 0.0094 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0252*** 0.0251*** 0.0250*** 0.0250*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0531* -0.0534** -0.0534** -0.0544** -0.0539** -0.0539** -0.0527* -0.0533* -0.0532* -0.0532* 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
           
Observations 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 
R2 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.085 
Nr. of affiliates 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
7.1.2 Extended Sample 
We run the same regressions on the extended sample, which expands the period to include 
the years 1994-2006 and an additional 25 countries around the world
106
, to test the 
robustness of the results. The extended sample also includes two additional country-level 
control variables; inflation and corruption. These factors are natural to include since we 
extend the analysis to economies outside Europe and the OECD. The significant effects 
found in the main sample turns out not to be very robust to the extended sample (see Table 7 
and Table 8). For parent debt (Table 7), none of the regressions on the extended sample 
show significant effects for any of the explanatory variables of interest
107
.  
 
                                                 
106 Table C2 lists the countries in the main and the extended samples. 
107 The significant effects of the tax rate found in the main sample disappear even if the sample is extended by years only 
(i.e. running regressions on the same countries included in the main sample, but extending the time horizon to the years 
1994-2006). See Table D3 in Appendix D. 
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Table 8 shows the results of the regressions on the total debt ratio. We note that the 
relationship between the tax rate and the total debt ratio never proves significant, and 
otherwise only two coefficients of interest are significant. In column (5) the interaction 
between the rule dummy and the tax rate is significantly negative, implying that a rule 
reduces the tax rate sensitivity of total debt. This is the same qualitative result as we obtained 
in the regression on the main sample, although the tax rate itself also was significant for the 
main sample. Compared to the main sample, the magnitudes of the coefficients of the main 
explanatory variables in column (5) are about halved.  
 
Column (7) shows a significant positive level effect of thin-capitalization rules’ tightness on 
total debt ratio. This suggests that imposing or tightening a rule is associated with increased 
total debt ratios, and that the increase is larger the tighter the rule. This is not in accordance 
with the theoretical predictions. In relation to the substitution effect between internal and 
external debt, this would imply that firms take on more external debt than they reduce 
internal debt when facing a thin-capitalization rule. A more plausible explanation may be 
that the results in column (7) are confounded by the exclusion of the interaction term. 
Column (10) shows that the level effect is indeed insignificant for an affiliate facing the 
sample average tax rate, when both the level effect and the interaction term are included.  
 
The common control variables enter with the same signs as they did in the main samples. 
The two additional control variables, corruption, and inflation, enters with a negative and 
positive sign, respectively. The coefficients are significant in relation to parent debt, but not 
in relation to total debt. The negative effect of corruption on parent debt may suggest that 
firms in more corrupt countries resort more to parent lending. The coefficients of inflation 
for both parent and total debt may be said to be a precisely estimated zero
108
, and thus not of 
much importance
109
.  
  
                                                 
108 A coefficient is said to be precisely estimated zero if the boundaries of the 95% confidence interval are not economically 
significant. 
109 Note that Møen et al. (2011) include inflation as a control variable when testing total and external debt, but not when 
testing internal debt. 
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Table 7: Extended sample with parent debt ratio as dependent variable 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.0249  -0.0221 -0.0270 0.0122 0.0122 -0.0275 -0.0251 -0.0325 -0.0325 
 (0.045)  (0.045) (0.047) (0.079) (0.079) (0.051) (0.045) (0.079) (0.079) 
TCR  0.0041 0.0036  0.0210 0.0034     
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.028) (0.008)     
TIGHT       -0.0046  -0.0151 -0.0041 
       (0.041)  (0.107) (0.041) 
STR x TCR    0.0055 -0.0543 -0.0543     
    (0.025) (0.082) (0.082)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.0092 0.0337 0.0337 
        (0.123) (0.322) (0.322) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0237*** 0.0236*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0128* -0.0125 -0.0125 -0.0127 -0.0126 -0.0126 -0.0129* -0.0129* -0.0128* -0.0128* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0185** -0.0186** -0.0185** -0.0185** -0.0185** -0.0185** -0.0185** -0.0185** -0.0185** -0.0185** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Corruption -0.0107*** -0.0108*** -0.0106*** -0.0107*** -0.0102** -0.0102** -0.0107*** -0.0107*** -0.0107*** -0.0107*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
           
Observations 15,440 15,440 15,440 15,440 15,440 15,440 15,440 15,440 15,440 15,440 
R2 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 
Nr. of affiliates 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
 
Table 8: Extended sample with total debt ratio as dependent variable 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.0325  -0.0195 -0.0395 0.2443 0.2443 0.0621 -0.0270 0.2230 0.2230 
 (0.082)  (0.081) (0.101) (0.155) (0.155) (0.096) (0.081) (0.147) (0.147) 
TCR  0.0224 0.0220  0.1242*** 0.0068     
  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.043) (0.024)     
TIGHT       0.1542**  0.4521** 0.0850 
       (0.077)  (0.189) (0.095) 
STR x TCR    0.0126 -0.3624** -0.3624**     
    (0.073) (0.152) (0.152)     
STR x TIGHT        0.2838 -1.1331 -1.1331 
        (0.287) (0.690) (0.690) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0556*** 0.0556*** 0.0556*** 0.0556*** 0.0559*** 0.0559*** 0.0556*** 0.0556*** 0.0558*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0157 0.0166 0.0166 0.0157 0.0193 0.0193 0.0166 0.0158 0.0178 0.0178 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0254*** 0.0254*** 0.0254*** 0.0254*** 0.0252*** 0.0252*** 0.0254*** 0.0254*** 0.0253*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0413** -0.0408** -0.0408** -0.0412** -0.0410** -0.0410** -0.0408** -0.0410** -0.0411** -0.0411** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0029 0.0029 0.0031 0.0031 0.0029 0.0029 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.0104 -0.0102 -0.0102 -0.0105 -0.0076 -0.0076 -0.0090 -0.0100 -0.0077 -0.0077 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
           
Observations 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 
R2 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.079 0.079 
Nr. of affiliates 2,721 2,721 2,721 2,721 2,721 2,721 2,721 2,721 2,721 2,721 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
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7.1.3 Robustness Tests 
Since two samples are used in the empirical analysis, where one is an extended version of 
the other, a robustness test of the results is automatically incorporated in the analysis. The 
regressions above showed that the results from the main sample are not very robust when the 
sample is extended. The differences between the two samples are the number of countries, 
years, and control variables. In the regressions reported in Table D1 – Table D6 in Appendix 
D, it can be seen that most of the significant effects on parent debt ratio disappear when the 
sample is extended by years. The effects on total debt ratio disappear when the extra 
countries are added.  
 
Apart from the number of countries and years included, there may be other factors 
influencing the empirical results. This subsection will test and shortly comment the 
robustness of the results to such factors. All tests are done for both samples and dependent 
variables, thus producing numerous tables of regressions. We limit the following discussion 
to comments only, and selected tables of interest are reported in Appendix D.  
 
As discussed in Section 6.3.4, creditor rights may belong in the regressions as a control 
variable, especially when testing the extended sample. Including creditor rights produces 
some significantly positive effects of thin-capitalization rules for both parent debt (Table D7) 
and total debt in the main sample, and for total debt in the extended sample (Table D9). 
Further testing shows that the results are due to observations being dropped when including 
creditor rights
110
, and not due to the variable creditor rights itself. This can be seen by 
comparing Table D7 to Table D8, and Table D9 to Table D10. Thus, leaving out creditor 
rights as a control variable seems not to be an issue. However, this test is another indication 
of the results being sensitive to the sample selection.  
 
About ¼ of the observations belong to affiliates switching parent, i.e. majority owner, during 
the period. Instead of including parent fixed effects, we test the robustness of our results by 
removing all of these observations. When an affiliate is acquired, there may be other factors 
than characteristics of the new owner that determines financial decisions, which is not picked 
up by the parent fixed effects. However, deleting affiliates changing parents does not affect 
                                                 
110 Five countries are not included in the creditor rights index. See section 6.3.4. 
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the results remarkably. For the main sample with parent debt ratio as the dependent variable 
(Table D11), the tax rate sensitivity becomes insignificant in columns (5) and (9), while the 
interaction term between the tight variable and the tax rate in column (9) barely turns 
significant on the 10%-level. The same happens with the interaction term in column (9) for 
the extended sample with total debt ratio as dependent variable (Table D12). However, the 
small changes are most likely due to the fact that ¼ of the observations are dropped. There is 
thus seemingly no real difference in the results by excluding affiliates with changing parents 
versus including parent fixed effects.  
 
Two parent companies stick out by having 188 and 136 affiliates each, accounting for almost 
1500 observations
111
. Large MNCs are more likely to engage in internal lending through an 
internal bank, and the use of parent debt may thus not follow expected patterns. Testing 
affiliates of these two parents separately reveal that they do not exert behavior as expected. 
Parent and total debt ratios show a significantly negative relationship to the tax rate in both 
samples (Table D13 and Table D14), and parent debt reacts positively to thin-capitalization 
rules. These observations are thus pulling the coefficients in the wrong direction compared to 
the theoretical predictions. The most expressed effect of removing these observations are 
found for total debt in the extended sample, which now show a significantly positive 
relationship to tax rates in column (5) and (9) (Table D15). The normal tax rate effect found 
for total debt in the main sample thus becomes robust to the extended sample by removing 
these observations. Otherwise, it does not improve the significance or robustness of the 
results, though some coefficients gain magnitude in the theoretically expected direction. An 
important takeaway is thus that there are affiliates in our data set driving the coefficients in 
the wrong direction for unknown reasons, but excluding affiliates of the two largest parents 
is not sufficient to completely remove this effect.  
 
7.1.4 Discussion of Preliminary Findings 
The empirical results hitherto are weak. We have obtained some proof of the theoretical 
predicted effects of thin-capitalization rules on the tax rate sensitivity of debt, but no 
evidence of a level effect. The results are dependent on the specific samples, and the 
significant effects found in the main samples do not carry over to the extended samples. In 
                                                 
111 Numbers for the calibrated data sets. The two MNCs are the largest in terms of number of affiliates, and account for 917 
and 574 affiliate-year observations, respectively.   
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addition, the data set contains observations pulling the results in the wrong direction. It may 
be that such observations are driven by special incentives and should be excluded, but even 
if that is the case it is difficult to identify these observations.   
 
With regards to the effects of thin-capitalization rules on parent debt, the main peers to this 
thesis have generally found robust, significant effects of thin-capitalization rules, on similar 
selections of years and countries (see Blouin et al., 2014; Buettner et al., 2008, 2012). We 
only find effects in our least restrictive regression. On the contrary, Blouin et al. (2014) do 
not find significant effects in their equivalent regression
112
, but both Blouin et. al (2014) and 
Buettner et al. (2012) find effects in the more restrictive regressions. It is especially 
remarkable that neither parent debt nor total debt exerts a robust, positive relationship to tax 
rates, as existing literature, in general, have found significantly positive relationships 
between the tax rate and debt ratios, even without controlling for thin-capitalization rules. 
 
The possible substitution effect between parent and external debt may make it difficult to 
find significant effects of thin-capitalization rules on total debt. On the other hand, Wamser 
(2014) obtains evidence for the substitution not being complete and thus indirectly 
suggesting that the total debt ratio will decrease, and Blouin et al. (2014) find a significant 
negative effect of the rule dummy when running a regression equivalent to column (3) in the 
tables hitherto presented
113
.  
 
By all standards, it is unlikely that Norwegian MNCs react differently to thin-capitalization 
rules and changes in tax rates, compared to the German and US MNCs studied in the 
abovementioned peer papers. Knowing that the results are very sensitive to sample 
selections, we therefore devote the continuation of the analysis to dig deeper into our data by 
testing different subsamples, in an attempt to obtain further evidence supporting the 
theoretically expected predictions.  
 
                                                 
112 Blouin et al. (2014, pp. 29-30), Table 4 and Table 5, Column (3). 
113 Blouin et al. (2014, p. 29), Table 4, Column (2). 
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7.2 Subsamples Based on Implementation of Thin-
Capitalization Rules 
7.2.1 Motivation 
To identify the level effect and the tax rate sensitivity effect of thin-capitalization rules, the 
analysis is dependent on variation in the tax rates, and the presence and tightness of thin-
capitalization rules, within countries. Although 35 countries in our data set had thin-
capitalization rules by 2006, whereof 23 countries implemented the rule after 1994, our 
results depend on how the observations are distributed among, and within, countries. For 
instance, Sweden, the UK, and the USA account for about two-fifths of all observations in 
the extended sample – countries for which there is no change in the thin-capitalization 
rules
114
 and barely changes in the tax rates
115
. Our main explanatory variables are not useful 
in identifying the capital structure decision of firms in such countries. Observations in these 
countries might even indirectly affect the estimated coefficients of the main explanatory 
variables through the other control variables. The countries we are interested in are those that 
implemented a rule or experienced a change in their rules. It may therefore be more valuable 
to split the full samples into three subsamples, based on (1) countries that implemented a rule 
during the period of the sample, (2) countries that always had a rule, and (3) countries that 
never had a rule
116
.  
 
Each subsample may serve as a designated sample to test one or more of the particular 
effects we are interested in. For instance, the subsample of countries that never had a rule 
may serve as a designated sample to test the normal relationship between debt ratios and the 
tax rate in the absence of thin-capitalization rules, while the subsample of countries that 
implemented a rule is of particular interest in relation to the effects of thin-capitalization 
rules. Table 9 and Table 10 show the development in tax rates and debt ratios, as well as the 
number of observations, for each of the three subsamples
117
. 
 
                                                 
114 Sweden did not have a rule during the period, while the UK and US had a rule, but it did not change.  
115 The US only had incremental decreases in the tax rate, and the UK reduced its tax rate two times, totaling a 3 percentage 
points decrease in total. Sweden had no change in the tax rate. 
116 We have excluded the subsample of countries abolishing their rules, as this sample only consists of Slovakia, which has 
31 affiliate-year observations for parent debt ratio and 24 for total debt ratio. 
117 The tables show statistics for the extended subsamples. 
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7.2.2 Descriptive Evidence  
Table 9 and Table 10 show that countries without rules (“Never rule”) had a declining trend 
in the mean debt ratios, which seemingly was not driven by the tax rate
118
. This indicates that 
there are other factors than the tax rate that affect the use of debt in countries without thin-
capitalization rules. In the extended sample, these countries account for about 1/3 of all 
observations, and may be an explanation for why the base regressions do not show robust 
evidence of the normal tax rate sensitivity.  
 
Table 9 and Table 10 show that only 19% and 7% of the observations in the main and 
extended samples, respectively, belong to countries that implemented a rule during the 
sample period. As can be seen in Table E1 (Appendix E), the numbers of observations 
within these countries are unevenly distributed between before and after the rule was 
implemented.  Further, from Table E2 it can be seen that only a limited number of affiliates 
are observed both before and after. Thus, in the full samples tested this far, substantially less 
than 19% and 7% of the observations belong to firms that experience an introduction of thin-
capitalization rules. The subsample of only the countries that implemented a rule may then 
be a better sample for studying the effects of thin-capitalization rules. The average parent 
debt ratios in countries that implemented a rule seemingly fluctuate around a lower level 
after 1999 (Table 9), and Table 10 shows that the average total debt ratio for this subsample 
declined with the tax rate
119
.  
 
The subsample of countries that always had a rule may also offer some degree of variation in 
thin-capitalization rules. Five countries tightened or loosened their rules during the period, 
and these are listed in Table E3 and Table E4. However, the t-tests presented in the same 
tables show few signs of the debt ratios being significantly lowered by the tightening of a 
thin-capitalization rule. The subsample should also be useful in analyzing how firms react to 
tax rate changes when a thin-capitalization rule is in place. 
 
 
  
                                                 
118 Since the mean tax rate was relatively constant. 
119 Note, though, that the t-tests for differences in average debt ratios before and after the implementations of rules (Table 
E2) do not show promising results, but these tests do not take the tax rate into account. 
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Table 9: Mean parent debt ratio (PDR) and tax rate for the three subsamples; Never rule, 
Implemented rule and Always rule (extended sample) 
 Never rule  Implemented rule  Always rule  Total 
 
Year 
 
N 
Mean  
PDR 
Mean 
STR 
  
N 
Mean 
PDR 
Mean 
STR 
  
N 
Mean 
PDR 
Mean 
STR 
  
N 
1994 396 .1464 .2859   178 .1452 .3640    605 .1404 .3822  1,179 
1995 431 .1339 .2846   197 .1492 .3620    603 .1325 .3904  1,231 
1996 477 .1337 .2902    220 .1283 .3619    581 .1382 .3895  1,278 
1997 483 .1332 .2870     247 .1238 .3561    581 .1375 .3819  1,311 
1998 481 .1186 .2869    224 .1210 .3375    584 .1259 .3906  1,289 
1999 526 .0996 .2881    233 .1438 .3247    594 .1137 .3725  1,353 
2000 437 .0990 .2927    238 .0979 .3177    519 .0974 .3695  1,194 
2001 502 .1020 .2886    259 .1290 .3042    530 .1146 .3418  1,291 
2002 431 .0907 .2878    218 .1216 .2902    460 .1092 .3376  1,109 
2003 460 .0896 .2823    252 .1141 .2832    521 .1181 .3379  1,233 
2004 419 .0933 .2844    223 .1137 .2609    427 .1061 .3346  1,069 
2005 374 .0995 .2731    212 .1207 .2559    397 .1190 .3274  983 
2006 332 .1140 .2729    190 .1189 .2616    367 .1039 .3288  889 
Total 5,749    2,891    6,769    15,409 
 
 
Table 10: Mean total debt ratio (TDR) and tax rate for the three subsamples; Never rule, 
Implemented rule and Always rule (extended sample)
120
 
 Never rule  Implemented rule  Always rule  Total 
 
Year 
 
N 
Mean 
TDR 
Mean 
STR 
  
N 
Mean 
TDR 
Mean 
STR 
  
N 
Mean 
TDR 
Mean 
STR 
  
N 
1999 454 .6176 .2874   63 .6550 .3104  675 .5853 .3637  1,192 
2000 454 .5487 .2916    79 .5665 .3112  696 .5433 .3575  1,229 
2001 510 .6049 .2881    94 .6217 .3065  711 .5870 .3327  1,315 
2002 482 .5937 .2885    89 .6030 .2720  650 .5727 .3292  1,221 
2003 448 .5730 .2820    85 .6078 .2616  672 .5496 .3285  1,205 
2004 445 .5557 .2839    84 .5991 .2357  631 .5437 .3200  1,160 
2005 432 .5525 .2723    95 .5724 .2414  644 .5593 .3137  1,171 
2006 387 .5261 .2725    89 .5745 .2442  617 .5658 .3162  1,093 
Total 3,612    678    5,296    9,586 
 
7.2.3 Regressions 
We have tested subsamples of both the main and extended sample with both the dependent 
variables. This produces twelve regression tables. To keep this section tidy, we stick to 
commenting on the results and we only report the most interesting regression tables, while 
other tables of interest are reported in Appendix E.  
 
For countries in the main sample that never had a rule, we find signs of a positive 
relationship between the debt ratios and the tax rate (Table E5, column (1) and (3)), but only 
the positive relationship between the total debt ratio and the tax rate is significant. The 
                                                 
120 As we only have observations of total debt for the years 1999 and onwards, only countries implementing a rule in 2000 
or later are included in the subsample Implemented rule.  
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results are not robust to the extended sample, where the coefficients turn negative, though 
insignificant
121
 (Table E5, column (2) and (4)). We, thus, only obtain weak evidence of 
Norwegian MNCs reacting to tax rate changes as expected in the absence of thin-
capitalization rules.  
 
Testing only countries that had a rule the entire period returns a significant, negative 
relationship between the parent debt ratio and the tax rate in both the main and the extended 
sample (Table E7). Regressions on the total debt ratio show the same significant relationship 
in the main sample, but improve slightly in the extended sample where the relationship is no 
longer significant (Table E8). The observations in these countries, thus, show a relationship 
to tax rates that contradicts theory on capital structure. If we were to assume that all affiliates 
in these countries were restricted by thin-capitalization rules, we might have expected to find 
no relationship between debt and the tax rate. However, that assumption is unlikely to hold, 
and it would in any case not explain the significantly negative relationship found in Table E7 
and Table E8.  
 
The subsample of countries that implemented a rule gives the hitherto most pronounced 
results for parent debt. Table 11 and Table 12 show the expected relationship between the 
parent debt ratio and the tax rate, for both the main and the extended subsample. In the main 
sample, the dummy variable, the tight variable, and their respective interaction terms with 
the tax rate generally show the expected negative significant coefficient (see Table 11). 
These qualitative results carry over to the extended sample when the affiliates of the two 
largest parents are dropped (Table 12)
122
.  
 
Column (2), (3) and (6) provides evidence supporting the prediction that implementing a 
thin-capitalization rule reduces the parent debt ratio. Quantitatively, column (6) of Table 11 
estimates that implementing a rule reduces the parent debt ratio of affiliates facing the 
sample average tax rate by about 5 percentage points. The coefficient is about halved in the 
extended subsample (Table 12).  
                                                 
121
 Removing affiliates of the two largest parents (which were seen to slightly improve the results in the robust 
analysis) does not help in this case. See Table E6. 
122 See Table E9 for the results when these two MNCs are included. 
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Column (7) and (10) of Table 11 and Table 12 further indicates that the reduction in parent 
debt ratio depends on the tightness of the rule. Quantitatively, a rule with tightness of 0.2 
(safe haven ratio of 4:1) is in column (7) estimated to reduce the parent debt ratio by 4.7 
percentage points (≈ −0.236 × 0.20) in the main sample, and 2.8 percentage points in the 
extended sample. Column (10) indicates that the level effect of tight is significantly negative 
for affiliates facing the sample average tax rate. 
 
In both Table 11 and Table 12, column (4) provides evidence of thin-capitalization rules 
reducing the tax rate sensitivity of parent debt, and column (8) further suggests the reduction 
depends on the tightness of the rule. In column (8) it is estimated that a rule of sample 
average tightness reduces the tax rate sensitivity of a 10 percentage points increase in the tax 
rate by about 40% in the main sample and 25% in the extended sample
123
, compared to when 
there is no rule in place. Thus far, Table 11 and Table 12 provide the most complete 
evidence supporting the theoretical predictions. It is notable that the coefficients halves in 
magnitude in the extended sample compared to the main sample.  
 
For total debt, the subsample of countries that implemented a rule provides some significant 
results. The results in both the main and extended subsamples suggest that implementing a 
thin-capitalization rule reduce total debt ratios (see Table E10 and Table E11). Both 
subsamples show large positive coefficients for the tax rate, but the coefficients are 
insignificant. All coefficients of interest for TIGHT and TCR, in addition to their interaction 
terms, are significant in the main subsample (see Table E10). However, the subsamples of 
countries that implemented a rule are relatively small as we only have observations for total 
debt from 1999 and onwards, and, thus, the subsamples only include countries implementing 
a rule after 1999. We are therefore reticent to draw conclusions about total debt based on 
these subsamples. 
 
 
 
                                                 
123 How to calculate the change (for the extended sample): Tax rate sensitivity of a 10 percentage points increase in tax rate 
in the case of no thin-capitalization rule is estimated to 0.03152. In the case with rules, the equivalent tax rate sensitivity is 
estimated to 0.10 × (0.3152 − 0.4026 × 0.20) ≈ 0.023486. 
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Table 11: Subsample of the main sample, including observations for 1996 – 2004 from 
countries that implemented a rule during 1997 – 2004124 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.3195**  0.3395*** 0.3828*** 0.3537** 0.3537** 0.3481*** 0.4004*** 0.3698** 0.3698** 
 (0.142)  (0.116) (0.126) (0.146) (0.146) (0.118) (0.129) (0.152) (0.152) 
TCR  -0.0470** -0.0486***  -0.0340 -0.0505**     
  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.054) (0.021)     
TIGHT       -0.2360***  -0.1464 -0.2484** 
       (0.083)  (0.231) (0.097) 
STR x TCR    -0.1597** -0.0509 -0.0509     
    (0.065) (0.195) (0.195)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.7808** -0.3147 -0.3147 
        (0.299) (0.837) (0.837) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0436*** 0.0427*** 0.0429*** 0.0433*** 0.0430*** 0.0430*** 0.0428*** 0.0431*** 0.0429*** 0.0429*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0037 0.0530** 0.0238 0.0239 0.0242 0.0242 0.0156 0.0155 0.0158 0.0158 
 (0.032) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0077* 0.0071 0.0074 0.0073 0.0074 0.0074 0.0075 0.0073 0.0074 0.0074 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0222 -0.0203 -0.0228 -0.0223 -0.0226 -0.0226 -0.0223 -0.0219 -0.0221 -0.0221 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
           
Observations 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598 
R2 0.114 0.117 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 
Nr. of affiliates 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
Table 12: Subsample of the extended sample, including observations for 1994 – 2006 from 
countries that implemented a rule during 1995 – 2006 (Excluding affiliates of the two 
largest parents)
 
 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.2864**  0.2849** 0.3062*** 0.2880** 0.2880** 0.2911** 0.3152*** 0.2784** 0.2784** 
 (0.117)  (0.113) (0.116) (0.125) (0.125) (0.114) (0.117) (0.124) (0.124) 
TCR  -0.0262** -0.0260**  -0.0225 -0.0263*     
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.040) (0.014)     
TIGHT       -0.1391***  -0.2034 -0.1357** 
       (0.053)  (0.172) (0.056) 
STR x TCR    -0.0807* -0.0117 -0.0117     
    (0.042) (0.138) (0.138)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.4026** 0.2089 0.2089 
        (0.178) (0.577) (0.577) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0307*** 0.0302*** 0.0304*** 0.0306*** 0.0304*** 0.0304*** 0.0302*** 0.0303*** 0.0301*** 0.0301*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0214 0.0362* 0.0257 0.0274 0.0260 0.0260 0.0231 0.0253 0.0218 0.0218 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0070* 0.0069* 0.0072* 0.0071* 0.0072* 0.0072* 0.0073* 0.0072* 0.0073* 0.0073* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0131 -0.0104 -0.0108 -0.0100 -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0107 -0.0098 -0.0114 -0.0114 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Corruption 0.0036 0.0000 0.0030 0.0034 0.0031 0.0031 0.0032 0.0039 0.0029 0.0029 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
           
Observations 2,662 2,662 2,662 2,662 2,662 2,662 2,662 2,662 2,662 2,662 
R2 0.121 0.120 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.123 0.124 0.124 
Nr. of affiliates 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
                                                 
124 Only countries implementing a rule after 1996, or before 2005, are included, so that we can observe a change in the TCR 
variable.  
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Recall from Section 5.2 that we throughout this analysis also run an extended version 
(unreported) of the regression in column (8), where tight is split based on how the safe haven 
ratio is defined
125
. For the first time in our analysis we find a significant effect on the tax rate 
sensitivity in column (8) (Table 11, Table 12 and Table E10), and the extended regression 
also show some significant effects. The results are reported in Table E12. We obtain the 
same qualitative results for parent debt as Buettner et al. (2012); the coefficients suggest that 
the reduction in the tax rate sensitivity is larger if safe haven ratios are defined in terms of 
total debt. For total debt, rules defined by related party debt are found to exert stronger 
effects in the main sample, while rules defined by total debt is the stronger in the extended 
sample. The significant coefficients are large. However, as mentioned above, the subsamples 
for total debt do not have many observations, and thus we do not read too much into these 
results.  
 
In sum, the subsamples based on thin-capitalization rules status show some results 
supporting the theoretical predictions. By analyzing only affiliates in countries that 
implemented a rule, we find proof supporting the theoretical expected relationships for 
parent debt. The results are qualitatively in accordance with Blouin et al. (2014) and 
Buettner et al. (2012). Total debt of affiliates in countries without rules display a 
significantly positive relationship to the tax rate in the main sample, but otherwise these 
subsamples do not provide evidence of the standard tax rate sensitivity. Affiliates in 
countries that had a rule the entire sample period show a quite robust, negative relationship 
between debt ratios and the tax rate, contradicting theory on capital structure and existing 
empirical results. These observations may partially explain why the analysis of the full 
samples does not show the expected outcomes.  
  
                                                 
125 Tight is split into two separate tight variables based on if the safe haven ratio is defined in terms of total debt or related 
party debt.  
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7.3 Further Investigation 
In addition to the subsamples tested in Section 7.2, several more tests have been conducted 
in the search for more evidence of Norwegian MNCs’ behaving in line with the theoretical 
predictions. These tests include other subsamples, and altering assumptions that affect the 
data calibration. Of particular interest are subsamples of only the affiliates with debt ratios in 
the fifth quintile, which are created in an effort to isolate the affiliates that are in fact 
restricted by thin-capitalization rules. The results from these subsamples are reported in 
Section 7.3.1, and provide evidence that thin-capitalization rules affect parent debt ratios. In 
Section 7.3.2, a selection of the numerous other tests conducted is reported, but these tests 
generally provide no new insight.  
 
7.3.1 Subsamples Based on Quintiles of Debt 
Among the observed affiliates, only those with debt ratios exceeding the safe haven ratio 
will be affected by thin-capitalization rules, but with our data set it is not possible to 
precisely determine if an affiliate is indeed restricted or not. We, therefore, divide the 
samples into quintiles based on debt ratios, in an effort to separately test the effects of thin-
capitalization rules on the highest leveraged firms. Observations in the upper quintiles are 
naturally more likely to be restricted. 
 
The regressions on the fifth quintile of debt ratios in the main samples are printed in Table 
13 and Table 14. The fifth quintile exerts behavior coinciding with the theoretical 
expectations, showing the same tendencies as the regressions on the subsample of countries 
that implemented a rule. In Table 13, the dummy variable approach suggests that thin-
capitalization rules are effective in reducing the level and tax rate sensitivity of parent debt 
in affiliates with parent debt ratios in the fifth quintile. In Column (4) of Table 13, it is 
estimated that a thin-capitalization rule on average reduces the tax rate sensitivity of parent 
debt by approximately 1/3. Column (5), where also the level effect is included, estimates the 
same effect to be a reduction of about 2/3. In columns (7) through (10), the tight variable 
does not prove significant, but the signs of the coefficients are as expected. The results are 
robust to, and even improve in, the extended sample (Table F1, Appendix F). In total, the 
results indicate that thin-capitalization rules have the intended effect on parent debt ratios in 
the highest leveraged affiliates. 
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In regressions run on the fifth quintile of total debt ratios (Table 14), the effects of thin-
capitalization rules are not as pronounced, though some effects are significant, and the signs 
of the coefficients are as expected. However, the significant negative effect of thin-
capitalization rules in column (2) and (4) become insignificant when the sample is extended 
(Table F2). We, thus, do not obtain strong evidence of thin-capitalization rules affecting the 
total debt ratios in the highest leveraged affiliates.  
 
The lower quintiles do not show any signs of being affected by thin-capitalization rules. 
Regressions run on the lower quintiles of parent debt ratios show some significant effects of 
the tax rate on parent debt ratios, but show no significant relationships between parent debt 
ratios and thin-capitalization rules. For total debt, regressions on the fourth and fifth quintile 
combined makes all the tax rate coefficients significant at the 1% level in the extended 
sample (Table F3), while all thin-capitalization variables are insignificant. The lack of 
significant effects of thin-capitalization rules in the lower quintiles may suggest that 
affiliates in these quintiles are not restricted, and that the fifth quintile to a great extent 
includes the affiliates that are restricted by the rules. 
 
 
Table 13: Main sample for quintile 5 of parent debt ratios 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.3852**  0.3451** 0.4427*** 0.6354*** 0.6354*** 0.3235* 0.3782** 0.5136** 0.5136** 
 (0.170)  (0.170) (0.159) (0.192) (0.192) (0.182) (0.170) (0.205) (0.205) 
TCR  -0.0482** -0.0388*  0.0900 -0.0444*     
  (0.022) (0.021)  (0.072) (0.024)     
TIGHT       -0.1028  0.2444 -0.1204 
       (0.099)  (0.294) (0.101) 
STR x TCR    -0.1519** -0.4148* -0.4148*     
    (0.072) (0.224) (0.224)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.4322 -1.1257 -1.1257 
        (0.298) (0.885) (0.885) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0686*** 0.0693*** 0.0681*** 0.0685*** 0.0693*** 0.0693*** 0.0682*** 0.0683*** 0.0688*** 0.0688*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0145 0.0111 0.0094 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0127 0.0112 0.0101 0.0101 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Ln(Revenue) -0.0096 -0.0098 -0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0094 -0.0094 -0.0095 -0.0095 -0.0096 -0.0096 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Asset tangibility  -0.1207*** -0.1207*** -0.1207*** -0.1211*** -0.1218*** -0.1218*** -0.1206*** -0.1209*** -0.1216*** -0.1216*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
           
Observations 1,933 1,933 1,933 1,933 1,933 1,933 1,933 1,933 1,933 1,933 
R2 0.103 0.101 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.103 0.104 0.104 0.104 
Nr. of affiliates 789 789 789 789 789 789 789 789 789 789 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
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Table 14: Main sample for quintile 5 of total debt ratios 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0875*  0.0792* 0.1158** 0.1367 0.1367 0.0759 0.0779 0.1697 0.1697 
 (0.047)  (0.045) (0.048) (0.108) (0.108) (0.061) (0.048) (0.106) (0.106) 
TCR  -0.0159* -0.0137  0.0088 -0.0136     
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.042) (0.009)     
TIGHT       -0.0132  0.1422 -0.0308 
       (0.044)  (0.143) (0.038) 
STR x TCR    -0.0446* -0.0690 -0.0690     
    (0.023) (0.116) (0.116)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.1200 -0.5338 -0.5338 
        (0.112) (0.407) (0.407) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0107*** 0.0109*** 0.0110*** 0.0111*** 0.0111*** 0.0111*** 0.0107*** 0.0108*** 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0080 0.0064 0.0073 0.0071 0.0070 0.0070 0.0078 0.0072 0.0065 0.0065 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ln(Revenue) -0.0037** -0.0040*** -0.0038** -0.0038** -0.0037** -0.0037** -0.0037** -0.0038*** -0.0037** -0.0037** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0102 -0.0113 -0.0105 -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0102 -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0104 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
           
Observations 1,394 1,394 1,394 1,394 1,394 1,394 1,394 1,394 1,394 1,394 
R2 0.089 0.088 0.091 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.089 0.090 0.091 0.091 
Nr. of affiliates 748 748 748 748 748 748 748 748 748 748 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
 
7.3.2 Other Tests 
As a closure to this analysis, we report a few chosen tests to highlight further issues with the 
samples.   
 
Observations with Invariant Key Explanatory Variables 
Countries with constant tax rates do not contribute in estimating the tax rate sensitivity. Nine 
countries have constant tax rates, and dropping these in the full samples may give better 
evidence of the tax rate sensitivity of debt. For total debt, dropping these countries makes the 
effects found in the main sample robust to the extended sample (Table F4, column 5 and 9). 
For the other base regressions, the results are unchanged.  
 
The three countries with the most observations in our samples – Sweden, the UK and the 
US
126
 – had no variation in thin-capitalization rules and almost no change in tax rates. 
Dropping these countries from the full samples may serve as an alternative to the subsample 
of countries that implemented a rule. However, we are not able to reproduce similar results 
by dropping these three countries. Compared to the base regressions, the effects on parent 
                                                 
126 Combined, they account for about two-fifths of the full samples. 
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debt in the main sample slightly improve (see Table F5), but otherwise we obtain the same 
qualitative results when observations from Sweden, the US and the UK are dropped.  
 
Alternative Data Set Calibration 
There are several ways of calibrating the data set. Some choices are indisputable, such as 
removing observations with nonsensical values, while others may have alternative options. 
Several alternative ways to calibrate the data set have been tested, such as only including 
affiliates with revenue or assets above a certain threshold
127
. An alternative total debt ratio 
variable to replace the missing years has also been tested, created by subtracting the account 
named equity from total assets. None of these tests provide any new insights.  
 
Changing the requirements of the parent’s ownership share somewhat affects the results. The 
default is to include affiliates where the Norwegian parent’s total direct plus indirect 
ownership share exceeds 50%. If this is changed to only include affiliates in which the parent 
has direct majority ownership, the significant effects found in the base regressions for total 
debt becomes slightly more significant in the main sample, and the results carry over to the 
extended sample (see Table F6). An even harsher criterion of direct ownership share of 
100% reinforces the significant effects in the main sample. However, in the extended 
sample, thin-capitalization rules now show some significantly positive effects on total debt 
(see Table F7). 
7.4 Discussion of Results 
The analysis has shown that the results are very sensitive to the sample selection, which 
seems to be partly due to non-expected behavior by quite many of the observed affiliates. 
Separate analyzes of the countries that always had a rule, and the affiliates of the two largest 
parents, indicated a significantly negative relationship between debt ratios and the tax rate. 
The affiliates of the two largest parents even exert a significant increase in parent debt ratios 
when a thin-capitalization rule is implemented. There is no evident explanation for these 
effects, and it strongly contradicts theoretical predictions.  
 
                                                 
127 Two threshold values for revenue and assets have been tested: 1 million NOK and 3 million NOK.  
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An issue with the full samples may be that many of the included countries had no changes in 
their tax rate or thin-capitalization rule during the sample period, making it hard to identify 
the effects of interest. This hypothesis gains some support by the significant results found in 
the subsample of only countries that implemented a rule. On the contrary, these results may 
be partially due to the elimination of the observations discussed in the previous paragraph.  
 
Another possible explanation for why the effects of thin-capitalization rules are not very 
pronounced may be that affiliates of Norwegian MNCs, in general, do not have debt in 
excess of the defined safe haven ratios. The subsample of observations with parent debt 
ratios in the fifth quintile was able to identify significant effects of thin-capitalization rules 
on parent debt ratios, while none of the other quintiles showed significant effects. This may 
indicate that few affiliates in our data set are in fact restricted by thin-capitalization rules, 
and thus the effects may be harder to identify in the full samples.  
 
This thesis focuses on explicitly defined thin-capitalization rules. However, as pointed out by 
Buettner et al. (2012, p. 933), countries may also restrict the use of excessive debt by means 
of general substance over form rules, such as the arm’s length principle. The presence of 
such rules may lead to underestimated effects of both tax rate changes and thin-capitalization 
rules.  
 
In the theoretical model, thin-capitalization rules are assumed to offer some leeway. The 
existence of loopholes will weaken the pronounced effects of thin-capitalization rules. If the 
partly weak results found in this thesis are due to loopholes, the results indicate that firms are 
able to circumvent the rules and, thus, that the rules are not effective in restricting the use of 
debt. On the other hand, comparable studies have been able to obtain evidence of the rules 
being effective in the same countries as studied in this thesis. 
 
The abovementioned reasons for why the effect of thin-capitalization rules may be hard to 
detect do not explain why we do not find robust evidence of the normal tax rate sensitivity of 
debt. For parent debt, an explanation may be that parent debt is motivated by other reasons 
than tax rate differentials since Norway is not a low-tax country. For debt in general, a 
problem with the analysis is that we do not have the exact tax rates that firms are faced with 
when making capital structure decisions. Since our tax rate variable differs from the actual 
tax rates that influence firms’ behavior, we will have a measurement error in our tax 
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variable, and the estimated tax rate coefficients will be biased towards zero (Wooldridge, 
2014, pp. 255-261). It is next to impossible to find the firm-specific tax rates faced by every 
single affiliate in our data set, since countries often impose several types of taxes for 
corporations, and some apply different tax rates to different industries
128
.  
 
This thesis assumes that thin-capitalization rules, if such rules are present, and tax rates are 
the main drivers of the capital structure of MNCs. In addition, we control for other 
characteristics of the affiliates and their host countries that are likely to affect the use of debt. 
In reality, there will also be other factors influencing the capital structure decision that we 
are not able to control for. This can create noise in our data and, thus, make it harder to find 
significant coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
 
Finally, the composition of the data set at hand may be a concern. As have been mentioned 
before, we only have electronically submitted responses to the “Utenlandsoppgave”. The 
data set is thus most likely not an entirely random sample of affiliates of Norwegian MNCs. 
This is even less likely if the decision to submit electronically versus by paper is dependent 
on firm characteristics. For instance, companies with excessively high debt levels may be 
more likely to submit a stack of papers to conceal their numbers, even though the survey is 
used for statistical purposes. If that is the case, our data set will be biased towards companies 
with lower debt levels, which are less likely to be restricted by thin-capitalization rules.  
                                                 
128 See for instance the variation in corporate tax rates for various legal entities in Greece, listed in OECD (2001, p. 119) 
Table 28: Main legal entities and their corporate income tax rate.  
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8. Conclusions 
Multinational companies’ enhanced opportunities to exploit the tax advantages of debt have 
the last few decades gained greater attention among tax authorities, which have resulted in 
the emergence of thin-capitalization rules. This thesis examines the effects of such rules on 
the capital structure decision of foreign affiliates of Norwegian MNCs, and is inspired by a 
similar study on German MNCs by Buettner et al. (2012). The aim is to answer the research 
question: Do thin-capitalization rules reduce leverage in foreign affiliates of Norwegian 
MNCs?  
 
Thin-capitalization rules are theoretically predicted to reduce the level, as well as the tax rate 
sensitivity, of both internal and total debt for restricted firms. Our empirical analysis makes 
use of variation over time in countries’ tax rates, and the presence and tightness of thin-
capitalization rules. Two samples are tested; a main sample consisting of European and 
OECD countries for the years 1996 – 2004, and an extended sample where 25 countries are 
added and the period extended to 1994 – 2006. To further search for evidence of the effects 
of thin-capitalization rules, several subsamples are tested. As dependent variables we have 
total and parent debt, where the latter serves to identify the effects of thin-capitalization rules 
on internal debt.  
 
In our least restrictive regression model, the main sample provides some evidence supporting 
that thin-capitalization rules reduce the tax rate sensitivity of internal and total debt, but no 
evidence supporting a direct reduction in the levels of debt. For total debt, a rule with an 
approximately sample average safe haven debt-to-equity ratio of 4:1 is estimated to reduce 
the tax rate sensitivity to zero. However, the results for both kinds of debt are not robust to 
the extended sample.  
 
In a subsample including only the countries that implemented a rule during the sample 
period, a thin-capitalization rule with a safe haven ratio of 4:1 is estimated to reduce the 
parent debt-to-assets ratio by 4.7 (2.8) percentage points for the main (extended) sample. 
Equivalently, it is estimated that the tax rate sensitivity of a 10 percentage points increase in 
the tax rate is reduced by 40% (25%). The subsamples for total debt are small, but the level 
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and tax rate sensitivity show evidence of being reduced in the main sample. However, the 
results are weaker in the extended sample. 
 
Another subsample split the full samples into five subsamples based on affiliates’ debt 
levels, to try to separate the restricted from the unrestricted affiliates. Firms with parent debt 
ratios in the fifth quintile provide robust evidence supporting that the level and the tax rate 
sensitivity of parent debt is reduced for the highest leveraged firms. Quantitatively, the level 
effect is estimated to be of about equal size as in the subsamples of countries that 
implemented a rule. The total debt ratios of the highest leveraged affiliates do not show 
strong evidence of being affected by thin-capitalization rules. None of the lower quintiles are 
significantly affected by thin-capitalization rules. 
 
Identification on the Norwegian data has proven more challenging than comparable studies 
on German and US data. Overall, to the extent we find evidence of the effects of thin-
capitalization rules, the evidence supports that thin-capitalization rules are effective in 
reducing the incentive to use internal debt. The strongest evidence is found in countries that 
implemented a rule and for affiliates with the highest debt levels. This suggests that the rules 
have an effect on internal debt in the firms they are aimed at. We only find weak evidence of 
thin-capitalization rules affecting total debt. A possible explanation may be that firms can 
substitute external for internal debt if the thin-capitalization rules only restrict the use of 
internal debt. The weak effects on total debt may then suggest that thin-capitalization rules 
are not very effective in increasing the corporate tax base. 
 
A weakness of the analysis is that we are limited to total and parent debt, and we are 
therefore not able to build a complete model of international debt shifting, including non-
parent internal debt shifting and external debt shifting. Furthermore, countries without 
explicit thin-capitalization rules might have other rules in place restricting excessive interest 
deductions. The existence of such rules may lead to an underestimation of thin-capitalization 
rules in our analysis, especially in the full samples. This thesis treats all thin-capitalization 
rules as equal, but in reality rules differ to a great extent, and it is not given that all kinds of 
rules are equally effective. Further research taking more properties of thin-capitalization 
rules, including loopholes, into account may thus be helpful in providing more accurate 
estimates of the effects of thin-capitalization rules. This could especially be valuable in 
regards to the effects on total debt. 
 70 
References (APA 6
th
) 
Aggarwal, R., & Kyaw, N. A. (2008). Internal capital networks as a source of MNC 
competitive advantage: Evidence from foreign subsidiary capital structure decisions. 
Research in International Business and Finance, 22(3), 409-439. 
doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2008.02.003 
Altman, E. I. (1984). A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question. 
Journal of Finance, 39(4), 1067-1089.  
Andrade, G., & Kaplan, S. N. (1998). How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? 
Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed. Journal of 
Finance, 53(5), 1443-1493.  
Auerbach, A. J. (2002). Taxation and Corporate Financial Policy Handbook of Public 
Economics (Vol. 3, pp. 1251-1292). New York: North-Holland. 
Barford, V., & Holt, G. (2013). Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The rise of 'tax shaming'. BBC 
News Magazine. Retrived 12 March  2015, from  
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20560359 
Berk, J., & DeMarzo, P. M. (2014). Corporate finance (3rd ed., Global ed., [Special ed.]. 
ed.). Boston: Pearson. 
Betker, B. L. (1997). The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructurings: Some Recent 
Evidence. FM: The Journal of the Financial Management Association, 26(4), 56-68.  
Blouin, J., Huizinga, H., Laeven, L., & Nicodème, G. (2014). Thin Capitalization Rules and 
Multinational Firm Capital Structure. IMF Working Paper, WP/14/12.   
Bordignon, M., Giannini, S., & Panteghini, P. (2001). Reforming Business Taxation: 
Lessons from Italy? International Tax and Public Finance, 8(2), 191-210.  
Bucovetsky, S., & Haufler, A. (2008). Tax competition when firms choose their 
organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed? Journal of 
International Economics, 74(1), 188-201. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.06.001 
Buettner, T., Overesch, M., Schreiber, U., & Wamser, G. (2006). The Impact of Thin-
Capitalization Rules on Multinationals' Financing and Investment Decision. IFIR 
Working Paper No. 2006-06.   
Buettner, T., Overesch, M., Schreiber, U., & Wamser, G. (2008). The Impact of Thin-
Capitalization Rules on Multinationals' Financing and Investment Decision. 
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies No 03/2008.   
Buettner, T., Overesch, M., Schreiber, U., & Wamser, G. (2012). The impact of thin-
capitalization rules on the capital structure of multinational firms. Journal of Public 
Economics, 96(11/12), 930-938. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.06.008 
Buettner, T., Overesch, M., & Wamser, G. (2014). Anti Profit-Shifting Rules and Foreign 
Direct Investment CESifo Working Paper No. 4710.   
 71 
Buettner, T., & Wamser, G. (2013). Internal Debt and Multinational Profit Shifting: 
Empirical Evidence from Firm-Level Panel Data. National Tax Journal, 66(1), 63-
95.  
Cameron, A. C., & Miller, D. L. (2013). A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust inference. 
Department of Economics, University of California - Davis.   
De Mooij, R. A., & Devereux, M. (2011). An Applied Analysis of ACE and CBIT Reforms 
in the EU. International Tax and Public Finance, 18, 93-120. doi:10.1007/s10797-
010-9138-8 
DeAngelo, H., & Masulis, R. W. (1980). Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate and 
Personal Taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, 8(1), 3-29.  
Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F., & Hines Jr, J. R. (2004). A Multinational Perspective on Capital 
Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets. Journal of Finance, 59(6), 2451-
2487. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00706.x 
Dewaelheyns, N., & Van Hulle, C. (2010). Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure: 
Bank Versus Internal Debt. European Financial Management, 16(3), 345-373. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-036X.2008.00457.x 
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2007). Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 84(2), 299-329. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.004 
Dourado, A. P., & de la Feria, R. (2008). Thin Capitalization Rules in the Context of the 
CCCTB. Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 
08/04.   
Egger, P., Eggert, W., Keuschnigg, C., & Winner, H. (2010). Corporate taxation, debt 
financing and foreign-plant ownership. European Economic Review, 54(1), 96-107. 
doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.06.007 
Ernst & Young. (2004). Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide. Retrieved from 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Worldwide_corporate_tax_guide_2004/
$FILE/WCTG_2004_Worldwide_Corporate_Tax_Guide.pdf  
Ernst & Young. (2015). Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide. Retrived from 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Worldwide_corporate_tax_guide_2015/
$FILE/Worldwide%20Corporate%20Tax%20Guide%202015.pdf 
Gertner, R. H., Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1994). Internal Versus External Capital 
Markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 1211-1230.  
Haufler, A., & Runkel, M. (2012). Firms' financial choices and thin capitalization rules 
under corporate tax competition. European Economic Review, 56(6), 1087-1103. 
doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.03.005 
Huizinga, H., Laeven, L., & Nicodeme, G. (2008). Capital structure and international debt 
shifting. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(1), 80-118. 
doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.006 
 72 
Jaccard, J., & Turrisi, R. (2003). Interaction effects in multiple regression (2nd ed. ed. Vol. 
72). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.  
Kraus, A., & Litzenberger, R. H. (1973). A State-Preference Model of Optimal Financial 
Leverage. Journal of Finance, 28(4), 911-922.  
Lehis, L., Klauson, I., Pahapill, H., & Uustalu, E. (2008). Compatibility of the Estonian 
Corporate Income Tax System with the Community Law. Intertax, International Tax 
Review, 36(8/9), 389-399.  
LoPucki, L., & Doherty, J. (2004). The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 1, 111-141. 
doi:10.1111/j.1740-1461.2004.00004.x 
Mackie-Mason, J. K. (1990). Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions? Journal of 
Finance, 45(5), 1471-1493.  
Merlo, V., Riedel, N., & Wamser, G. (2014). Anti-Avoidance Legislations and the Location 
Choice of Multinational Firms. 
Messere, K., de Kam, F., & Heady, C. (2003). Corporate Income Tax and Other Business 
Taxes. Tax Policy: Theory and Practice in OECD Countries (1 ed., pp. 115). United 
States, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mintz, J. M., & Smart, M. (2004). Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory 
and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada. Journal of Public Economics, 
88(6), 1149. doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00060-4 
Mintz, J. M., & Weichenrieder, A. J. (2010). The indirect side of direct investment - 
Multinational company finance and taxation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the 
thoery of investment. American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297.  
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1963). Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A 
Correction. American Economic Review, 53(3), 433.  
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 5(2), 147-175.  
Møen, J., Schindler, D., Schjelderup, G., & Bakke, J. T. (2012). A Model of Debt Shifting 
with Parental Debt as Commitment Device Norwegian School of Economics  
Møen, J., Schindler, D., Schjelderup, G., & Tropina, J. (2011). International Debt Shifting: 
Do Multinationals Shift Internal or External Debt? CESifo Working Paper No. 3519. 
Munich.  
Niesten-Dietrich, L. (2014). The Parental Debt Puzzle. (Master of Science), Norwegian 
School of Economics, Bergen.    
 73 
OECD. (2001). OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2001. doi:10.1787/eco_surveys-grc-2001-
en 
OECD. (2002). OECD Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook. OECD Publishing. doi: 
10.1787/sme_outlook-2002-en 
Overesch, M., & Wamser, G. (2010). Corporate tax planning and thin-capitalization rules: 
evidence from a quasi-experiment. Applied Economics, 42(5), 563-573. 
doi:10.1080/00036840701704477 
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from International Data. Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421-1460.  
Robichek, A. A., & Myers, S. C. (1966). Problems in the Theory of Optimal Capital 
Structure. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 1(2), 1-35.  
Ruf, M., & Schindler, D. (2012). Debt Shifting and Thin-Capitalization Rules - German 
Experience and Alternative Approaches NHH Discussion Paper RRR 06-2012. 
Bergen.  
Schindler, D., & Schjelderup, G. (2012). Debt shifting and ownership structure. European 
Economic Review, 56(4), 635-647. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.02.015 
Schjelderup, G., Andvord, G. B., Holmøy, E., Håkonsen, L., Semmingsen, L., & Veum, I. S. 
H. (2006). NOU 2006: 4: Rederiskatteutvalget — Forslag til endringer i 
beskatningen av norsk utenriks sjøfart. 
Smith, A. M. C., & Dunmore, P. V. (2005). Double Tax Agreements and the Arm's Length 
Principle: the Safe Harbour Ratio in New Zealand's Thin Capitalisation Rules. 
Retrived from http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10063/199/ 
paper.pdf?sequence=2 
Standard for næringsgruppering (SN2002). (2009). Statistics Norway.  Retrieved from 
http://stabas.ssb.no/ItemsFrames.asp?ID=5556001&Language=nb 
Wamser, G. (2014). The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt Usage - A 
Propensity Score Matching Approach. Oxford Bulletin of Economics & Statistics, 
76(5), 764-781. doi:10.1111/obes.12040 
Weichenrieder, A. J., & Windischbauer, H. (2008). Thin-Capitalization Rules and Company 
Responses - Experience from German Legislation. CESifo Working Paper No. 2456.   
Wooldridge, J. M. (2014). Introduction to econometrics (Europe, Middle East and Africa ed. 
ed.). Andover: Cengage Learning. 
 74 
Appendix A  
Optimal capital structure for a given level of 𝑲𝒊 
ℒ(𝐷𝑖
𝐼 , 𝐷𝑖
𝐸 , 𝜆) = ∑{(1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ 𝐹(𝐾𝑖)
𝑖
− 𝑟 ∙ 𝐾𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 ∙ [𝐷𝑖
𝐼 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐸] − (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ [𝐶
𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) + 𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)]
∙ 𝐾𝑖 −  𝜆 ∙ (𝑟 ∙ 𝐷𝑖
𝐼)} 
 
FOC Internal debt
129
:        
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝐼  = 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 − (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ [
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼∙ ∙  
𝑑𝑏𝐼
𝑑𝐷𝑖
𝐼∙] ∙ 𝐾𝑖 −  𝜆 ∙ 𝑟 = 0 
= (𝑡𝑖 −  𝜆) ∙ 𝑟 − (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ [
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼∙ ∙  
1
𝐾𝑖
] ∙ 𝐾𝑖       
= (𝑡𝑖 −  𝜆) ∙ 𝑟 − (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼∙    
(𝑡𝑖 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙
𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼  
 
FOC External debt
130
:   
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝐸  = 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 − (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ [
𝜕𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸∙ ∙  
𝑑𝑏𝐸
𝑑𝐷𝑖
𝐸∙] ∙ 𝐾𝑖 = 0 
= 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 − (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ [
𝜕𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸∙ ∙  
1
𝐾𝑖
] ∙ 𝐾𝑖        
= (𝑡𝑖 −  𝜆) ∙ 𝑟 − (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙
𝜕𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸∙    
(𝑡𝑖 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙
𝜕𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸∙  
 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙
𝜕𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸  
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𝐼 =  
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𝐼
𝐾𝑖
  ,   
𝑑𝑏𝑖
𝐼
𝑑𝐷𝑖
𝐼 =  
1
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131
 
Internal debt 
𝑑𝑏𝑖
𝐼
𝑑𝑡𝑖
= −
𝜕ℒ 𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝐼⁄
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝜕ℒ 𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝐼⁄
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼
=  − 
𝑟+𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼⁄
−(1−𝑡𝑖)∙ (𝜕
2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼2⁄ )
= 
𝑟 + 𝜕𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼⁄
(1−𝑡𝑖) ∙ (𝜕
2𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐼2⁄ )
 
 External debt      
     
𝑑𝑏𝑖
𝐸
𝑑𝑡𝑖
= −
𝜕ℒ 𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝐸⁄
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝜕ℒ 𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝐸⁄
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸
=  −
𝑟+𝜕𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸⁄
−(1−𝑡𝑖)∙ (𝜕
2𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸2⁄ )
=
𝑟 + 𝜕𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸⁄
(1−𝑡𝑖) ∙ (𝜕
2𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) 𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝐸2⁄ )
  
 
                                                 
131 𝐻(𝑥, 𝑦) ≡ 0 ⇔
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝑥 +
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑦
𝑑𝑦 = 0  ⇔
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
=  −
𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝑥⁄
𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝑦⁄
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Appendix B 
This appendix explains how the variable tight allows for identification of the effects of thin-
capitalization rules. The model is directly adopted from Buettner et al. (2012), and a similar, 
but less extensive explanation is found in the original paper. 
 
Buettner et al. (2012) divide firms into two “regimes”, based on whether an affiliate’s debt 
ratio is above the allowable safe haven ratio or not. The two regimes are separated by an 
indicator variable, 𝑑𝑖,𝑡, which equals 1 if an affiliate has excess debt, and 0 if it is 
unrestricted
132
. In the model, affiliates with excess debt face strictly binding thin-
capitalization rules, which theoretically imply that the tax rate sensitivity will not be the 
same for the two regimes. Buettner et al. (2012) presents the following two different 
equations, describing the relationship between the debt ratio and tax rate for the two regimes 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
0 = (1 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡) ∙ ?̃?𝑖,𝑡
0 = (1 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡) ∙ (𝛽1
0𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)                  (1) 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
1 = 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∙ ?̃?𝑖,𝑡
1 = 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (𝛽1
1𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)        (2) 
 
where the tax rate, 𝒯𝑖,𝑡, and the control variables, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, are observed, while ?̃?𝑖,𝑡
0  and ?̃?𝑖,𝑡
1  are 
latent variables depending on the outcome of  𝑑𝑖,𝑡.  Note that it is assumed that the only 
difference between the two regimes is the tax rate sensitivity, which is seen by the difference 
in the expected value of 𝛽1
𝑑𝑖,𝑡. For affiliates not facing restrictions, i.e. 𝑑𝑖,𝑡=0, the tax rate 
sensitivity should be positive, and thus 𝛽1
0 > 0. For affiliates facing strictly binding 
restrictions, 𝑑𝑖,𝑡=1, the tax rate sensitivity is expected to be zero, 𝛽1
1 = 0.  
 
To deal with the difficulties in assigning an affiliate to a regime, Buettner et al. (2012) 
exploit the relationship between the probability of a rule being binding, i.e. an affiliate being 
restricted (𝑑𝑖,𝑡=1), and a tightness-measure of the thin-capitalization rule. The tightness of a 
rule in country j at period t is defined as 
 
𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 =
1
1+𝜎𝑖,𝑡 
             (3) 
 
                                                 
132 Note that 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 0 also represent the case for countries without thin-capitalization rules. 
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where 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio. The tight variable captures the complete 
possible range of debt-to-equity ratios in the interval of 0-1. It takes the value of 0 if no rule 
is present (𝜎𝑖,𝑡 → ∞), and takes the value of 1 in the most restrictive case of 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 = 0. The 
relationship between the tight variable and the indicator variable is described by a linear 
probability function 
 
𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜑 ∙ 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡           (4) 
 
where 𝜑 is a positive parameter and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is random disturbance. It is now possible to 
formulate a general regression equation, based on the two regimes’ separate regression 
equations and the relationship between 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 and tight. By pooling equation (1) and (2), and 
inserting equation (4) for 𝑑𝑖,𝑡, the following regression equation is obtained 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = [(1 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡) ∙ 𝛽1
0𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + (1 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡) ∙ (𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)] + [𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝛽1
1𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∙
 (𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)]    
= 𝛽1
0𝒯𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝛽1
0𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝛽1
1𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)  
= 𝛽1
0𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + 𝒯𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (𝛽1
1 − 𝛽1
0) + (𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)  
= 𝛽1
0𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + 𝒯𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (𝜑 ∙ 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡) ∙ (𝛽1
1 − 𝛽1
0) + (𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡)  
= 𝛽1
0 ∙ 𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃 ∙ 𝒯𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡)        (5) 
where 𝜃 =  𝜑 ∙ (𝛽1
1 − 𝛽1
0) and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = max (𝑦𝑖,𝑡
0 , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
1 ). 
 
Looking at equation (5), we see that the standard tax rate effect of debt is captured by 𝛽1
0, 
and expected to be positive. The coefficient 𝜃 estimates how the presence and tightness of a 
thin-capitalization rule change the tax rate sensitivity of debt if rules are binding. 𝜃 is 
expected to be negative, since (𝛽1
1 − 𝛽1
0) < 0 and 𝜑 > 0. This is in line with the theoretical 
prediction of thin-capitalization rules reducing the tax rate sensitivity. Further, we see that 
the tighter the rule is, the more the tax rate sensitivity is reduced.  
 
In theory, the model above separates the effects of thin-capitalization rules on restricted 
firms from unrestricted firms. 𝛽1
0 is the tax rate sensitivity for unrestricted firms, and 𝜃 is the 
difference in tax rate sensitivity between restricted and unrestricted firms. However, the tight 
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variable is measured at the country-level, meaning that in reality it will not be able to 
separate restricted firms from unrestricted firms within a country. Thus, the regression 
measures the average effect of thin-capitalization rules within a country. Identification of the 
effect is consequently dependent on a sufficient number of firms being restricted – for which 
the probability increase with the tightness.  
 
In contrast to Buettner et al. (2012), we assume thin-capitalization rules to offer loopholes to 
some extent. As have been stressed, we are not able to explicitly control for loopholes, but 
the transformation from two separate regimes into one general regression equation shown 
above is still valid. First, note that the likelihood of rules being binding (and thus the 
likelihood of being restricted) is only dependent on the safe haven ratio. The safe haven 
ratio, and thus tightness, is the same regardless of loopholes, and, thus, the relationship 
between the likelihood of rules being binding and the tightness of the rule still holds. Next, 
recall that the theory section established that loopholes allow for the debt tax shield to 
remain positive even if the safe haven ratio is exceeded, but at the same time the utilization 
of loopholes increases the costs of debt. This means that restricted firms operate under 
another regime than unrestricted firms, even if the rules offer loopholes.  
 
What does change is the expectancy of the tax rate sensitivity of restricted firms, 𝛽1
1. In 
contrast to strictly binding rules, the tax rate sensitivity is expected to remain positive when 
there are loopholes, i.e. we expect 𝛽1
1 > 0. However, this does not invalidate the model 
above, we merely have to adjust the theoretically quantitative expected outcome. To see this, 
remember that though we expect the tax rate sensitivity of restricted firms to stay positive, 
we expect it to be lower than the tax rate sensitivity of unrestricted firms, i.e. 𝛽1
0 > 𝛽1
1 > 0. 
Now, re-examining the coefficient of the interaction term between the tax rate and the tight 
measure, 𝜃 =  𝜑 ∙ (𝛽1
1 − 𝛽1
0), we see that the expectancy of the coefficient to be negative 
still holds. The difference from Buettner et al. (2012) is that we would theoretically expect 
the coefficient to be smaller in magnitude. However, Buettner et al. (2012) does not control 
for loopholes, meaning that the empirical regressions are the same, so we expect the 
empirical results to be similar.   
 
Equation (5) presented above is the regression equation in column (8) in the regression tables 
presented in this thesis. However, the relationship above can be used to generate all 
regressions involving TIGHT. For instance, the equation for column (7) can be obtained in 
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the following way: In the model above, assume that the tax rate effect is the same for the two 
regimes, and that there instead is a level effect that differs. In equations (1) and (2), that 
means assuming the tax rate effect to be equal for the two regimes, 𝛽𝑇𝑎𝑥
0 = 𝛽𝑇𝑎𝑥
1 = 𝛽1, and 
adding a rule-dummy in both equations with different coefficients 𝛽𝑇𝐶𝑅
0 (= 0)133 and 
𝛽𝑇𝐶𝑅
1 (< 0). The resulting regression is 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 ∙ 𝒯𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝐶𝑅
0 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) 
 
where 𝛿 =  𝜑 ∙ (𝛽𝑇𝐶𝑅
1 − 𝛽𝑇𝐶𝑅
0 ) < 0. Since 𝛽𝑇𝐶𝑅
0 = 0, the second term disappears, and in the 
third term 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 can be dropped, since 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 are indicators for the same rule 
and almost perfectly correlated. 
                                                 
133 The level effect on unrestricted firms and in countries without rules should be zero.  
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Appendix C  
Survey form, Utenlandsoppgave, Statistics Norway 
 
Seksjo n fo r kredit tmarkedsstat ist ikk Utenlandsoppgave
P o stbo ks 8131 D ep, 0033 Oslo
T lf .: 21 09 00 00    F aks: 21 09 49 98 Inntektsår
1. Registreringsopplysninger
Skatteyters navn og adresse Organisasjonsnr.
Fødselsnr.
Kommunenr. og -navn Telefon Bransje
2. Opplysninger om det utenlandske selskap eller innretning
Navn og adresse
3. Skatteyters eierandel mv. i det utenlandske selskap eller innretning (NOK 1000)
I NOK 1000 i %
- direkte eiet
- indirekte eiet (se spesielt om utbytteopplysninger i veiledningen pkt. 3)
Innflytelse uten formelt eierskap Ja Nei
4. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
5. Transaksjoner mellom det utenlandske selskap eller innretning og skatteyter (NOK 1000)
-
a
b
c
d
e
6. Opplysninger fra utenlandsk selskaps eller innretnings resultatregnskap (NOK 1000)
a d
b e
c f
7. Opplysninger fra utenlandsk selskaps eller innretnings balanse (NOK 1000)
a e
b f
c g
d h
i
8. Underskrift
Skatteyters underskrift (gjentas med blokkskrift)
Aksjer/andeler ved 
regnskapsårets slutt
Pålydende pr. 
aksje/andel i valuta
Historisk kostpris i 
alt (NOK 1000)
Antall
Dato
(1)
(1)
(1)
Skatteyters økonomiske tilknytning til det utenlandske selskap eller innretning (NOK 1000)                   (1)                                              (2)
Sum egenkapital inkl. aksje-/andelskapital
Sum langsiktig gjeld
herav skip, maskiner, inventar o .l bygn, og 
annen fast eiend.
herav patenter og andre immatrielle eiendeler
Driftskostnader
Salg/ kjøp av varer og/eller anleggsmidler
Engangsvederlag og/eller løpende lisensavgift royalty for know how, 
opphavsrettigheter, rett til varemerke, patenter o .l.
Skatter
Årets overskudd
herav varer/kundefordringer
Langsiktig lånefordring på (1) og lånegjeld til (2) det utenlandske selskap eller 
innretning
Inntektsførte renter av langsiktige lånefordringer på (1) og kostnadsførte renter på 
lånegjeld (2)
Nettoresultat av finansielle poster
Sum anleggsmidler
Kortsiktige fordringer på (1) og gjeld til (2) det utenlandske selskap eller innretning
Inntektsførte renter av kortsiktig fordring (1) og kostnadsførte renter på gjeld (2)
Skatteyters garantiansvar for det utenlandske selskaps/innretnings gjeld (1) og 
inntektsførte garantiprovisjoner (2)
Skatteyters kostnadsførte tap på garanti/lån eller annet mellomværende
(2)
(2)
(1)
(1)
(1)
Sum kortsiktig gjeld
(2)
Leie, leasing, franchise eller befraktning
Kommisjoner/provisjoner
Driftsinntekter Resultat før skatt
Forskning og utvikling, tekniske/administrative eller lignende tjenester
Regnskapsperiode:
Utenlandske selskaps inntekter Utenlandske selskaps kostnader
(2)
(2)
Hovedaktivitet
Eierandel i %
Rettslig form
Navn og adresse på direkte eier hvis det utenlandske selskap eller innretning er helt eller 
delvis indirekte eiet av skatteyter eller av innretning hvor skatteyter har bestemmende 
innflytelse.
Skatteyters/direkte eiers andel                                              
av utdelt utbytte
Stemmeber.                 andel i 
%
Sum omløpsmidler Aksjer-/andelskapital
(2)
Omregningskurs:
Sted
RA - 0567
Regnskapsperiode:
Omregningskurs:
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Table C1: Available observations without missing values for dependent variables after 
duplicates, minority owned affiliates, and affiliates changing country have been removed 
 Year Observations Parent debt ratio Total debt ratio 
1990 2,359 0 0 
1991 2,345 0 0 
1992 2,337 1 0 
1993 2,267 3 0 
1994 2,226 2,028 0 
1995 2,264 2,110 0 
1996 2,395 2,194 0 
1997 2,473 2,275 0 
1998 2,491 2,331 0 
1999 3,023 2,644 2,340 
2000 3,546 2,421 2,414 
2001 4,047 3,495 3,488 
2002 4,221 2,905 3,051 
2003 4,234 3,151 3,054 
2004 3,982 2,805 2,906 
2005 4,125 2,595 2,852 
2006 4,077 2,315 2,667 
Total 52,412 33,273 22,772 
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Table C2: Number, share and mean debt ratios of foreign affiliates by country 
Country 
 
 
 
N 
 
 
Share (%) 
Mean 
Parent 
Debt 
  
 
N 
 
 
Share(%) 
Mean 
Total  
Debt 
 
Main 
sample 
Argentina  
 
48 0.31% 0.1461 
 
36 0.37% 0.4942 - 
Australia 
 
208 1.35% 0.1457 
 
139 1.45% 0.5995 Yes 
Austria 
 
141 0.91% 0.0223 
 
95 0.99% 0.5272 Yes 
Belgium 
 
335 2.17% 0.0786 
 
209 2.17% 0.5042 Yes 
Bulgaria 
 
20 0.13% 0.0000 
 
14 0.15% 0.3146 Yes 
Brazil 
 
173 1.12% 0.1057 
 
161 1.68% 0.4373 - 
Canada 
 
353 2.29% 0.1481 
 
224 2.33% 0.5522 Yes 
Chile 89 0.58% 0.1019 61 0.63% 0.4245 - 
China  139 0.90% 0.1114  123 1.28% 0.5268 - 
Colombia  18 0.12% 0.0717  15 0.16% 0.6225 - 
Croatia  13 0.08% 0.4284  10 0.10% 0.7026 Yes 
Cyprus 
 
44 0.28% 0.1272 
 
21 0.22% 0.4400 Yes 
Czech Republic 
 
135 0.87% 0.1013 
 
106 1.10% 0.5120 Yes 
Germany 
 
1076 6.97% 0.1074 
 
620 6.45% 0.6146 Yes 
Denmark 
 
1291 8.36% 0.0828 
 
741 7.71% 0.6024 Yes 
Egypt 
 
32 0.21% 0.0881 
 
28 0.29% 0.5210 - 
Estonia 
 
184 1.19% 0.1411 
 
169 1.76% 0.5552 Yes 
Finland 
 
486 3.15% 0.1755 
 
302 3.14% 0.5989 Yes 
France 
 
714 4.62% 0.0999 
 
419 4.36% 0.5715 Yes 
Greece 69 0.45% 0.1462 53 0.55% 0.5834 Yes 
Guatemala  14 0.09% 0.3075  8 0.08% 0.7018 - 
Hong Kong  168 1.09% 0.1148  90 0.94% 0.5354 - 
Hungary  65 0.42% 0.0899  48 0.50% 0.4978 Yes 
Iceland  23 0.15% 0.1123  14 0.15% 0.4113 - 
India  51 0.33% 0.0756  44 0.46% 0.4958 - 
Indonesia  47 0.30% 0.1161  37 0.39% 0.6252 - 
Ireland  144 0.93% 0.0969  87 0.91% 0.5740 Yes 
Italy  314 2.03% 0.1422  213 2.22% 0.7613 Yes 
Japan  109 0.71% 0.2860  69 0.72% 0.6151 Yes 
Lithuania 
 
113 0.73% 0.1770 
 
99 1.03% 0.5974 Yes 
Luxembourg 
 
66 0.43% 0.1008 
 
36 0.37% 0.3419 Yes 
Latvia 
 
114 0.74% 0.2217 
 
106 1.10% 0.5832 Yes 
Malaysia 138 0.89% 0.0936 99 1.03% 0.6244 - 
Malta 
 
5 0.03% 0.1165 
 
6 0.06% 0.3595 Yes 
Mexico 
 
40 0.26% 0.1409 
 
29 0.30% 0.6694 Yes 
Netherlands 
 
531 3.44% 0.0703 
 
343 3.57% 0.5078 Yes 
New Zealand 
 
39 0.25% 0.2621 
 
30 0.31% 0.6969 Yes 
Pakistan 
 
0 0.00% - 
 
6 0.06% 0.6837 - 
Panama 
 
16 0.10% 0.2154 
 
11 0.11% 0.7735 - 
Peru 
 
10 0.06% 0.0000 
 
15 0.16% 0.5592 - 
Philippines 
 
32 0.21% 0.2164 
 
29 0.30% 0.7256 - 
Poland 
 
266 1.72% 0.1678 
 
216 2.25% 0.4798 Yes 
Portugal 
 
206 1.33% 0.1853 
 
124 1.29% 0.5958 Yes 
Romania 
 
21 0.14% 0.2023 
 
20 0.21% 0.4150 - 
Russia 
 
69 0.45% 0.1172 
 
52 0.54% 0.4537 - 
Singapore 
 
446 2.89% 0.1198 
 
272 2.83% 0.4974 - 
Slovakia 
 
31 0.20% 0.1787 
 
24 0.25% 0.4508 Yes 
Slovenia 
 
2 0.01% 0.0000 
 
0 0.00% - Yes 
Spain 
 
298 1.93% 0.1668 
 
199 2.07% 0.5654 Yes 
South Africa 60 0.39% 0.2135 49 0.51% 0.6957 - 
South Korea  67 0.43% 0.1206  44 0.46% 0.4206 Yes 
Sri Lanka  13 0.08% 0.0229  9 0.09% 0.3338 - 
Sweden 
 
2927 18.96% 0.1062 
 
1671 17.39% 0.6169 Yes 
Switzerland 204 1.32% 0.1116 108 1.12% 0.5024 Yes 
Thailand 
 
52 0.34% 0.1530 
 
31 0.32% 0.5053 - 
Turkey 
 
30 0.19% 0.0827 
 
31 0.32% 0.5407 Yes 
UK 1707 11.06% 0.1212 958 9.97% 0.5551 Yes 
Ukraine 
 
27 0.17% 0.0092 
 
22 0.23% 0.4764 - 
USA 
 
1339 8.67% 0.1349 
 
772 8.03% 0.5482 Yes 
Venezuela 
 
47 0.30% 0.0942 
 
27 0.28% 0.3378 - 
Vietnam 
 
21 0.14% 0.0233 
 
16 0.17% 0.3881 - 
Total 
 
15440 100% 0.1184 
 
9610 100% 0.2840  
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Table C3: Correlation matrix of regression variables in the main sample 
           
 Parent 
debt ratio 
Total debt 
ratio 
STR TCR STR x 
TCR 
TIGHT STR x 
TIGHT  
Loss 
carry- 
forward 
Log of 
lending 
rate 
Log of 
revenue 
Total debt ratio 0.326          
STR 0.016 -0.0113         
TCR 0.012 -0.0902 0.382        
STR x TCR 0.019 -0.080 0.592 0.958       
TIGHT  0.014 -0.084 0.314 0.891 0.844      
STR x TIGHT 0.020 -0.078 0.485 0.890 0.905 0.974     
Loss carryforward 0.122 0.128 0.013 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.017    
Log of lending rate 0.036 0.021 0.189 0.024 0.055 -0.013 0.019 0.0292   
Log of revenue -0.018 0.217 0.080 0.087 0.089 0.102 0.107 -0.0686 -0.0365  
Asset tangibility  -0.065 -0.088 -0.066 -0.008 -0.026 -0.031 -0.039 0.0762 0.0310 -0.013 
Bolded (italicized) correlations are significant at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
 
Table C4: Correlation matrix of regressions variables in extended sample 
 Parent 
debt ratio 
Total debt 
ratio 
STR TCR STR x 
TCR 
TIGHT STR x 
TIGHT  
Loss 
carry- 
forward 
Log of 
lending 
rate 
Log of 
revenue 
Asset 
tangibility 
Log 
inflation 
Corruption 
Total debt ratio 0.340             
STR 0.018 0.032            
TCR 0.011 -0.029 0.373           
STR x TCR 0.017 -0.014 0.575 0.957          
TIGHT  0.015 -0.025 0.332 0.901 0.861         
STR x TIGHT 0.020 -0.015 0.490 0.892 0.914 0.975        
Loss carryforward 0.101 0.128 0.038 0.018 0.026 0.032 0.036       
Log of lending rate 0.027 -0.041 0.162 -0.124 -0.085 -0.137 -0.106 0.011      
Log of revenue -0.021 0.192 0.050 0.082 0.078 0.093 0.093 -0.081 -0.048     
Asset tangibility  -0.066 -0.098 -0.042 -0.008 -0.025 -0.026 -0.034 0.077 0.060 0.003    
Log of inflation 0.032 -0.036 -0.040 -0.040 -0.052 -0.059 -0.065 0.007 0.326 -0.015 0.016   
Corruption -0.050 0.054 -0.087 -0.021 0.006 0.015 0.026 -0.041 -0.477 0.017 -0.034 -0.337  
Creditor rights -0.014 -0.015 -0.024 0.259 0.203 0.293 0.221 -0.011 -0.085 0.009 -0.011 0.0268 0.115 
Bolded (italicized) correlations are significant at the 1% (5%) level. 
 84 
Appendix D 
Main Samples Extended with Extra Control Variables 
Parent debt ratio 
Table D1: Main sample with log of inflation and corruption as extra control variables 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0413  0.0474 0.0320 0.1820* 0.1820* 0.0798 0.0436 0.1746* 0.1746* 
 (0.046)  (0.047) (0.049) (0.103) (0.103) (0.057) (0.046) (0.103) (0.103) 
TCR  0.0106 0.0113  0.0745* 0.0113     
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.039) (0.009)     
TIGHT       0.0654  0.2450* 0.0582 
       (0.045)  (0.145) (0.045) 
STR x TCR    0.0179 -0.1949* -0.1949*     
    (0.026) (0.113) (0.113)     
STR x TIGHT        0.1179 -0.5766 -0.5766 
        (0.128) (0.417) (0.417) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0189*** 0.0191*** 0.0189*** 0.0189*** 0.0191*** 0.0191*** 0.0190*** 0.0189*** 0.0190*** 0.0190*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0305*** -0.0302*** -0.0300*** -0.0299*** -0.0331*** -0.0331*** -0.0304*** -0.0299*** -0.0331*** -0.0331*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0077 -0.0076 -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.0079 -0.0078 -0.0080 -0.0080 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0029* 0.0027* 0.0028* 0.0029* 0.0027* 0.0027* 0.0029* 0.0029* 0.0027* 0.0027* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.0100** -0.0089** -0.0095** -0.0099** -0.0081* -0.0081* -0.0091** -0.0097** -0.0083* -0.0083* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
           
Observations 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 9,863 
R2 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.067 
Nr. of affiliates 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
Total debt ratio 
Table D2: Main sample with log of inflation and corruption as extra control variables 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0074  0.0038 0.0855 0.5286** 0.5286** 0.0826 0.0009 0.4578** 0.4578** 
 (0.092)  (0.088) (0.149) (0.252) (0.252) (0.131) (0.091) (0.216) (0.216) 
TCR  -0.0069 -0.0068  0.1756*** -0.0325     
  (0.038) (0.038)  (0.065) (0.048)     
TIGHT       0.0975  0.7219** -0.0321 
       (0.125)  (0.284) (0.160) 
STR x TCR    -0.1167 -0.6423** -0.6423**     
    (0.146) (0.272) (0.272)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.1429 -2.3272** -2.3272** 
        (0.486) (1.103) (1.103) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0512*** 0.0512*** 0.0512*** 0.0512*** 0.0522*** 0.0522*** 0.0514*** 0.0512*** 0.0519*** 0.0519*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0105 0.0101 0.0101 0.0089 0.0100 0.0100 0.0112 0.0101 0.0093 0.0093 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0252*** 0.0251*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0252*** 0.0251*** 0.0250*** 0.0250*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0530* -0.0533** -0.0533** -0.0543** -0.0539** -0.0539** -0.0527* -0.0532* -0.0532* -0.0532* 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption -0.0060 -0.0060 -0.0061 -0.0052 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0050 -0.0061 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
           
Observations 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 6,424 
R2 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.085 
Nr. of affiliates 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average  
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Main Samples Extended with Extra Years 
Parent debt ratio 
Table D3: Main sample, period extended to 1994-2006 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.0490  -0.0416 -0.0550 0.0698 0.0698 -0.0303 -0.0477 0.0223 0.0223 
 (0.047)  (0.048) (0.051) (0.090) (0.090) (0.056) (0.047) (0.090) (0.090) 
TCR  0.0105 0.0096  0.0635** 0.0097     
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.032) (0.009)     
TIGHT       0.0317  0.1343 0.0290 
       (0.046)  (0.120) (0.046) 
STR x TCR    0.0141 -0.1661* -0.1661*     
    (0.027) (0.093) (0.093)     
STR x TIGHT        0.0539 -0.3250 -0.3250 
        (0.135) (0.355) (0.355) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0246*** 0.0246*** 0.0247*** 0.0246*** 0.0248*** 0.0248*** 0.0247*** 0.0246*** 0.0246*** 0.0246*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0134* -0.0126 -0.0127* -0.0129* -0.0146* -0.0146* -0.0132* -0.0131* -0.0146* -0.0146* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0067*** 0.0068*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0197* -0.0198** -0.0197* -0.0197* -0.0197** -0.0197** -0.0197* -0.0197* -0.0197** -0.0197** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
           
Observations 13,686 13,686 13,686 13,686 13,686 13,686 13,686 13,686 13,686 13,686 
R2 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 
Nr. of affiliates 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
Total debt ratio 
Table D4: Main sample, period extended to 1999-2006 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.0037  0.0117 -0.0135 0.4345** 0.4345** 0.1290 0.0028 0.4145** 0.4145** 
 (0.088)  (0.088) (0.113) (0.190) (0.190) (0.106) (0.086) (0.185) (0.185) 
TCR  0.0300 0.0302  0.1868*** 0.0115     
  (0.024) (0.024)  (0.055) (0.027)     
TIGHT       0.2006**  0.6849*** 0.1197 
       (0.087)  (0.240) (0.101) 
STR x TCR    0.0155 -0.5413*** -0.5413***     
    (0.083) (0.189) (0.189)     
STR x TIGHT        0.3272 -1.7442** -1.7442** 
        (0.307) (0.826) (0.826) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0565*** 0.0566*** 0.0566*** 0.0565*** 0.0573*** 0.0573*** 0.0567*** 0.0565*** 0.0571*** 0.0571*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0389*** 0.0393*** 0.0393*** 0.0389*** 0.0415*** 0.0415*** 0.0386*** 0.0387*** 0.0389*** 0.0389*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0280*** 0.0280*** 0.0280*** 0.0281*** 0.0278*** 0.0278*** 0.0281*** 0.0281*** 0.0279*** 0.0279*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0296 -0.0287 -0.0287 -0.0295 -0.0284 -0.0284 -0.0288 -0.0292 -0.0287 -0.0287 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
           
Observations 8,335 8,335 8,335 8,335 8,335 8,335 8,335 8,335 8,335 8,335 
R2 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.088 0.088 0.086 0.086 0.087 0.087 
Nr. of affiliates 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
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Main Samples Extended with Extra Countries 
Parent debt ratio 
Table D5: Main sample, 1996-2004, with extra countries 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0199  0.0258 0.0155 0.1482* 0.1482* 0.0482 0.0214 0.1360 0.1360 
 (0.045)  (0.046) (0.047) (0.086) (0.086) (0.056) (0.046) (0.086) (0.086) 
TCR  0.0085 0.0089  0.0665** 0.0073     
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.032) (0.009)     
TIGHT       0.0478  0.2193* 0.0332 
       (0.043)  (0.122) (0.044) 
STR x TCR    0.0095 -0.1828* -0.1828*     
    (0.028) (0.094) (0.094)     
STR x TIGHT        0.0635 -0.5743 -0.5743 
        (0.132) (0.372) (0.372) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0186*** 0.0187*** 0.0186*** 0.0186*** 0.0187*** 0.0187*** 0.0187*** 0.0186*** 0.0187*** 0.0187*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0285*** -0.0282*** -0.0280*** -0.0283*** -0.0295*** -0.0295*** -0.0282*** -0.0283*** -0.0297*** -0.0297*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0032* 0.0032* 0.0032* 0.0032* 0.0032* 0.0032* 0.0032* 0.0032* 0.0032* 0.0032* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0125 -0.0125 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
           
Observations 11,152 11,152 11,152 11,152 11,152 11,152 11,152 11,152 11,152 11,152 
R2 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 
Nr. of affiliates 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
Total debt ratio 
Table D6: Main sample 1999-2004, with extra countries 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.0551  -0.0548 -0.0170 0.2313 0.2313 0.0050 -0.0550 0.1807 0.1807 
 (0.087)  (0.083) (0.131) (0.207) (0.207) (0.114) (0.086) (0.175) (0.175) 
TCR  0.0018 0.0005  0.1004* -0.0205     
  (0.031) (0.031)  (0.052) (0.040)     
TIGHT       0.0804  0.3959* -0.0207 
       (0.101)  (0.227) (0.144) 
STR x TCR    -0.0624 -0.3732* -0.3732*     
    (0.123) (0.223) (0.223)     
STR x TIGHT        0.0031 -1.2858 -1.2858 
        (0.428) (0.948) (0.948) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0485*** 0.0485*** 0.0485*** 0.0486*** 0.0490*** 0.0490*** 0.0486*** 0.0485*** 0.0488*** 0.0488*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0101 -0.0094 -0.0101 -0.0109 -0.0072 -0.0072 -0.0084 -0.0101 -0.0078 -0.0078 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0805*** -0.0806*** -0.0805*** -0.0812*** -0.0813*** -0.0813*** -0.0802*** -0.0805*** -0.0809*** -0.0809*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
           
Observations 7,340 7,340 7,340 7,340 7,340 7,340 7,340 7,340 7,340 7,340 
R2 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.079 
Nr. of affiliates 2,468 2,468 2,468 2,468 2,468 2,468 2,468 2,468 2,468 2,468 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
  
  
87 
Creditor Rights Included as a Control Variable 
Main sample – Parent debt ratio 
Table D7: Main sample, with creditor rights as an additional control variable 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0201  0.0300 0.0011 0.1778* 0.1778* 0.0757 0.0240 0.1755* 0.1755* 
 (0.046)  (0.048) (0.048) (0.104) (0.104) (0.059) (0.047) (0.104) (0.104) 
TCR  0.0175** 0.0179**  0.0846** 0.0175*     
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.040) (0.009)     
TIGHT       0.0909**  0.2738* 0.0824* 
       (0.045)  (0.146) (0.044) 
STR x TCR    0.0356 -0.2072* -0.2072*     
    (0.025) (0.113) (0.113)     
STR x TIGHT        0.1904 -0.5908 -0.5908 
        (0.126) (0.416) (0.416) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0189*** 0.0191*** 0.0190*** 0.0190*** 0.0192*** 0.0192*** 0.0191*** 0.0190*** 0.0191*** 0.0191*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0299*** -0.0293*** -0.0292*** -0.0288*** -0.0328*** -0.0328*** -0.0299*** -0.0289*** -0.0330*** -0.0330*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0039** 0.0040** 0.0040** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0040** 0.0040** 0.0039** 0.0039** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0175 -0.0175 -0.0176 -0.0175 -0.0176 -0.0176 -0.0178 -0.0177 -0.0179 -0.0179 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Creditor rights -0.0501* -0.0498* -0.0503* -0.0505* -0.0489 -0.0489 -0.0513* -0.0512* -0.0504* -0.0504* 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
           
Observations 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 
R2 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.068 
Nr. of affiliates 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
Table D8: Main sample, excluding observations where creditor rights are missing 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0129  0.0227 -0.0057 0.1766* 0.1766* 0.0664 0.0164 0.1711 0.1711 
 (0.046)  (0.048) (0.048) (0.104) (0.104) (0.059) (0.047) (0.104) (0.104) 
TCR  0.0175** 0.0178**  0.0872** 0.0173*     
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.040) (0.009)     
TIGHT       0.0878*  0.2795* 0.0789* 
       (0.045)  (0.146) (0.045) 
STR x TCR    0.0346 -0.2155* -0.2155*     
    (0.025) (0.114) (0.114)     
STR x TIGHT        0.1781 -0.6191 -0.6191 
        (0.128) (0.419) (0.419) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0192*** 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0192*** 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0283*** -0.0277*** -0.0276*** -0.0272*** -0.0314*** -0.0314*** -0.0283*** -0.0274*** -0.0315*** -0.0315*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0038** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0039** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0173 -0.0174 -0.0175 -0.0174 -0.0175 -0.0175 -0.0177 -0.0175 -0.0177 -0.0177 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
           
Observations 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 
R2 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.067 
Nr. of affiliates 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
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Extended sample – Total debt ratio 
Table D9: Extended sample, with creditor rights as an additional control variable 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.0775  -0.0561 -0.1353 0.1146 0.1146 0.0428 -0.0694 0.1267 0.1267 
 (0.078)  (0.080) (0.090) (0.146) (0.146) (0.099) (0.079) (0.146) (0.146) 
TCR  0.0430*** 0.0420***  0.1048** 0.0316**     
  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.043) (0.016)     
TIGHT       0.1930***  0.3420* 0.1582** 
       (0.070)  (0.185) (0.076) 
STR x TCR    0.0942* -0.2258* -0.2258*     
    (0.049) (0.135) (0.135)     
STR x TIGHT        0.5112** -0.5673 -0.5673 
        (0.229) (0.615) (0.615) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0559*** 0.0557*** 0.0558*** 0.0557*** 0.0560*** 0.0560*** 0.0559*** 0.0558*** 0.0560*** 0.0560*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0156 0.0172 0.0174 0.0160 0.0190 0.0190 0.0166 0.0157 0.0172 0.0172 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0236*** 0.0236*** 0.0238*** 0.0238*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0495*** -0.0487*** -0.0487*** -0.0489*** -0.0488*** -0.0488*** -0.0491*** -0.0491*** -0.0492*** -0.0492*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0033 0.0033 0.0032 0.0033 0.0031 0.0031 0.0032 0.0033 0.0031 0.0031 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.0062 -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0066 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0054 -0.0038 -0.0038 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Creditor rights 0.0254* 0.0219 0.0224 0.0234* 0.0228 0.0228 0.0213 0.0222 0.0218 0.0218 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
           
Observations 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 
R2 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.077 0.078 0.078 
Nr. of affiliates 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
Table D10: Extended sample, excluding observations where creditor rights are missing 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.0723  -0.0508 -0.1333 0.1180 0.1180 0.0515 -0.0644 0.1326 0.1326 
 (0.079)  (0.080) (0.090) (0.147) (0.147) (0.099) (0.079) (0.146) (0.146) 
TCR  0.0441*** 0.0433***  0.1054** 0.0330**     
  (0.015) (0.016)  (0.044) (0.016)     
TIGHT       0.2001***  0.3440* 0.1666** 
       (0.070)  (0.186) (0.076) 
STR x TCR    0.0986** -0.2233* -0.2233*     
    (0.049) (0.135) (0.135)     
STR x TIGHT        0.5378** -0.5472 -0.5472 
        (0.230) (0.614) (0.614) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0556*** 0.0555*** 0.0556*** 0.0555*** 0.0558*** 0.0558*** 0.0557*** 0.0556*** 0.0558*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0147 0.0165 0.0166 0.0152 0.0183 0.0183 0.0159 0.0149 0.0165 0.0165 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0238*** 0.0238*** 0.0238*** 0.0238*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0238*** 0.0238*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0496*** -0.0488*** -0.0487*** -0.0490*** -0.0488*** -0.0488*** -0.0491*** -0.0492*** -0.0492*** -0.0492*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0034 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0033 0.0032 0.0032 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0056 -0.0064 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0051 -0.0035 -0.0035 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
           
Observations 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 
R2 0.077 0.077 0.078 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.077 0.078 0.078 
Nr. of affiliates 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
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Excluding Affiliates Changing Majority Owner 
Main sample – Parent debt ratio 
Table D11: Main sample, excluding affiliates changing majority owner 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.0038  -0.0070 0.0140 0.1435 0.1435 -0.0050 -0.0059 0.1248 0.1248 
 (0.055)  (0.055) (0.059) (0.112) (0.112) (0.067) (0.055) (0.112) (0.112) 
TCR  -0.0058 -0.0059  0.0653 -0.0064     
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.040) (0.011)     
TIGHT       -0.0020  0.2481 -0.0167 
       (0.051)  (0.154) (0.053) 
STR x TCR    -0.0351 -0.2211* -0.2211*     
    (0.034) (0.119) (0.119)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.1096 -0.8175* -0.8175* 
        (0.161) (0.478) (0.478) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0136** 0.0135** 0.0136** 0.0135** 0.0137** 0.0137** 0.0136** 0.0135** 0.0136** 0.0136** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0184 -0.0184 -0.0185 -0.0192 -0.0224* -0.0224* -0.0184 -0.0186 -0.0224* -0.0224* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0057** 0.0057** 0.0057** 0.0056** 0.0056** 0.0056** 0.0057** 0.0057** 0.0056** 0.0056** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0058 -0.0058 -0.0058 -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0058 -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0059 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
           
Observations 7,388 7,388 7,388 7,388 7,388 7,388 7,388 7,388 7,388 7,388 
R2 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 
Nr. of affiliates 2,256 2,256 2,256 2,256 2,256 2,256 2,256 2,256 2,256 2,256 
Parent Fixed Effects  no no no no no no no no no no 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample average. 
 
Extended sample – Total debt ratio 
Table D12: Extended sample, excluding affiliates changing majority owner 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.0948  -0.0871 -0.0797 0.2142 0.2142 0.0075 -0.0894 0.2214 0.2214 
 (0.100)  (0.099) (0.116) (0.166) (0.166) (0.109) (0.098) (0.161) (0.161) 
TCR  0.0139 0.0119  0.1301*** -0.0046     
  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.046) (0.025)     
TIGHT       0.1653**  0.5668*** 0.0746 
       (0.084)  (0.202) (0.101) 
STR x TCR    -0.0280 -0.4159*** -0.4159***     
    (0.077) (0.160) (0.160)     
STR x TIGHT        0.2407 -1.5192** -1.5192** 
        (0.304) (0.724) (0.724) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0529*** 0.0527*** 0.0529*** 0.0529*** 0.0533*** 0.0533*** 0.0530*** 0.0529*** 0.0532*** 0.0532*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0325** 0.0327** 0.0330** 0.0324** 0.0361*** 0.0361*** 0.0331** 0.0325** 0.0350*** 0.0350*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0233*** 0.0234*** 0.0233*** 0.0233*** 0.0232*** 0.0232*** 0.0234*** 0.0234*** 0.0233*** 0.0233*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0206 -0.0204 -0.0202 -0.0208 -0.0208 -0.0208 -0.0201 -0.0203 -0.0207 -0.0207 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0024 0.0025 0.0023 0.0024 0.0021 0.0021 0.0023 0.0024 0.0020 0.0020 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption -0.0083 -0.0081 -0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0053 -0.0053 -0.0070 -0.0081 -0.0051 -0.0051 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
           
Observations 7,224 7,224 7,224 7,224 7,224 7,224 7,224 7,224 7,224 7,224 
R2 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.046 0.048 0.048 
Nr. of affiliates 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234 
Parent Fixed Effects  no no no no no no no no no no 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
 90 
Affiliates of the two Largest Parents 
Main sample – Parent debt ratio 
Table D13: Affiliates of the two largest parents included in the main sample 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -0.1738**  -0.1597** -0.2637*** -0.1912* -0.1912* -0.0694 -0.1699** -0.1969 -0.1969 
 (0.079)  (0.079) (0.093) (0.109) (0.109) (0.082) (0.079) (0.129) (0.129) 
TCR  0.0476*** 0.0460***  0.0325 0.0455***     
  (0.013) (0.012)  (0.037) (0.012)     
TIGHT       0.1636***  -0.0436 0.1595*** 
       (0.058)  (0.180) (0.056) 
STR x TCR    0.1318*** 0.0401 0.0401     
    (0.036) (0.111) (0.111)     
STR x TIGHT        0.5063*** 0.6268 0.6268 
        (0.182) (0.582) (0.582) 
Loss Carryforward -0.0128** -0.0129** -0.0130** -0.0131** -0.0130** -0.0130** -0.0125** -0.0126** -0.0126** -0.0126** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0264 -0.0225 -0.0261 -0.0227 -0.0250 -0.0250 -0.0280 -0.0245 -0.0236 -0.0236 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
Ln(Revenue) -0.0007 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  0.0157 0.0146 0.0142 0.0144 0.0143 0.0143 0.0139 0.0142 0.0143 0.0143 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
           
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 
R2 0.058 0.063 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.064 
Nr. of affiliates 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 
Parent Fixed Effects  no no no no no no no no no no 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
 
Extended sample – Total debt ratio 
Table D14: Affiliates of the two largest parents included in the extended sample 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR -1.1092***  -1.1111*** -1.3661** -1.5043 -1.5043 -1.2514*** -1.1501*** -1.1887** -1.1887** 
 (0.424)  (0.425) (0.605) (0.970) (0.970) (0.421) (0.412) (0.518) (0.518) 
TCR  -0.0088 0.0174  -0.0492 0.0963     
  (0.026) (0.028)  (0.167) (0.187)     
TIGHT       -0.1692  -0.0602 -0.2123 
       (0.296)  (0.582) (0.350) 
STR x TCR    0.2882 0.4490 0.4490     
    (0.555) (1.082) (1.082)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.6625 -0.4692 -0.4692 
        (1.083) (2.120) (2.120) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0165 0.0127 0.0165 0.0167 0.0168 0.0168 0.0165 0.0162 0.0163 0.0163 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0464 -0.0265 -0.0460 -0.0461 -0.0471 -0.0471 -0.0491 -0.0491 -0.0493 -0.0493 
 (0.055) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0212*** 0.0209*** 0.0213*** 0.0213*** 0.0213*** 0.0213*** 0.0213*** 0.0213*** 0.0213*** 0.0213*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Asset tangibility  0.0431 0.0378 0.0431 0.0442 0.0447 0.0447 0.0435 0.0426 0.0428 0.0428 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0155 0.0204 0.0156 0.0161 0.0164 0.0164 0.0157 0.0152 0.0154 0.0154 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Corruption 0.0240 0.0169 0.0237 0.0200 0.0185 0.0185 0.0231 0.0242 0.0238 0.0238 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
           
Observations 723 723 723 723 723 723 723 723 723 723 
R2 0.082 0.067 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 
Nr. of affiliates 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 
Parent Fixed Effects  no no no no no no no no no no 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
  
91 
Regressions Excluding Affiliates of the Two Largest Parents 
Extended sample – Total debt ratio 
Table D15: Extended sample excluding affiliates of the two largest parents 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0627  0.0782 0.0503 0.3193** 0.3193** 0.1400 0.0662 0.2914** 0.2914** 
 (0.084)  (0.082) (0.102) (0.155) (0.155) (0.099) (0.084) (0.148) (0.148) 
TCR  0.0222 0.0238  0.1192*** 0.0100     
  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.044) (0.024)     
TIGHT       0.1305  0.4144** 0.0667 
       (0.080)  (0.191) (0.097) 
STR x TCR    0.0233 -0.3371** -0.3371**     
    (0.073) (0.153) (0.153)     
STR x TIGHT        0.2241 -1.0731 -1.0731 
        (0.294) (0.694) (0.694) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0566*** 0.0568*** 0.0566*** 0.0566*** 0.0570*** 0.0570*** 0.0567*** 0.0566*** 0.0569*** 0.0569*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0188 0.0201* 0.0198* 0.0189 0.0225* 0.0225* 0.0195* 0.0189 0.0208* 0.0208* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0278*** 0.0278*** 0.0278*** 0.0278*** 0.0277*** 0.0277*** 0.0279*** 0.0279*** 0.0278*** 0.0278*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0460** -0.0452** -0.0453** -0.0458** -0.0454** -0.0454** -0.0456** -0.0458** -0.0457** -0.0457** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0017 0.0015 0.0016 0.0017 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0017 0.0015 0.0015 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.0148** -0.0149** -0.0145** -0.0149** -0.0122* -0.0122* -0.0136* -0.0145* -0.0124* -0.0124* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
           
Observations 8,887 8,887 8,887 8,887 8,887 8,887 8,887 8,887 8,887 8,887 
R2 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.084 0.084 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 
Nr. of affiliates 2,516 2,516 2,516 2,516 2,516 2,516 2,516 2,516 2,516 2,516 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
 
 92 
Appendix E 
Table E1: Mean values of the variables parent debt ratio and total debt ratio before and 
after the introduction of a thin-capitalization rule. The table includes all observations in 
countries with a meaningful number of observations.  *,**,*** indicates if the mean value 
ex-post is statistically different from the value ex-ante at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 Parent debt ratio Total debt ratio 
 Observations  Mean Observations  Mean 
Country Before After  Before After Before After  Before After 
Argentina 17 31  0.117 0.162 0 36  - 0.494 
Chile 41 48  0.077 0.123 14 47  0.441 0.420 
Denmark 581 710  0.096 0.072** 0 741  - 0.602 
Italy 256 58  0.136 0.170 142 71  0.766 0.752 
Latvia 63 51  0.227 0.216 47 59  0.589 0.578 
Lithuania 82 31  0.187 0.152 59 40  0.596 0.600 
Luxembourg 47 19  0.126 0.039 15 21  0.428 0.281 
Poland 59 207  0.202 0.158 0 216  - 0.480 
Portugal 33 173  0.329 0.158*** 0 124  - 0.596 
Russia 37 32  0.136 0.096 15 37  0.378 0.484 
 
 
Table E2: Mean values of the variables parent debt ratio and total debt ratio before and 
after the introduction of a thin-capitalization rule. The table only includes observations 
from affiliates that are observed both before and after the change.  *,**,*** indicates if the 
mean value ex-post is statistically different from the value ex-ante at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
 Parent debt ratio Total debt ratio 
 Number of 
affiliates 
Mean Number of 
affiliates 
 Mean 
Country Before After  Before After 
Argentina 3  0.135 0.067 0  - - 
Chile 6  0.049 0.135 6  0.416 0.401 
Denmark 104  0.092 0.075 0  - - 
Italy 22  0.151 0.163 23  0.767 0.793 
Latvia 10  0.252 0.248 11  0.567 0.599 
Lithuania 11  0.181 0.150 10  0.604 0.643 
Luxembourg 9  0.223 0.020 8  0.527 0.150* 
Poland 16  0.253 0.158 0  - - 
Portugal 18  0.291 0.198 0  - - 
Russia 8  0.160 0.050 7  0.334 0.333 
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Table E3: Mean values of the variables parent debt ratio and total debt ratio before and 
after a change in the tightness of a thin-capitalization rule. The table includes all 
observations in the given countries.  *,**,*** indicates if the mean value ex-post is 
statistically different from the value ex-ante at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 Parent debt ratio Total debt ratio 
 Observations  Mean Observations  Mean 
Country Before After  Before After Before After  Before After 
           
Tightened           
Australia 65 43  0.171 0.217 0 29  - 0.726 
Canada 195 158  0.162 0.131 55 169  0.557 0.551 
Germany 664 412  0.120 0.104 164 456  0.608 0.617 
Hungary 29 36  0.089 0.091 10 38  0.677 0.451** 
           
Loosened           
Australia 43 100  0.217 0.099*** 29 110  0.726 0.566*** 
Spain 46 252  0.227 0.156* 0 0  - - 
 
 
Table E4: Mean values of the variables parent debt ratio and total debt ratio before and 
after a change in the tightness of a thin-capitalization rule. The table only includes 
observations from affiliates that are observed both before and after the change.  *,**,*** 
indicates if the mean value ex-post is statistically different from the value ex-ante at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 Parent debt ratio Total debt ratio 
 # of  
affiliates 
Mean # of 
affiliates 
 Mean 
Country Before After  Before After 
         
Tightened         
Australia 10  0.173 0.181 0  - - 
Canada 26  0.169 0.156 25  0.541 0.527 
Germany 69  0.102 0.082 66  0.628 0.615 
Hungary 5  0.199 0.205 5  0.701 0.536 
 
Loosened 
        
Australia 16  0.157 0.129 17  0.691 0.636 
Spain 24  0.263 0.215 0  - - 
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Subsample: Never Rule 
Table E5: Subsample of the main and extended sample, including only countries that did not 
have a rule in the period 1996-2004 in the main subsample and 1994-2006 in the extended 
subsample 
 Parent debt ratio Total debt ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Main sample Extended sample Main sample Extended sample 
STR 0.2598 -0.1366 0.6805** -0.0683 
 (0.177) (0.131) (0.262) (0.229) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0120 0.0284*** 0.0451*** 0.0514*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0655** 0.0001 -0.0173 0.0025 
 (0.029) (0.015) (0.035) (0.025) 
Ln(Revenue) -0.0002 0.0031 0.0342*** 0.0251*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0364* -0.0331** -0.0063 -0.0104 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.035) (0.025) 
Ln(Inflation)  0.0011  -0.0012 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Corruption  -0.0113*  -0.0288** 
  (0.006)  (0.012) 
     
Observations 3,218 5,749 2,085 3,612 
R2 0.107 0.087 0.100 0.088 
Nr. of affiliates 949 1,339 727 1,052 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
 
Table E6: Subsample of the main and extended sample, including only countries that did not 
have a rule in the period 1996-2004 in the main subsample and 1994-2006 in the extended 
subsample (Excluding affiliates of the two largest parents) 
 Parent debt ratio Total debt ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Main sample Extended sample Main sample Extended sample 
STR 0.2862 -0.1194 0.7222*** -0.0059 
 (0.177) (0.136) (0.259) (0.228) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0152* 0.0323*** 0.0465*** 0.0535*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0612* 0.0085 -0.0237 0.0032 
 (0.032) (0.015) (0.037) (0.025) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0012 0.0039 0.0367*** 0.0284*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0439** -0.0374** -0.0225 -0.0182 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.033) (0.023) 
Ln(Inflation)  0.0021  -0.0010 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Corruption  -0.0151**  -0.0319*** 
  (0.007)  (0.012) 
     
Observations 2,960 5,313 1,958 3,413 
R2 0.111 0.091 0.109 0.094 
Nr. of affiliates 888 1,250 688 996 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
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Subsample: Always Rule 
Parent debt ratio 
Table E7: Subsample of the main and extended sample, including only countries that had a 
rule during 1996-2004 in the main subsample and 1994-2006 in the extended subsample  
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 Main subsample Extended subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
STR -0.1582** -0.2712* -0.1599** -0.7263* -0.7263* -0.1576*** -0.1901* -0.1571*** -0.4892* -0.4892* 
 (0.062) (0.145) (0.062) (0.407) (0.407) (0.055) (0.105) (0.054) (0.284) (0.284) 
TIGHT  -0.1444  -0.7404 -0.2326  -0.0463  -0.4392 -0.0924 
  (0.141)  (0.507) (0.174)  (0.109)  (0.355) (0.123) 
STR x TIGHT    -0.2365 1.5674 1.5674   -0.0255 1.0704 1.0704 
   (0.333) (1.163) (1.163)   (0.270) (0.862) (0.862) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0178*** 0.0176*** 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 0.0200*** 0.0200*** 0.0200*** 0.0202*** 0.0202*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0338** -0.0355*** -0.0350** -0.0345*** -0.0345*** -0.0523*** -0.0524*** -0.0524*** -0.0490*** -0.0490*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0085*** 0.0084*** 0.0085*** 0.0085*** 0.0085*** 0.0102*** 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 0.0102*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  0.0276 0.0280 0.0278 0.0284 0.0284 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0039 0.0039 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Ln(Inflation)      0.0103** 0.0103** 0.0103** 0.0099** 0.0099** 
      (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Corruption      -0.0128** -0.0134** -0.0130** -0.0125* -0.0125* 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
           
Observations 5,022 5,022 5,022 5,022 5,022 6,769 6,769 6,769 6,769 6,769 
R2 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 
Nr. of affiliates 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
 
Total debt ratio 
Table E8: Subsample of the main and extended sample, including only countries that had a 
rule during 1996-2004 in the main subsample and 1994-2006 in the extended subsample 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 Main subsample Extended subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
STR -0.1907** -0.2823* -0.1971** -0.9643* -0.9643* -0.1052 -0.0789 -0.1052 -0.9192 -0.9192 
 (0.075) (0.153) (0.079) (0.519) (0.519) (0.072) (0.148) (0.071) (0.576) (0.576) 
TIGHT  -0.1049  -0.9857 -0.1920  0.0344  -1.0666 -0.0342 
  (0.130)  (0.647) (0.133)  (0.134)  (0.746) (0.137) 
STR x TIGHT    -0.1789 2.4494 2.4494   0.2351 3.1864 3.1864 
   (0.377) (1.825) (1.825)   (0.395) (2.155) (2.155) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0541*** 0.0540*** 0.0540*** 0.0541*** 0.0541*** 0.0584*** 0.0584*** 0.0584*** 0.0585*** 0.0585*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0006 0.0001 0.0002 0.0023 0.0023 0.0128 0.0126 0.0125 0.0155 0.0155 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0217*** 0.0216*** 0.0217*** 0.0216*** 0.0216*** 0.0270*** 0.0270*** 0.0270*** 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0872** -0.0870** -0.0871** -0.0866** -0.0866** -0.0607** -0.0608** -0.0608** -0.0605** -0.0605** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Ln(Inflation)      0.0114** 0.0114** 0.0113** 0.0120*** 0.0120*** 
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Corruption      -0.0079 -0.0080 -0.0078 -0.0060 -0.0060 
      (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
           
Observations 3,974 3,974 3,974 3,974 3,974 5,296 5,296 5,296 5,296 5,296 
R2 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.093 0.093 
Nr. of affiliates 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
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Subsample: Implemented Rule  
Extended sample – Parent debt ratio 
Table E9: Subsample of the extended sample, including observations for 1994-2006, but 
only from countries that implemented a rule during 1995-2006 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.2950***  0.2966*** 0.3106*** 0.3113** 0.3113** 0.3020*** 0.3202*** 0.3065** 0.3065** 
 (0.111)  (0.107) (0.110) (0.120) (0.120) (0.107) (0.110) (0.119) (0.119) 
TCR  -0.0168 -0.0171  0.0010 -0.0185     
  (0.013) (0.012)  (0.041) (0.014)     
TIGHT       -0.1066*  -0.0826 -0.1079* 
       (0.055)  (0.181) (0.058) 
STR x TCR    -0.0572 -0.0605 -0.0605     
    (0.042) (0.141) (0.141)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.3274* -0.0783 -0.0783 
        (0.180) (0.602) (0.602) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0256*** 0.0250*** 0.0254*** 0.0255*** 0.0255*** 0.0255*** 0.0252*** 0.0253*** 0.0252*** 0.0252*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0006 0.0132 0.0021 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0007 0.0025 0.0012 0.0012 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0044 0.0041 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0044 0.0043 0.0044 0.0044 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0185 -0.0164 -0.0170 -0.0165 -0.0164 -0.0164 -0.0168 -0.0161 -0.0166 -0.0166 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0049 0.0046 0.0051 0.0051 0.0051 0.0051 0.0053 0.0051 0.0052 0.0052 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Corruption 0.0058 0.0022 0.0052 0.0055 0.0055 0.0055 0.0053 0.0057 0.0054 0.0054 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
           
Observations 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 
R2 0.118 0.116 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 
Nr. of affiliates 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
 
Main sample – Total debt ratio 
Table E10: Subsample of the main sample, including observations for 1999-2004, but only 
from countries that implemented a rule during 2000-2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt 
STR 0.6800  0.5630 0.8080 0.8738 0.8738 0.5947 0.8369 0.9660 0.9660 
 (0.876)  (0.694) (0.612) (0.600) (0.600) (0.756) (0.661) (0.641) (0.641) 
TCR  -0.1637** -0.1611**  0.0507 -0.2048***     
  (0.070) (0.066)  (0.116) (0.061)     
TIGHT       -0.6931*  0.5079 -1.1530*** 
       (0.378)  (0.585) (0.385) 
STR x TCR    -0.6426*** -0.7885* -0.7885*     
    (0.183) (0.384) (0.384)     
STR x TIGHT        -3.6003*** -5.1261** -5.1261** 
        (1.197) (2.143) (2.143) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0451 0.0341 0.0341 0.0439* 0.0471* 0.0471* 0.0347 0.0420* 0.0484* 0.0484* 
 (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0022 -0.0473 -0.0829 -0.0783 -0.0699 -0.0699 -0.0724 -0.0895 -0.0737 -0.0737 
 (0.116) (0.102) (0.125) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.133) (0.120) (0.118) (0.118) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0015 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0044 -0.0054 -0.0054 0.0020 -0.0029 -0.0052 -0.0052 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Asset tangibility  0.1618 0.1298 0.1252 0.1167 0.1179 0.1179 0.1359 0.1204 0.1218 0.1218 
 (0.108) (0.104) (0.102) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
           
Observations 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 
R2 0.120 0.160 0.163 0.185 0.186 0.186 0.145 0.172 0.176 0.176 
Nr. of affiliates 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
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Extended sample – Total debt ratio 
Table E11: Subsample of the extended sample, including observations for 1999-2006, but 
only from countries that implemented a rule during 2000-2006 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.4385  0.2995 0.3587 0.3662 0.3662 0.3820 0.3946 0.4169 0.4169 
 (0.299)  (0.287) (0.292) (0.291) (0.291) (0.297) (0.300) (0.298) (0.298) 
TCR  -0.0715** -0.0646**  0.0063 -0.0824**     
  (0.033) (0.032)  (0.050) (0.039)     
TIGHT       -0.1809  0.1510 -0.3050 
       (0.135)  (0.272) (0.205) 
STR x TCR    -0.2545** -0.2739 -0.2739     
    (0.120) (0.210) (0.210)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.8985 -1.4071 -1.4071 
        (0.608) (1.243) (1.243) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0453** 0.0436** 0.0435** 0.0450** 0.0452** 0.0452** 0.0441** 0.0448** 0.0456** 0.0456** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0463 -0.0512 -0.0549 -0.0369 -0.0353 -0.0353 -0.0532 -0.0408 -0.0320 -0.0320 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.055) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0040 0.0032 0.0031 0.0021 0.0020 0.0020 0.0033 0.0024 0.0020 0.0020 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0265 -0.0363 -0.0383 -0.0365 -0.0361 -0.0361 -0.0324 -0.0323 -0.0306 -0.0306 
 (0.096) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0012 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Corruption 0.0879** 0.0627* 0.0752* 0.0633 0.0627 0.0627 0.0821** 0.0719* 0.0677 0.0677 
 (0.040) (0.036) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
           
Observations 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
R2 0.091 0.098 0.100 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.094 0.096 0.096 0.096 
Nr. of affiliates 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
 
Table E12: Extension of regression (8) in Table 11, Table 12, Table E10 and Table E11. 
TIGHT is split based on the definition of the safe haven ratio; ratios defined in terms of total 
debt-to-equity and related party debt-to-equity 
Implemented rule      
 Parent debt  Total debt  
 Main sample Extended sample  Main sample Extended sample 
STR 0.4142*** 0.3221***  0.9048 0.4715* 
 (0.125) (0.119)  (0.605) (0.283) 
STR x TIGHT  -0.8316*** -0.4656**  -1.2271 -1.9723*** 
  (total debt) (0.299) (0.232)  (1.759) (0.632) 
STR x TIGHT -0.5867 -0.3489  -3.8334*** -0.3598 
  (related party debt) (0.621) (0.260)  (1.199) (0.744) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0429*** 0.0303***  0.0524* 0.0423** 
 (0.011) (0.008)  (0.028) (0.020) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0142 0.0254  -0.0393 -0.0699 
 (0.029) (0.019)  (0.115) (0.054) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0074 0.0072*  -0.0069 0.0040 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.019) (0.012) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0214 -0.0091  0.1223 -0.0237 
 (0.032) (0.025)  (0.100) (0.091) 
Ln(Inflation)  0.0004   -0.0024 
  (0.004)   (0.007) 
Corruption  0.0031   0.0886** 
  (0.009)   (0.044) 
      
Observations 1,598 2,662  347 678 
R2 0.120 0.124  0.184 0.104 
Nr. of affiliates 442 616  108 186 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes  yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes  yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
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Appendix F 
Subsamples Based on Quintiles of Debt 
Extended sample - Parent debt ratio 
Table F1: Extended sample for quintile 5 of parent debt ratio 
 Dependent variable: Parent debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.4150***  0.3729*** 0.4339*** 0.5166*** 0.5166*** 0.3446*** 0.4001*** 0.3941** 0.3941** 
 (0.127)  (0.127) (0.124) (0.166) (0.166) (0.133) (0.126) (0.177) (0.177) 
TCR  -0.0399** -0.0295*  0.0424 -0.0319**     
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.061) (0.016)     
TIGHT       -0.1132  -0.0120 -0.1143* 
       (0.069)  (0.263) (0.068) 
STR x TCR    -0.1056** -0.2294 -0.2294     
    (0.048) (0.181) (0.181)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.3501* -0.3158 -0.3158 
        (0.198) (0.760) (0.760) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0544*** 0.0550*** 0.0538*** 0.0540*** 0.0542*** 0.0542*** 0.0538*** 0.0539*** 0.0539*** 0.0539*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0367* -0.0383* -0.0406** -0.0406** -0.0395** -0.0395** -0.0398** -0.0398* -0.0398** -0.0398** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Ln(Revenue) -0.0077 -0.0080* -0.0075 -0.0075 -0.0076 -0.0076 -0.0076 -0.0076 -0.0076 -0.0076 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0763** -0.0761** -0.0759** -0.0762** -0.0765** -0.0765** -0.0755** -0.0758** -0.0758** -0.0758** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0090*** 0.0083*** 0.0090*** 0.0088*** 0.0086*** 0.0086*** 0.0090*** 0.0088*** 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.0331*** -0.0302*** -0.0324*** -0.0317*** -0.0310*** -0.0310*** -0.0331*** -0.0326*** -0.0327*** -0.0327*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
           
Observations 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
R2 0.115 0.113 0.116 0.116 0.117 0.117 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 
Nr. of affiliates 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
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Extended sample - Total debt ratio 
Table F2: Extended sample for quintile 5 of total debt ratio 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.1028**  0.0976** 0.1179** 0.0811 0.0811 0.0922* 0.1007** 0.0856 0.0856 
 (0.050)  (0.049) (0.052) (0.081) (0.081) (0.056) (0.050) (0.082) (0.082) 
TCR  -0.0108 -0.0094  -0.0163 -0.0094     
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.028) (0.008)     
TIGHT       -0.0135  -0.0249 -0.0125 
       (0.036)  (0.105) (0.036) 
STR x TCR    -0.0250 0.0210 0.0210     
    (0.023) (0.084) (0.084)     
STR x TIGHT        -0.0347 0.0383 0.0383 
        (0.110) (0.321) (0.321) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0079*** 0.0081*** 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 0.0079*** 0.0079*** 0.0079*** 0.0079*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0200** 0.0190** 0.0200** 0.0201** 0.0199** 0.0199** 0.0200** 0.0200** 0.0199** 0.0199** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(Revenue) -0.0034** -0.0037** -0.0035** -0.0035** -0.0035** -0.0035** -0.0034** -0.0034** -0.0034** -0.0034** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0115 -0.0120 -0.0115 -0.0116 -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0115 -0.0113 -0.0113 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.0025* -0.0025* -0.0024 -0.0024* -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0025* -0.0025* -0.0025* -0.0025* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Corruption 0.0018 0.0017 0.0013 0.0014 0.0013 0.0013 0.0016 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
           
Observations 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 
R2 0.085 0.083 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 
Nr. of affiliates 954 954 954 954 954 954 954 954 954 954 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
 
Table F3: Extended subsample of quintile 4 and 5 of total debt ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt 
STR 0.1355***  0.1348*** 0.1398*** 0.1772*** 0.1772*** 0.1747*** 0.1443*** 0.1696*** 0.1696*** 
 (0.043)  (0.042) (0.046) (0.061) (0.061) (0.047) (0.042) (0.062) (0.062) 
TCR  -0.0036 -0.0009  0.0156 -0.0015     
  (0.009) (0.008)  (0.022) (0.008)     
TIGHT       0.0499  0.0412 0.0508 
       (0.035)  (0.091) (0.038) 
STR x TCR    -0.0075 -0.0526 -0.0526     
    (0.026) (0.066) (0.066)     
STR x TIGHT        0.1507 0.0295 0.0295 
        (0.121) (0.317) (0.317) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0274*** 0.0275*** 0.0274*** 0.0275*** 0.0275*** 0.0275*** 0.0273*** 0.0273*** 0.0273*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0055 -0.0059 -0.0055 -0.0055 -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0056 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(Revenue) -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0052 -0.0055 -0.0052 -0.0053 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0054 -0.0051 -0.0053 -0.0053 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.0069 -0.0068 -0.0069 -0.0070 -0.0069 -0.0069 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0061 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
           
Observations 3,844 3,844 3,844 3,844 3,844 3,844 3,844 3,844 3,844 3,844 
R2 0.084 0.081 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 
Nr. of affiliates 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
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Table F4: Extended sample, excluding countries with constant tax rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt Total debt 
STR 0.0148  0.0228 0.0180 0.2984* 0.2984* 0.1039 0.0194 0.2682* 0.2682* 
 (0.088)  (0.088) (0.107) (0.155) (0.155) (0.099) (0.087) (0.148) (0.148) 
TCR  0.0167 0.0170  0.1244*** 0.0009     
  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.043) (0.024)     
TIGHT       0.1486*  0.4571** 0.0773 
       (0.077)  (0.189) (0.093) 
STR x TCR    -0.0055 -0.3810** -0.3810**     
    (0.073) (0.152) (0.152)     
STR x TIGHT        0.2606 -1.1720* -1.1720* 
        (0.283) (0.686) (0.686) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0582*** 0.0582*** 0.0582*** 0.0582*** 0.0586*** 0.0586*** 0.0583*** 0.0582*** 0.0584*** 0.0584*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Lending rate) 0.0091 0.0101 0.0101 0.0090 0.0132 0.0132 0.0101 0.0093 0.0116 0.0116 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0252*** 0.0252*** 0.0250*** 0.0250*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0605*** -0.0599** -0.0599*** -0.0606*** -0.0601*** -0.0601*** -0.0599** -0.0601*** -0.0602** -0.0602** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0030 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 0.0027 0.0027 0.0029 0.0030 0.0027 0.0027 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.0091 -0.0089 -0.0089 -0.0091 -0.0058 -0.0058 -0.0075 -0.0087 -0.0061 -0.0061 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
           
Observations 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 
R2 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.081 0.081 
Nr. of affiliates 2,090 2,090 2,090 2,090 2,090 2,090 2,090 2,090 2,090 2,090 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
Excluding Sweden, the USA and the UK  
Main sample – Parent debt ratio 
Table F5: Main sample, excluding observations from Sweden, the USA and the UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Parent debt Parent debt Parent debt Parent debt Parent debt Parent debt Parent debt Parent debt Parent debt Parent debt 
STR 0.0450  0.0451 0.0419 0.2264** 0.2264** 0.0783 0.0443 0.2424** 0.2424** 
 (0.056)  (0.056) (0.061) (0.110) (0.110) (0.063) (0.056) (0.113) (0.113) 
TCR  0.0090 0.0090  0.0928** 0.0084     
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.041) (0.011)     
TIGHT       0.0658  0.3706** 0.0462 
       (0.050)  (0.157) (0.052) 
STR x TCR    0.0044 -0.2605** -0.2605**     
    (0.031) (0.118) (0.118)     
STR x TIGHT        0.0730 -1.0011** -1.0011** 
        (0.153) (0.475) (0.475) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0256*** 0.0256*** 0.0256*** 0.0256*** 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 0.0257*** 0.0256*** 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0278** -0.0271** -0.0273** -0.0276** -0.0327** -0.0327** -0.0276** -0.0273** -0.0334** -0.0334** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0075*** 0.0076*** 0.0076*** 0.0075*** 0.0075*** 0.0075*** 0.0076*** 0.0076*** 0.0075*** 0.0075*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility  0.0054 0.0053 0.0052 0.0054 0.0052 0.0052 0.0048 0.0052 0.0050 0.0050 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
           
Observations 5,547 5,547 5,547 5,547 5,547 5,547 5,547 5,547 5,547 5,547 
R2 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.065 0.065 
Nr. of affiliates 1,470 1,470 1,470 1,470 1,470 1,470 1,470 1,470 1,470 1,470 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
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Table F6: Extended sample, including only affiliates that are majority owned 
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.1116  0.1334 0.1051 0.5121*** 0.5121*** 0.1931 0.1130 0.4533** 0.4533** 
 (0.109)  (0.107) (0.123) (0.183) (0.183) (0.126) (0.110) (0.177) (0.177) 
TCR  0.0265 0.0291  0.1787*** 0.0034     
  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.053) (0.023)     
TIGHT       0.1438  0.6342*** 0.0286 
       (0.090)  (0.228) (0.102) 
STR x TCR    0.0131 -0.5410*** -0.5410***     
    (0.074) (0.175) (0.175)     
STR x TIGHT        0.1419 -1.8688** -1.8688** 
        (0.316) (0.787) (0.787) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0582*** 0.0584*** 0.0581*** 0.0582*** 0.0590*** 0.0590*** 0.0583*** 0.0582*** 0.0587*** 0.0587*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0064 -0.0041 -0.0048 -0.0063 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0051 -0.0063 -0.0024 -0.0024 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0229*** 0.0228*** 0.0229*** 0.0229*** 0.0225*** 0.0225*** 0.0229*** 0.0230*** 0.0227*** 0.0227*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0424* -0.0411* -0.0414* -0.0423* -0.0417* -0.0417* -0.0421* -0.0423* -0.0420* -0.0420* 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0035 0.0033 0.0035 0.0035 0.0033 0.0033 0.0035 0.0035 0.0033 0.0033 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption -0.0224** -0.0228** -0.0222** -0.0225** -0.0191** -0.0191** -0.0210** -0.0222** -0.0196** -0.0196** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
           
Observations 6,358 6,358 6,358 6,358 6,358 6,358 6,358 6,358 6,358 6,358 
R2 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.095 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.095 
Nr. of affiliates 1,778 1,778 1,778 1,778 1,778 1,778 1,778 1,778 1,778 1,778 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample.  
 
Excluding Affiliates that are not 100% Directly Owned 
Extended sample – Total debt ratio 
Table F7: Extended sample, including only affiliates that are 100% directly owned  
 Dependent variable: Total debt ratio      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
STR 0.0452  0.0859 0.0195 0.7450*** 0.7450*** 0.2171 0.0530 0.6928*** 0.6928*** 
 (0.141)  (0.140) (0.154) (0.219) (0.219) (0.162) (0.142) (0.219) (0.219) 
TCR  0.0527** 0.0545**  0.3044*** 0.0129     
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.065) (0.025)     
TIGHT       0.2737**  1.1394*** 0.0859 
       (0.110)  (0.287) (0.113) 
STR x TCR    0.0489 -0.8997*** -0.8997***     
    (0.082) (0.209) (0.209)     
STR x TIGHT        0.3743 -3.2512*** -3.2512*** 
        (0.360) (0.953) (0.953) 
Loss Carryforward 0.0632*** 0.0636*** 0.0634*** 0.0632*** 0.0648*** 0.0648*** 0.0636*** 0.0632*** 0.0644*** 0.0644*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln(Lending rate) -0.0129 -0.0096 -0.0099 -0.0125 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0106 -0.0125 -0.0071 -0.0071 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0234*** 0.0234*** 0.0240*** 0.0240*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset tangibility  -0.0475** -0.0455* -0.0457* -0.0470* -0.0469* -0.0469* -0.0470* -0.0472* -0.0478** -0.0478** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.0065** 0.0062** 0.0063** 0.0065** 0.0060* 0.0060* 0.0064** 0.0065** 0.0061* 0.0061* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption -0.0244** -0.0246** -0.0241** -0.0245** -0.0200* -0.0200* -0.0218* -0.0236** -0.0202* -0.0202* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
           
Observations 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 
R2 0.079 0.080 0.081 0.079 0.086 0.086 0.081 0.079 0.084 0.084 
Nr. of affiliates 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 
Parent Fixed Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year & Affiliate FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (6) 
and (10) rerun the regressions in column (5) and (9), respectively, where STR is measured as the difference from the sample 
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Appendix H 
STATA Do-File for the Base Regressions 
clear  
cd "C:\Data" 
set more off 
ssc instal egenmore 
 
use utloppgaven_1990_2005_avid.dta 
rename frtk_id parent_id 
rename objektnr fa_id 
rename aar yr 
rename sektor sector 
rename land country 
rename landkode country_code 
rename hakt activity_fa 
rename eanddir dir_own 
rename eandind indir_own 
rename lang_fordring lt_parentdebt 
rename kort_fordring st_parentdebt 
rename lang_gjeld lt_debt_fromfa 
rename kort_gjeld st_debt_fromfa 
rename driftsinntekter revenue 
rename driftskostnader expenses 
rename res_av_fin_poster netfinancial_result 
rename res_etter_fin_poster profit_less_finresult 
rename res_foer_skatt profit_before_tax 
rename skatt tax_paid 
rename overskudd profit 
rename sum_anleggsmidler fixed_assets 
label variable fixed_assets "Fixed assets in affiliate" 
rename sum_omloepsmidler current_assets 
rename debt_s tot_st_debt 
rename debt_l tot_lt_debt 
rename egenkapital equity_capital 
save utloppgaven_1990_2005_changed, replace 
 
clear 
use utloppgaven_2006_avid.dta 
rename frtk_id parent_id 
rename objektnr fa_id 
rename aar yr 
rename bransje business 
rename landnavn country 
rename landkode country_code 
rename land country_abbr 
rename hakt activity_fa 
rename eanddir dir_own 
rename eandind indir_own 
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rename langford lt_parentdebt 
rename kortford st_parentdebt 
rename langgjeld lt_debt_fromfa 
rename kortgjeld st_debt_fromfa 
rename bdrinnt revenue 
rename drkostn expenses 
rename resefin netfinancial_result 
rename resbetsk profit_before_tax 
rename skatter tax_paid 
rename oversk profit 
rename sumanl fixed_assets 
label variable fixed_assets "Fixed assets in affiliate" 
rename sumoml current_assets 
rename kort_gjeld tot_st_debt 
rename lang_gjeld tot_lt_debt 
rename ek equity_capital 
save utloppgaven_2006_changed, replace 
 
clear 
use utloppgaven_1990_2005_changed 
append using utloppgaven_2006_changed   
save Merged_data set_1990_2006, replace 
 
clear  
import excel "C:\Data\Exceldata\Dashboard.xlsx", sheet("Dashboard") firstrow 
merge m:m country_code yr using Merged_data set_1990_2006, keep(match using) 
drop _merge 
save Merged_data set_1990_2006_control_variables, replace 
erase Merged_data set_1990_2006.dta 
 
* Extract annual firm information 
forvalues i=1994/2006 { 
        clear 
        display `i' 
        use "Q:\Kunnskapsøkonomien\Sifon\sifon`i'_avid" 
                if `i'<2001 { 
                keep frtk_ID aar totutla2 stutla2 stutland2 sifon_kons_ID  
                rename frtk_ID parent_id 
                rename aar yr 
                rename totutla2 total_foreign_own_percent 
                rename stutla2 largest_foreign_own_percent 
                rename stutland2 countrycode_largest_foreign_own 
                rename sifon_kons_ID MNC_parent 
                } 
                if `i'>=2001 { 
                keep frtk_id aargang storste_utenlandsk_eierandel storst_utenlandsk_eier_landkode  
> kons_id 
                destring(aargang), gen(yr) 
                rename frtk_id parent_id 
                rename storste_utenlandsk_eierandel largest_foreign_own_percent 
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                rename storst_utenlandsk_eier_landkode letters_largest_foreign_own 
                rename kons_id MNC_parent 
                } 
        save "C:\Data\temp`i'", replace 
        } 
 
 * Append the temporary files to a panel 
 use "C:\Data\temp1994" 
        forvalues i=1995/2006 { 
        display `i' 
        append using "C:\Data\temp`i'" 
        erase "C:\Data\temp`i'.dta" 
        } 
sort parent_id yr 
save parent_ownership_data, replace 
erase "C:\Data\temp1994.dta" 
 
* Extract annual unconsolidated accounts information for parent 
forvalues i=1994/2006 { 
        clear 
        display `i' 
                if `i'<=2006 { 
                use "Q:\Kunnskapsøkonomien\Regnskap 1992-2012\rskap_sel_`i'_0411_avid" 
                } 
                keep frtk_id aar totinn lonnsos resfs sumeiend gjeld driftsrs 
                rename frtk_id parent_id 
                rename aar yr 
                rename totinn parent_income 
                rename lonnsos parent_wage_expense 
                rename resfs parent_result_before_tax 
                rename sumeiend parent_assets 
                rename gjeld debt_in_parent 
                rename driftsrs parent_EBITDA 
                save "C:\Data\temp`i'.dta", replace 
        } 
 
* Append the temporary files to a panel 
use "C:\Data\temp1994.dta" 
        forvalues i=1995/2006 { 
        display `i' 
        append using "C:\Data\temp`i'.dta" 
        erase temp`i'.dta 
        } 
sort parent_id yr 
compress 
save parent_finance_data, replace 
erase "C:\Data\temp1994.dta" 
 
* Merge firm information to the accounts information 
merge 1:1 parent_id yr using parent_ownership_data, keep(match using) 
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tab _merge 
drop _merge 
 
* Save the final data set 
sort parent_id yr  
save parent_data, replace 
erase parent_ownership_data.dta 
erase parent_finance_data.dta 
 
merge m:m parent_id yr using Merged_data set_1990_2006_control_variables, keep(match using) 
drop _merge 
save Merged_data set_with_parentdata, replace 
erase Merged_data set_1990_2006_control_variables.dta 
 
clear  
import excel "C:\Data\Exceldata\Taxrates.xlsx", sheet("Dashboard") firstrow 
drop countryName 
merge m:m iso3code country_code yr using Merged_data set_with_parentdata, keep(match using) 
drop _merge  
save Merged_data set_1990_2006_STRs, replace 
erase Merged_data set_with_parentdata.dta 
 
clear 
import excel "C:\Data\Exceldata\TC rules.xlsx", sheet("Data") firstrow 
label variable debt_rule "0 = no rule, 1 = total debt, 2 = related party debt" 
gen tight = 1-debt_ratio 
merge m:m country_code iso3code yr using Merged_data set_1990_2006_STRs, keep(match using) 
drop _merge 
save Merged_data set_1990_2006_full, replace 
erase Merged_data set_1990_2006_STRs.dta 
 
* Generating variables 
gen tot_debt = tot_st_debt + tot_lt_debt 
gen tot_capital = tot_debt + equity_capital 
gen tot_assets = fixed_assets + current_assets 
gen tot_debt_ratio = tot_debt/tot_assets 
gen tot_own = dir_own + indir_own 
gen tot_parentdebt = lt_parentdebt + st_parentdebt 
gen fixed_assets_ratio = fixed_assets/tot_assets 
gen parent_debt_ratio = tot_parentdebt/tot_assets 
 
label variable tot_debt "Total debt in fa" 
label variable tot_capital "Total capital in fa" 
label variable tot_own "Total parent ownership in fa" 
label variable tot_debt_ratio "Total debt divided by total assets in fa" 
label variable tot_assets "Total assets in fa" 
label variable tot_parentdebt "Total gross parent debt in fa" 
label variable fixed_assets_ratio "Fixed assets ratio in fa" 
label variable parent_debt_ratio "Total parent debt divided by total assets in fa" 
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save merged_data set_1990_2006_preparedvariables, replace 
erase Merged_data set_1990_2006_full.dta 
 
******* Preparing data set ********************************************************** 
clear  
use merged_data set_1990_2006_preparedvariables 
 
* 2. Remove pure duplicates 
bysort fa_id parent_id yr: gen duplic = _n 
drop if duplic>1 
 
* 3. Remove minority owned firms and observations 
keep if tot_own > 50 
replace tot_own=100 if tot_own > 100 
 
* 4. Remove duplicates on fa-year level and fa's changing country 
bysort fa_id yr: gen duplic2 = _N 
drop if duplic2>1  
bysort fa_id: gen affiliate_change_country = 1 if iso3code[_n]!=iso3code[_n-1] & _n>1 
bysort fa_id: egen fa_changed_country = mean(affiliate_change_country) 
drop if fa_changed_country!=.  
 
**** Creating some regression variables before data calibration ********** 
 
* Loss carryforward 5 years 
bysort fa_id: gen loss_carryforward = 0  
bysort fa_id: replace loss_carryforward = 1 if profit[_n]<0 & profit[_n+1]<0 & profit[_n+2]<0 & _n==1 
bysort fa_id: replace loss_carryforward = 1 if profit[_n-1]<0 & profit[_n-1]!=. 
bysort fa_id: replace loss_carryforward = 1 if (profit[_n-1]+profit[_n])<0 
bysort fa_id: replace loss_carryforward = 1 if (profit[_n-2]+profit[_n-1]+profit[_n])<0 
bysort fa_id: replace loss_carryforward = 1 if (profit[_n-3]+profit[_n-2]+profit[_n-1]+profit[_n])< 0 
bysort fa_id: replace loss_carryforward = 1 if (profit[_n-4]+profit[_n-3]+profit[_n-2]+profit[_n-1] 
> +profit[_n])<0 
bysort fa_id: replace loss_carryforward = 1 if (profit[_n-5]+profit[_n-4]+profit[_n-3]+profit[_n-2] 
> +profit[_n-1]+profit[_n])<0 
 
* Indicators for likely errors in revenue 
bysort fa_id: gen too_small_rev=1 if revenue[_n]*900<revenue[_n-1] & revenue[_n]*900<revenue[_n+1]  
> & revenue[_n+1]!=. & revenue[_n-1]!=. & revenue[_n]>0 
bysort fa_id: gen too_large_rev=1 if revenue[_n]>900*revenue[_n-1] & revenue[_n]>900*revenue[_n+1]  
> & revenue[_n]!=. & revenue[_n-1]>0 & revenue[_n+1]>0 
 
bysort fa_id: egen median_nace = median(nace) 
 
save data set, replace 
 
********* Remove errors or missing values in data set* 
******************************************** 
* 5. Remove nonsensical values 
drop if fixed_assets<0 
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drop if current_assets<0 
drop if st_parentdebt<0 
drop if lt_parentdebt<0 
drop if lt_debt_fromfa<0 
drop if st_debt_fromfa<0 
drop if tot_st_debt<0 
drop if tot_lt_debt<0 
drop if revenue<0 
 
* 6. Remove obs with missing values in both the relevant variables  
drop if parent_debt_ratio==. & tot_debt_ratio==. 
 
* 7. Remove if obserations before 1994 
drop if yr<1994 
 
********* Calibrating the data set ******************************************************** 
* 8. Remove obs with equity<0 
drop if equity_capital<0 
 
* 9. Remove financial service providers  
drop if median_nace>65000 & median_nace<=67200 | median_nace==. 
gen financial_obs = 1 if nace>=65000 & nace<=67200 
bysort fa_id: egen financial_fa = mean(financial_obs) 
drop if financial_fa!=. 
  
* 10. Remove affiliates not part of a Norwegian MNC 
drop if largest_foreign_own_percent>50 & largest_foreign_own_percent!=. 
 
* 11. Remove obs with extreme changes in revenue 
drop if too_small_rev==1 | too_large_rev==1 
 
* 12. Remove obs where revenue is zero 
drop if revenue==0  
 
* 13. Remove obs where parent debt exceeds total debt 
replace parent_debt_ratio = . if tot_debt*1.05<tot_parentdebt & tot_parentdebt!=. 
 
* 14. Remove obs where total or parent debt ratio is above 1 
replace tot_debt_ratio =. if tot_debt_ratio>1.01 & tot_debt_ratio!=.  
replace tot_debt_ratio=1 if tot_debt_ratio>1 & tot_debt_ratio<1.01  
replace parent_debt_ratio = . if parent_debt_ratio>1.01 & parent_debt_ratio!=.  
replace parent_debt_ratio=1 if parent_debt_ratio>1 & parent_debt_ratio<1.01  
drop if parent_debt_ratio==. & tot_debt_ratio==. 
 
* 15. Remove obs without TC info or control-variables 
drop if missing(debt_ratio)  
drop if lendingrate==.  
drop if revenue==. 
 
save extendedsample, replace 
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* 16. Remove countries not used in Buettner et al. (2012) 
keep if mainsample==1  
 
* 17. Remove observations not in the period 1996-2004 
drop if yr<1996 | yr>2004 
 
save mainsample, replace 
***************** Generating explanatory variables ************************************ 
clear 
use extendedsample 
gen STR_TCR = STR * TCR 
gen STR_tight = STR * tight 
gen ln_revenue = ln(revenue) 
gen ln_lendingrate = ln(lendingrate) 
gen ln_inflation = ln(inflation) 
replace ln_inflation = 0 if inflation<=0 
gen ln_corruption = ln(corruption) 
 
egen mean_tax = mean(STR) 
gen adj_STR = STR - mean_tax 
gen adj_STR_TCR = 0 
gen adj_STR_tight = 0 
replace adj_STR_tight = adj_STR * tight 
replace adj_STR_TCR = adj_STR * TCR 
 
sort yr iso3code 
gen country_yr_string = string(yr) + iso3code  
egen country_yr = group(country_yr_string) 
 
sort yr 
tab yr, gen(Dyr) 
sort parent_id 
tab parent_id, gen(Dparent)  
 
gen TCR_par = 0  
gen TCR_tot = 0 
replace TCR_par = 1 if debt_rule==2 
replace TCR_tot = 1 if debt_rule==1 
gen tight_par = 0 
gen tight_tot = 0 
replace tight_par = tight if debt_rule==2 
replace tight_tot = tight if debt_rule==1 
 
***************************************************************************************** 
xtset fa_id yr  
 
*For Main sample: 
* 1.1 regression: Parent debt ratio 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
  
113 
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax11 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax12 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax13 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax14 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR TCR STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate  
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax15 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio adj_STR TCR adj_STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate 
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax16 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax17 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue 
>  fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax18 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR tight STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate 
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax19 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio adj_STR tight adj_STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate 
>  ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax110 
 
* 1.2 regression: Total debt ratio 
*For Extended sample: 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate fixed_assets 
> _ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot11 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate fixed_assets 
> _ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot12 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot13 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot14 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR TCR STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue 
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot15 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio adj_STR TCR adj_STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate  
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot16 
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qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate fixed_ 
> assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot17 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue  
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot18 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR tight STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue 
> fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot19 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio adj_STR tight adj_STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate 
>  ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio if mainsample==1 & yr>1995 & yr<2005, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot110 
 
* 2.1 regression: Parent debt ratio 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax21 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax22 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax23 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax24 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR TCR STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate  
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax25 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio adj_STR TCR adj_STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate 
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax26 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax27 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue 
>  fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax28 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio STR tight STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate  
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax29 
qui xtreg parent_debt_ratio adj_STR tight adj_STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate 
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store tax210 
 
*2.2 regression: Total debt ratio 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate fixed_assets 
> _ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot21 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate fixed_assets 
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> _ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot22 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot23 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate  
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot24 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR TCR STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue 
>  fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot25 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio adj_STR TCR adj_STR_TCR Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate 
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot26 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_revenue ln_lendingrate 
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot27 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue 
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot28 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio STR tight STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate   
> ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot29 
qui xtreg tot_debt_ratio adj_STR tight adj_STR_tight Dyr* Dparent* loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate 
>  ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption, fe ro cluster(country_yr) nonest 
est store taxTot210 
 
* Regression outputs 
outreg2 [tax11 tax12 tax13 tax14 tax15 tax16 tax17 tax18 tax19 tax110] using tableMainParent.rtf,  
> r2 se replace ctitle(Parent debt) bdec(4) keep(STR STR_TCR TCR tight STR_tight loss_carryforward 
>  ln_lendingrate ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio) sortvar(STR TCR tight STR_TCR STR_tight loss_car 
> ryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio) addtext(Year & Affiliate FE, yes, Parent  
> Fixed Effects, yes) 
outreg2 [taxTot11 taxTot12 taxTot13 taxTot14 taxTot15 taxTot16 taxTot17 taxTot18 taxTot19 taxTot110 
> ] using tableMainTotal.rtf, r2 se replace ctitle(Total debt) bdec(4) keep(STR STR_TCR TCR tight 
>  STR_tight loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio) sortvar(STR TCR tight 
>  STR_TCR STR_tight loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio) addtext(Year  
> & Affiliate FE, yes, Parent Fixed Effects, yes)  
outreg2 [tax21 tax22 tax23 tax24 tax25 tax26 tax27 tax28 tax29 tax210] using tableExtendedParent.rtf, 
> r2 se replace ctitle(Parent debt) bdec(4) keep(STR STR_TCR TCR tight STR_tight loss_carryforward 
> ln_lendingrate ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption) sortvar(STR TCR tight 
>  STR_TCR STR_tight loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation  
>  corruption) addtext(Year & Affiliate FE, yes, Parent Fixed Effects, yes) 
outreg2 [taxTot21 taxTot22 taxTot23 taxTot24 taxTot25 taxTot26 taxTot27 taxTot28 taxTot29 taxTot210 
> ] using tableExtendedTotal.rtf, r2 se replace ctitle(Total debt) bdec(4) keep(STR STR_TCR TCR  
> tight STR_tight loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation 
> corruption) sortvar(STR TCR tight STR_TCR STR_tight loss_carryforward ln_lendingrate ln_revenue 
> fixed_assets_ratio ln_inflation corruption) addtext(Year & Affiliate FE, yes, Parent Fixed Effects, yes) 
